

THE MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY

[Faint handwritten text and a signature]

CHECKED



ALLAMA IQBAL LIBRARY




18673

COPYRIGHT

956.1

2.96270

MR4



STOR

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, EDINBURGH

PREFACE

THIS book is not a history of Turkey ; its object is the much more restricted one of seeking to describe the nature of the Turkish State under the Ottoman Sultans, its nature to-day, and the causes (and to some extent the manner) of the transition. Had I attempted anything in the way of a comprehensive history, however succinct, had I not also firmly resisted the temptation to digress into the many by-paths, digression into which would have been easy, the volume would not only have become unduly long but would, I venture to think, have lost its point.

The book is a product of a study of Turkish conditions which began with my first visit to Turkey in 1904 and has continued ever since. I have been fortunate in the opportunities, unofficial and official, which have come my way for the prosecution of that study. Apart from journeys privately undertaken in the Near and Middle East from 1904 onwards, I have had the good fortune to see much official service in past and present provinces of Turkey, on both sides of the Bosphorus, at both ends of the Black Sea, in more than one Mediterranean island. I was a Government officer in Cyprus when Cyprus was under Ottoman suzerainty and after it became a British Crown Colony ; indeed, it fell to my lot to break to its Turkish notables, assembled for the betrothal ceremony of the son of one of their number in November, 1914, the news that the slender tie that still bound the island of Aphrodite to her Ottoman overlord had been severed by Turkey's entry into the War. In some of the later

chapters I have been helped by my experience as Political Officer to Admiral of the Fleet Sir John de Robeck in Constantinople during the fateful years 1919-1920. I have had considerable contact, in various capacities, with certain branches of the Orthodox Church and with most of the other Eastern Churches.

My obligation to many writers is duly recorded in the relevant pages of the book, but I should like to make special and respectful mention of the late Sir Charles Eliot's *Turkey in Europe*, one of the most brilliant studies of a country, I make bold to say, that has ever been written in any language. So far as recent events are concerned, I must not omit reference to the contemporary press, particularly to *The Times's* expert articles on Turkish affairs.

As regards the spelling of Turkish names and words, I have not used the new method of transliteration evolved by Angora, which is referred to in Chapter IX, but have preferred to retain the system prescribed by International Congresses and the Royal Geographical Society, except that, for the sake of simplification, I have omitted the inverted apostrophe which according to that system represents the letter 'ain. Nor have I referred to the President of the Turkish Republic as Kemal Atatürk, the designation assumed by him in 1934, as it seemed more logical to call him by the name, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, by which he was known during the years in which he figures in this book.

Chapter IX first appeared in the pages of the *Quarterly Review*, to whose editor I am indebted for permission to reproduce it here.

H. C. L.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I	PAGE
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AS THE HEIR OF BYZANTIUM	I
CHAPTER II	
THE FIRST BREAK WITH TRADITION: SELIM III AND MAHMUD II	20
CHAPTER III	
THE ERA OF THE TANZIMAT.	46
CHAPTER IV	
THE CHRISTIAN <i>MILLETS</i>	68
APPENDIX: <i>Berat</i> granted by Abdul Hamid II to Damianos, Patriarch of Jerusalem	103
CHAPTER V	
ISLAM IN TURKEY	107
CHAPTER VI	
YOUNG TURKS—PAN-ISLAM—YENI TURAN.	130
CHAPTER VII	
SULTAN, KHALIF, REPUBLIC: THE TRANSITION, 1918-1924.	168
CHAPTER VIII	
THE REFORM OF THE LAW	186
APPENDIX: Corresponding Ranks of the Civil, Ecclesiastical and Military Hierarchy of the Ottoman Empire	197

CONTENTS

CHAPTER IX		PAGE
THE LANGUAGE REFORM		198
CHAPTER X		
THE LAST BREAK WITH BYZANTIUM		209
GENEALOGICAL TABLES:		
I. The Later Ottoman Sultans		235
II. The Connexion between the Imperial Houses of Byzantium and Russia		236
GLOSSARY		237
INDEX		239

FRONTISPIECE

THE OLD AND THE NEW

The Khalif Abdul Mejid receiving homage on his assumption of office in 1922. In the middle stands Rafet Pasha, representing the Government of Angora.

(See p. 179)

CHAPTER I

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AS THE HEIR OF BYZANTIUM

WHEN Constantinople was seized by the Turks from the faltering hands of the Greeks, and its Christian exiles, spreading into the West, carried with them what remained of the city's manuscripts and scholarship, thus stimulating the intellectual upheaval known as the Renaissance, no similar upheaval of the prevailing ideas was provoked in the Byzantine capital by its change of masters. The Osmanlis, in establishing the seat of their Empire in the "all-corrupting yet seemingly incorruptible" Constantinople, met the fate attributed to the Roman victors of decaying Hellas, and the underlying principles upon which the Eastern Empire had been based remained unaltered under the new dispensation. The Turks had taken, indeed, the Great City, but the Great City, far from receiving the impress of the conquerors, placed its own upon them and upon their monarchs and their State. As Charlemagne, by his coronation in the Imperial Rome of the West, the most dazzling point on his horizon, attained the summit of the social no less than the political ambitions of the Frankish chief, so did Mehmed (Mohammed) the Conqueror look upon the possession of the brilliant metropolis of the Eastern Caesars as raising immeasurably the status of himself and his people in the eyes of the

world. He did not foresee that in swallowing Byzantium his Empire would be influenced for ever after by this long-coveted morsel which, as many have held, including the Turkish rulers of to-day, was to poison the swallower; he did not foresee that, although the Turk might set his architectural stamp upon his new capital, it was that capital, that embodiment of the immemorial rule of Rome, which would determine and fix the character and polity of his Empire from that day onward to the end of its history.

One of the features peculiar to the Byzantine Empire, an idiosyncrasy which distinguished it from contemporary States, was the existence in its capital of colonies of foreign cities or communities, enjoying varying but always considerable measures of autonomy. These colonies consisted of the commercial settlements of Genoa, Amalfi, Pisa, Venice, Ancona and the one French city of Narbonne, each with its warehouse (Low Latin *fundicum*, Italian *fondaco*, Turkish *funduk*) and landing-stage (Low Latin *scala*, Romaic *σκάλα*, French *échelle*, Turkish *iskele*), its court-house, church, mill, bakery, slaughter-house and bath, each under the official sent by the mother city to rule it with the title of Podestà, Consul, Bailo or Exarch. It was the policy of the Empire to attract these settlements in order to secure the support of the Western maritime States; and the Comneni and the Angeli before the establishment of the Latin Empire of Constantinople, even more the Palaeologi after the fall of that Empire and the restoration of the Greeks, encouraged them by the grant of trading privileges and by important exemptions or reductions in matters of taxation. The result was the

presence in the heart of the Empire of a group of foreign *enclaves*, to whose inhabitants the Basileus was content to allow full power to manage their religious and administrative affairs and to conduct their legal and judicial business. The most complete example of this system was the Genoese settlement, which became, as the Magnifica Comunità, a powerful and all but independent Republic and ultimately a menace to the Empire in which it was situated. The Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus, who restored Byzantine rule in Constantinople, sought to buttress his newly recovered throne and to avert possible attempts to bring back the Latins by allying himself with Genoa, the inveterate rival and foe of Venice, who had been the mainstay of the Latin Empire. So he enlarged the establishments and privileges of the Genoese, gave them additional territory in Galata at the junction of the Bosphorus and the Golden Horn, and allowed them to fortify it against the danger of attack by pirates. This new settlement, admirably situated for its purpose, formed a triangle the apex of which was the tower that is still the most conspicuous landmark in Galata; and within this triangle, with its base on deep and sheltered water, the Genoese built houses and stores of solid stone, while from its wharves their long galleys carried their merchandise to the ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. In the course of time they grew so bold as actually to forbid the Greeks, their hosts, the right to fish in the Bosphorus; and a fort which they built at its entrance made them masters of the Straits. They enlarged and raised the height of the tower and enclosed their domain within a double row of walls. They were governed by an official sent out

from Genoa each year with the title of *Potestas Juan-nuensis in Imperio Romaniae*, who was assisted by two Councils chosen by the inhabitants; and by 1453 they had become not so much a foreign quarter or suburb of a capital city as an armed and powerful equal facing Stambul in rivalry across the water. It is not surprising that the name *Jenovez* preserved for several centuries a formidable connotation in the territories of the Ottoman Empire.

Now there is, as Sir Charles Eliot has pointed out in *Turkey in Europe*, a curious lacuna in the Turkish language, which is accounted for by a similar lacuna in the Turkish brain. There is no Turkish equivalent of the word "interesting", for the reason that the Turk has not an interested mind. He accepts things, he can understand them, but he does not take an interest in them in the Western sense of the words. And so, when the Turks succeeded the Greeks in the ownership of Constantinople, they were not interested in the manner in which the subjects of Western States whom they found established there chose to conduct their internal affairs and their business operations, so long as they were peaceful and gave no trouble. The Turks were not prepared to allow them to retain their military strength and consequently dismantled the fortifications of the Magnifica Communità; otherwise, they were concerned but little with the manner in which these Franks traded and lived. This attitude was due, no doubt, to something else in addition to a lack of interest; it was due, also, to the contempt with which they looked upon these subtle, quick-witted but mostly non-martial merchants and to the indifference, and hence

the tolerance, which proceeded from that contempt.

Von Hammer enumerates, in his list of treaties concluded between the Sultans of Turkey and other nations from the time of the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, one hundred and thirty-six such instruments before he arrives at the famous treaty negotiated by the Venetian Ambassador Marco Memmo and signed by Suleiman the Magnificent in 1521. The terms of this treaty were set out in thirty chapters (Low Latin *capitula*), and it is from this method of marshalling their provisions that the acts of Oriental States granting extra-territorial privileges within their frontiers to the subjects of other States received their name of Capitulations. The Capitulations of 1521 confirmed the privileges which the Venetians had enjoyed under the Byzantines and were the first charter granted by the Turks in respect of any of the Western colonies in Constantinople. They specifically recognized the Bailo of the Venetian colony, placed his *ressortissants* under his authority and, conversely, made him responsible for them to the Porte. But they did more than this. They regulated not only the status of the Venetians resident in Constantinople but the general relations between the Sultan of Turkey and the Signory of Venice, and they constitute a document of the first diplomatic importance, since their main provisions were the prototype of the treaties which were subsequently negotiated with the principal European monarchies. France obtained her first Capitulations in 1536, England in 1580, and other countries followed; and these treaties, in addition to dealing with commerce and navigation, allowed the Powers concerned to appoint Consuls in the Ottoman dominions and gave

to these Consuls jurisdiction in civil matters over their own nationals. If the subjects of Capitulary Powers were tried on criminal charges, the trial was removed from the Qadi's Court to the Sublime Porte, and the judges who tried the case had to be assisted by a dragoman (from the Persian *terjuman*, an interpreter) of the accused's nationality. Subsequent French Capitulations secured to the French King the right to protect all Roman Catholics of non-Turkish nationality in most parts of the Ottoman Empire.

It must not be supposed that the grant of these important privileges implied concessions extorted from a feeble and reluctant Sultan by menacing and aggressive Christian Kings. In later times, certainly, as the Ottoman Empire decayed and its administration grew inefficient and dishonest, it became increasingly important to the Great Powers that their subjects should not be exposed to the delays and vagaries of Ottoman courts of law and to the venality of their judges. In this sense, therefore, the Capitulations came to involve a *diminutio capitis* of the Power that granted them, a curtailment of its sovereignty, a stigma on its administrative capacity, a perpetual declaration, so to speak, of inferiority. It was for this reason that the Young Turks sought, and the Kemalist Turks determined, to secure their abolition. But the Sultans who originally granted them took no such view of what their grant implied. They issued them in the plenitude of their power and grace in order to show their favour to a suppliant Western Prince and to relieve themselves of the irksome task, unworthy of engaging the time of their officials, of supervising the conduct and judging the disputes of unimportant

foreign Christians. It was in accordance with this order of ideas that the earlier Capitulations were held to expire on the death of the Sultan who granted them.¹

The Turk, then, in declining to assume the direct administration of certain categories of dwellers in his dominions, was acting on the example of his Byzantine predecessors as well as on his own inclination. But he extended widely both the principle and its application. The Byzantines had granted a measure of self-government, for political reasons, to groups of foreigners; the Turks not only did the same but were induced by apathy, by administrative convenience, as well as by a skilful application of the principle *divide et impera* to make similar grants to groups of their own subjects. Membership of these groups was determined not by the geographical provenance or even the language of those who composed them but by what had become the dominant classification of men in the Near East, their religious allegiance; and thus there arose what was perhaps the most characteristic administrative feature of the Ottoman Empire, the *millet* system. The Arabic word *millet* means "nation", and the system thus denoted implies that the Sultans granted autonomy, in varying measure, to bodies of their non-Moslem subjects, who were classified according to the dignitary whom they recognized as their spiritual chief. The *millet* of the Rûm, of the "Romans" (a term which will

¹ Until 1606 the treaties whereby the Sultans periodically renewed the state of peace with the Holy Roman Emperor began with the humiliating formula: "Graciously accorded by the Sultan, ever victorious, to the infidel King of Vienna, ever vanquished".

be explained in a subsequent chapter), consisted of those who obeyed the Orthodox Patriarch, the Armenian *millet* of those spiritually subject to the Gregorian Armenian Patriarch, and so on; while in one case, in which the *millet* system attained its fullest expression, the dignity of head of the *millet* (*millet-bashi*) was actually an hereditary one. Among the Nestorians or Assyrians, dwelling in the highlands of the Hakkiari Mountains to the north of Mosul, not only was the Patriarch of the Church likewise the leader of his people in other than religious matters, as were the Patriarchs of the other Christian Churches in the Ottoman Empire; his position became, towards the end of the seventeenth century, hereditary in one family, passing from brother to brother or uncle to nephew. And the holders of this dual office—they took, on accession, the title of Mar Shimun (Lord Simon)—were not only the sole hereditary *millet-bashis* in Turkey. They were feudal lords as well as anointed Patriarchs; they, and not the Turkish tax-gatherer, collected from their people the dues which were to be paid to the Porte; and they, when necessary, led their clans in battle. It was owing to the completeness of the autonomy enjoyed by this *millet* in the Ottoman Empire that it found it so difficult to adjust itself under the young Mar Shimun XXI to the altered conditions of the Kingdom of Iraq.

The logical development of the *millet* system led to the remarkable yet not surprising result that the Turks, too, became members of a *millet*, the *millet* of Islam, which in addition to the Turks included Arabs, Kurds, Tatars, Albanians, Bosnians, Circassians, Lazes and other Mohammedan peoples living in the Ottoman

Empire. When this happened, all the subjects of the Sultan belonged to one or other of these organizations, existing separately from one another, as it were, in watertight compartments. But the circumstance had also another result, namely that the Turk, especially the Turk of the governing class, began to lose something of his racial identity. He had already become in a measure Byzantinized and, now that he only formed a part, and not the whole, of the *millet* of Islam, he began to assume characteristics that were Islamic rather than Turkish. His terse, clear and concise speech came to be overlaid with euphuisms and foreign words to which the inflated language of the Byzantine Court and the rich vocabularies of Persian and Arabic alike contributed; he tended, if a Stambuli, to discard, then to despise as something unrefined and boorish, the essentially Turkish traits and habits of his forefathers as preserved by the Anatolian peasantry. In short, from being a Turk he became an Ottoman, who envisaged his State as a geographical unit Imperial and comprehensive in character, with an impress that was Islamic and to some extent also Christian¹ but was so little Turkish that the name "Turk" actually found no place in its designation. Foreigners might call the country Turkey, but the Sultan's subjects knew it as Memalik-i-Osmanié, "the Ottoman Realm".² It was the aim of the Young Turks

¹ Cf. pp. 101-102.

² "Osmanlis . . . is the name the Turks prefer. They indeed consider our word *Turk* insulting; and I remember seeing a poor Greek well kicked for exclaiming *τουρκικὸς* where he thought no Turk would hear him" (MacFarlane, *Constantinople in 1828*, London, 1829, vol. i., p. 78).

to make the inhabitants of the Empire administratively and politically homogeneous by breaking down the barriers between the watertight compartments, between these peoples that met but did not mingle. The Nationalist Turks, realizing the hopelessness of such a task, decided to render the attempt unnecessary by making the inhabitants of the Turkish Republic homogeneous in blood and speech; and, in doing so, they meant to ensure that the inhabitants in question were Turks of the Turkish and not of the Ottoman variety.

We have seen how the *millet* system in the Ottoman Empire is to be traced back to the practice of its Byzantine predecessor of granting autonomy to groups of people within its borders. There are two other respects in which the Ottoman Empire was the continuation of the Byzantine. Of those who have concerned themselves with the history and influence of that institution not all are agreed upon the precise meaning, or upon the merits and demerits, of the characteristics which they sum up in the adjective "Byzantine". But all agree that among those characteristics must be included a lavishness of pomp and ceremonial at Court, a complexity of ritual and etiquette, a polish and a *savoir vivre* unmatched in any contemporary country. The splendour of the Sacred Palace and its successor, the Blachernae, frequently masking though it might a background of sordid treachery and subtle intrigue; the sumptuous festivities conducted according to a minutely detailed and elaborate protocol; the Chrysotriclinium and its golden throne on which the Emperor and the Empress would show themselves in robes stiff with gold and

jewels such as delight us in the mosaics of San Vitale in Ravenna; the purple buskins; the Gynaecium guarded by eunuchs, in which the Empress presided over a parallel and no less splendid Court of her ladies; all these things contributed to make Byzantium, in the opinion of the rest of the world, the brilliant centre of the civilization of the day. And it did not seem to be regarded as anomalous that the magnificence of the display remained undiminished when the Empire itself was reduced to little more than its capital and was patently tottering to its fall, that there was about all this pomp more than an element of make-believe. The function of the later Byzantine Empire in the eyes of its Western contemporaries was not so much to be strong as to irradiate its characteristic glamour; to set the world a standard of luxury and refinement, a standard of proficiency in the art of living rather than in the art of war.

That rôle, or a part of it, the Ottoman adopted in his turn. The Turk who emerged from the great plains of Central Asia was a rough, nature-worshipping wanderer who spent the greater part of his existence on horseback and thought of a house, if at all, in terms of a round felt tent. He was a simple man of few wants and few ideas, his speech was plain and direct, his life was lived in the open air, his women-folk were active, hardened, independent and unveiled. As he penetrated from the East into Western Asia this primeval simplicity of the steppe perforce gave way before contact with higher and more complicated civilizations; anyone who believes that the energies of the mediaeval Turk were solely destructive has only to study the

monuments of the Seljuq Turks, the forerunners of the Ottomans, in Konia, Sivas, Aqshehir, Karaman and elsewhere in what was the Seljuq Sultanate of Rûm to convince himself to the contrary. By the time that the Ottoman Sultans superseded the Sultans of Rûm they had already learned from these some degree of polish and some conception of the divinity that should hedge a king; had begun to undergo the metamorphosis from nomad chieftain to emperor. The process continued when the Turks moved their capital from Asia to Europe and established their Court in Adrianople; it was achieved when they took Constantinople and absorbed its traditions. If the Autocrat of the Romans (who was often an Asiatic) had gone, the Grand Signor now sat in his place and continued to exact and to receive the same obeisances, the same fulsome adulation. The eunuchs who guarded his *baremlik* were no novelty, nor was the *barem* itself, with its elaborate organization and its regular hierarchy, anything less than a perpetuation by the new-comers of the former Gynaecium. The *Qizlar-aghasi* (Master of the Girls) of the Osmanlis had his predecessors in Byzantium no less than the Chief Nightingale-keeper and the Keeper of the Parrots. The *εἰς πολλὰ ἔτη* with which the Byzantines acclaimed their Basileus and the Greeks, on liturgical occasions, still acclaim their bishops was continued in the *Padishahimiz choq yasba* ("Long live our Padishah") that greeted the Sultans on their public appearances to the end of the Empire. And this brings us to the third feature of continuity. The Basileus of Constantinople, as heir to the authority and traditions of the Roman Caesars, had been in his temporal capacity the supreme

and unquestioned master of his Empire: he was its *imperator*, its autocrat (αὐτοκράτωρ) and its despot (δεσπότης). But he was not only the final legislator and the supreme military commander of his people; he retained also the divine attribute of the Caesars, to which Christianity had but given a different form. Where in the pagan Empire he would have been *divus*, he was now the elect and anointed of God, the head and defender of the Christian religion, the equal of the apostles (ἰσ-απόστολος). He was king and priest alike, infallible both in temporal and spiritual affairs; and he demanded the most Oriental forms of submission from his subjects, who approached his person in the attitude of adoration and were content to style themselves his slaves. Thus he came to embody in its completest form the monarchical conception of Christendom, and not even the long tale of defeats and other humiliations of which later Byzantine history is so largely composed diminished the awe which mediaeval Europe felt for his sacrosanct character. When the once glorious Empire had been reduced to a maimed and pitiful torso men still regarded its Emperor, though he might be little more than an itinerant beggar, as the Lord's anointed and the personification of Imperial Rome.

It followed that the Basileus ruled the Church as well as the State. He nominated the bishops to be elected; once elected, the bishops received their investiture at his hands. He convoked, and guided the discussions of, the Church Councils, he confirmed their canons, he enforced their decisions. Indeed, through the exercise of these powers he, more than any other single individual, defined the Orthodox faith. Again, when he

conferred a civil dignity, he did so in the manner of an ecclesiastic administering a sacrament. "In the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, my Majesty which is of God creates thee patrician", so ran the formula. And it was necessary for the candidate to be in a state of spiritual grace before he could receive this mark of Imperial favour. There was, in fact, no distinction between Church and State.

It is difficult to give a date for the formal assumption on the part of the Ottoman monarchs of that spiritual pre-eminence over their Moslem subjects—and over Sunni Moslems outside their dominions—which was so markedly emphasized by the last Sultans of Turkey. Although the title of Khalif had been ascribed to Turkish rulers loosely, intermittently, and in compliment rather than of right from the fourteenth century onwards, it was still held formally in 1453 by the descendants of the Abbasid rulers of Baghdad, pensioners since the capture of that city by the Mongols in 1258 of the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt; and it continued thus to be borne by them until the death of the last Abbasid, Mutawakkil, in Cairo in 1543. The Khalifate does not imply a doctrinal jurisdiction over Moslems such as the Pope exercises over his flock or the Byzantine Emperor wielded over his Orthodox subjects; it implies the obligation to protect and defend Islam, not the right to define its beliefs. Yet the spiritual position of the Byzantine Emperor and that of the Ottoman Sultan-Khalif had this much in common that the sacred character of both potentates was ever before the eyes of their subjects, who owed obedience to them as a religious as well as a political duty.

But the Turkish Sultan did assume on his capture of Constantinople, and assume at once, a measure of his Christian predecessor's jurisdiction in ecclesiastical affairs over his new Christian subjects. Even when at its last gasp and faced with imminent doom, the Byzantine Empire had been torn with ecclesiastical dissension on the question of the Union of the Eastern and Western Churches, once more restored, at all events in theory, by the Council of Ferrara-Florence in 1439. The Emperor Constantine was committed to the Union as the price of Papal help against the menace of the Turks, and had the support of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Gregory III, and of a small section of the hierarchy. But although actually proclaimed in S. Sophia in December, 1452, the Union was detested by the populace of the capital and by the bulk of the clergy, who, realizing that their choice lay between the life of their Empire and the autonomy of their Church, deliberately preferred the latter. "Rather the turban in Constantinople than the hat of a Roman Cardinal", declared the Great Duke Lucas Notaras in allusion to the presence at the celebrations in S. Sophia of Cardinal Isidore of Kiev as the Pope's Legate; and one George Scholarios, who had been secretary to the Emperor's brother and predecessor, John VII, actively organized the anti-unionist party in the Church. The Patriarch Gregory, as well as his ephemeral successor, had been deposed shortly before the city's final siege; and the entry of the Turks found the Oecumenical see without a Head. Mehmed the Conqueror promptly nominated George Scholarios to the office and himself performed the ceremony of investiture of the new Patriarch (who took the name

of Gennadios II) in the manner of the Christian Emperors. He went even farther by giving effect to the policy as regards Christian *millets* which has been described. He made Gennadios the civil as well as the religious head of what was now the *millet* of the "Romans" or Orthodox, granted him his Imperial *berat* and conferred on him, in token of his temporal dignity, the rank of a Beyler Beyi of three tails¹ in the Ottoman official hierarchy. The jurisdiction thus assumed by the Sultans was maintained to the end of the Empire.

I quote from the Byzantine courtier and historian George Phrantzes the detailed account² of the manner in which Mehmed II, whom he calls the "Emir", performed this Christian ceremony:

"On the third day after the storming of the city, the Emir held high festival of rejoicing over his victory, and made proclamation that all, both small and great, who had concealed themselves anywhere in the city should come forth, and live in freedom and quietness, also that such as had fled from the city in fear of the siege should return, every man to his own house, and abide, every man in his occupation and religion, even as it had been aforetime. Moreover, he commanded that they should make them a Patriarch in accordance with established customs, for the Patriarchate was vacant. Then the bishops who chanced to be in the city, and a very few clergy of other orders, and laymen, elected to be Patriarch the most learned George Scholarios, who was as yet a layman, and gave him the new name

¹ The standard or pole to which were affixed one, two or three horses' tails, as the case might be, was an emblem of rank formerly borne by senior Ottoman dignitaries. Cf. p. 197.

² Translated in Introduction II to Cobham's *Patriarchs of Constantinople* (Cambridge, 1911).

of Gennadios. It was an ancient established custom of the Christian Emperors to present the newly-elected Patriarch with a δέκανικιον (crozier) made of gold and adorned with precious stones and pearls, and a horse selected from the Imperial stables, gorgeously harnessed with a saddle and saddle-cloth of royal splendour, white silk and gold being the material of the trappings. The Patriarch returned to his residence accompanied by the senate and hailed with applauding shouts. Then he received consecration from the bishops in accordance with standing law and custom. Now the Patriarch-designate used to receive the δέκανικιον from the hands of the Emperor after the following manner. The Emperor sat on his throne, and the whole senate was present, standing with heads uncovered. The Great Prototype of the palace pronounced a blessing and then recited a short series of petitions (μικρὰν ἐκτενήν), after which the Grand Domestic sang the canticle 'Where the presence of the King is', etc., etc. Then, from the opposite side of the choir, the lampadarius recited the 'Gloria' and 'King of Heaven', etc. The canticle being ended, the Emperor rose to his feet, holding in his right hand the δέκανικιον, while the Patriarch-designate, coming forward with the Metropolitan of Caesarea on one side of him and the Metropolitan of Heraclea on the other, bowed thrice to the assembly, and then, approaching the sovereign, did obeisance in the manner due to the Imperial Majesty. Then the Emperor, raising the δέκανικιον a little, said, 'The Holy Trinity, which hath bestowed upon me the Empire, promoteth thee to be Patriarch of New Rome'. Thus the Patriarch was invested with authority by the hands of the Emperor, to whom he returned the assurance of his gratitude. Then the choirs sang 'Master, long be thy days' thrice, and after that came the dismissal. The Patriarch, coming down, with lights fixed in the

Imperial candelabra preceding him, found his horse standing ready, and mounted.

"The infidel, therefore, being desirous to maintain, as sovereign lord of the city, the tradition of the Christian princes, summoned the Patriarch to sit at meat and confer with him. When the Patriarch arrived, the tyrant received him with great honour. There was a long conference, in the course of which the Emir made no end of his promises to the Patriarch. The hour for the Patriarch's departure having come, the Emir, on giving him leave to retire, presented him with the costly δέκανικιον, and prayed him to accept it. He escorted the Patriarch down to the courtyard, despite his remonstrances, assisted him to mount a horse which he had caused to be made ready, and gave orders that all the grandees of the palace should go forth with the Patriarch. Thus they accompanied him to the venerable Church of the Apostles, some going before and some following him. The Emir, you must know, had assigned the precincts of the Church of the Apostles for a residence."

There could be no more complete example of the continuity of the Ottoman State with the Byzantine than the investiture by Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror of the Orthodox Patriarch Gennadios, a continuity facilitated by the circumstance that there had been much about the Christian Empire that was essentially Asiatic. The history of the Byzantine Empire is in one respect the record of the growth of its oriental character and of its trend towards that Asiatic goal to which the temperament of its peoples was ever leading that institution. As Sir William Ramsay observes¹,

¹ *The Intermixture of Races in Asia Minor* (London, 1916).

"The Turkish conquest of Constantinople was really the climax of a gradual orientalizing of the Byzantine Empire. Isaurians, Cappadocians, Phrygians and Armenians reigned in Constantinople on the throne of the Roman Caesars, and the final stage occurred when a Turkish Sultan sat on the same throne." Had the Ottoman Sultans not been Moslems, had they been Christians as were some of the Mongol chiefs, their contemporaries, converted to Christianity by the Nestorians, Mehmed the Conqueror's ascent of the Constantinopolitan throne might well have been regarded as being essentially in the same sequence as that of Leo the Isaurian or the Arab Nicephorus I, of Leo the Armenian or Michael the Amorian or Michael the Paphlagonian, if he had been followed only by his bodyguard and not by a nation. And Sir Charles Eliot points out that *"in one sense the Empire continued after the fall of Constantinople; that is to say, a Turkish Empire succeeded a Greek one, and the general methods of government remained nearly the same. The later Greek Government was, like the Sublime Porte, mainly a tax-collecting organization: it took tribute from its provinces and did nothing for them; it employed foreigners and mercenaries; it had an official nobility and a ruling race."* The fundamental changes which the twentieth century has witnessed in the basis and nature of the Turkish dominion have been the fulfilment of the wish on the part of members of the Turkish race—slow to be conceived but, once conceived, speedily realized—to break with their Byzantine past in order to recreate Turkey on the lines of a normally constituted national State.

CHAPTER II

THE FIRST BREAK WITH TRADITION: SELIM III AND MAHMUD II

THE Ottoman Empire was in its conception and essence an Islamic military institution. Its conscious aim was the conquest and armed occupation of lands not inhabited by Turks, and even those of its provinces in which the majority of the inhabitants were Turks had originally been seized from other States. No part of Ottoman territory had been Turkish before the Turks set out on their westward march from Central Asia. In this respect the Ottoman Government differed, after it had moved into Europe, from all other European Governments, for, while these might at times cherish warlike ambitions, their primary task was the administration of their own subjects living on their own soil. An invader in every section of his dominions, the Osmanli was by instinct, from his conception of his rôle and—on practical grounds—from the necessity to find constant employment for his soldiery an armed aggressor intent upon territorial expansion, and the peaceful administration and economic development of his country were aims that lay outside his political line of vision, partly on account of the Turkish temperament, partly, it may be suggested, for the reason that no portion of it was originally his. The Turk of to-day has come in the course of centuries to regard Asia Minor more or less

as his home-land, but that was not the case when his Empire was yet young. He could then look upon no corner of the Turkish Empire, not even upon the central Anatolian provinces, in the same light in which an Englishman looks upon England or a Frenchman upon France, while in his European provinces he had more in common with a unit of a garrison of occupation than with a settler. In no part of his vast domain was he really *chez lui*; throughout his territories he was the invader, who held them because he had taken them by force and not because he had sprung from their soil.

Here, then, is one of the essential differences between the Ottoman Empire and its European contemporaries. Another profound difference, resulting from it, was that the Sultans, unlike the monarchs of national kingdoms such as England, France, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Hungary and the Scandinavian States, whose subjects were on the whole homogeneous, ruled over peoples differing in blood, speech and faith, among whom the Turks were in a minority; for it was not until the reconstitution of Turkey as a national State in consequence of the territorial changes brought about by the Great War of 1914-1918 that Turks formed the majority of the inhabitants of Turkey. And in the control of the lives of some of these dwellers in the Sultan's dominions others, as we have seen in the previous chapter, had a say beside the Grand Turk himself. The Christian *millets* enjoyed a large measure of autonomy; the French Kings claimed to protect the Latins; then the Emperors of Russia claimed to protect the Orthodox; finally, and conversely, the Sultans put forward analogous claims

as regards Moslems in Russia and elsewhere outside Turkey.

For a long time before the capture of Constantinople the name "Turk" had inspired terror in eastern Europe; for some centuries after its capture the Turks inspired the same terror in central and western Europe. With a seemingly irresistible impetus they carried their arms northward and westward; and the individual ferocity and endurance of their fighting-men were matched by the technical efficiency of their forces on land and at sea. Their military and naval organization was so highly reputed that men of enterprise from many countries were impelled to learn warfare under the banner of the crescent; their artillery had no rival; they were pioneers in creating commissariat and medical services as regular adjuncts of an army in the field. Until Suleiman the Magnificent's check before Vienna in 1529, the only limit to their advance seemed to be that determined by their own ambitions. Then there set in, at the end of the sixteenth century, a period of standstill, when the Christian Powers began to challenge Turkish supremacy in the art and appliances of war and the Sultans began to delegate to their pashas the leadership of their campaigns. There followed, under the vigorous Grand Viziers¹ of the Albanian family—they might almost be called a dynasty—of Kiöprülü, a temporary revival of military ardour and success, culminating in the second siege of Vienna in 1683 and ending with its failure.

¹ The term Grand Vizier, as applied to the Prime Minister of the Ottoman Empire, is exclusively of European usage. Turks employed the Arabic expression *sadr azam*, *sadr* meaning "breast" and *azam* "foremost".

Then, the revival having spent itself, there came, with the Peace of Carlowitz in 1699, stagnation and decline. Already somewhat earlier, at the beginning of the century, that careful observer, Sir Thomas Roe, Ambassador of James I to Sultan Osman II, had likened the Empire to "an old body, crazed through many vices that remain where the youth and strength is decayed", but few Turks were then found to agree with him except the far-sighted Grand Vizier Dilaver himself. It was only when the decline had become obvious, towards the middle of the eighteenth century, that the rulers of Turkey began to take stock of their situation and to realize that their Empire, having ceased to conquer and to expand, was but the façade of a once mighty structure that might crumble at any moment. From having been a central European Power, occupying Hungary and threatening Austria, Turkey had become an Eastern State whose European ambitions now went no farther than the maintenance of its weakening hold on the Balkan Peninsula and the Black Sea, while other nations were beginning to make plans for dividing the inheritance when the collapse took place. The "Thunderbolt",¹ the "Conqueror",² the "Grim",³ the "Magnificent",⁴ and the "Hunter"⁵ had made way for the "Sick Man of Europe".

The Peace of Carlowitz marked the end of the Ottoman Empire's invasions to the north and north-west and confined the Turks, so far as Europe was concerned, to the territories south of a frontier formed by

¹ Bayazid I, 1389-1403.

² Mehmed II, 1451-1481.

³ Selim I, 1512-1520.

⁴ Suleiman I, 1520-1566.

⁵ Mehmed IV, 1648-1687.

the Save, the Danube and the Carpathians. It also marked the beginning of the period when, thanks in part to the efforts of a succession of particularly capable foreign envoys accredited to the Porte,¹ the influence of European diplomacy became an important factor amid the chaos in which the decaying Empire was wallowing, paving the way for that more decisive Western intervention in Ottoman affairs in the nineteenth century which we associate with the conception of the Concert of Europe. And as the Treaty of Carlowitz set the seal upon the military activities of the Turks in the direction of central Europe, so did that imposed on them by Russia in 1774 at the Bulgarian village of Küçük Qainarji² curtail their power on the shores of the Black Sea. The Treaty of Küçük Qainarji defined a new phase of Turkey's international position, that of the south-westward advance of Russia at her expense, although the eyes of the Tsars had long been turned in the direction of Constantinople. The starting-point of Russia's claim to be regarded as the political heir of Byzantium had been the marriage of Ivan III, Great Prince of Muscovy, to the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor, the Princess Zoe (afterwards Sophia) of the House of Palaeologus, who brought the Byzantine double-headed eagle as her dowry to the northern Court.³ But it was not until the consolidation of Russian power under the House of Románov that Russian

¹ Such as Sir James Porter, Ambassador of George II and George III, the Austrian Internuncios Barons Penkler and Thugut, the French Marquis de Villeneuve, the Russian Minister Obreskov.

² The name means "little hot spring".

³ Cf. Genealogical Table II.

aspirations took practical form. Two specific motives led the Russia of Peter the Great and his successors to attack the Ottoman Empire in the application of her general policy: first, that of gaining access to the Black Sea, hitherto to all intents and purposes, as we should say to-day, an Ottoman lake; secondly, that of acquiring the right to protect the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan. Russia's first objectives, translated into terms of geography, were the Crimea and the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, for the Crimea would open her way to the Black Sea while her avowed object so far as the Principalities were concerned was the establishment of a protectorate over their Christian inhabitants. The pursuit of Russia's ambitions was helped by the circumstance that her conversion by Peter the Great into a European Power eager to expand took place at a time when the decline of the Ottoman Empire had already set in.

By the Treaty of Küçük Qainarji the Tatars of the Crimea, indeed, all Tatars from the frontiers of Poland to the Caspian, were detached from Ottoman rule while left under the spiritual oversight of the Sultan as Khalif; commerce and navigation in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean were made free to both countries; the Danubian Principalities remained under the sovereignty of the Sultan, but Russia was recognized as their protector and as having "the right to speak in their favour, the Porte undertaking to listen with the attention due to friendly and respected Powers"; the Porte likewise agreed "to protect the Christian religion and its churches" and conceded to the envoys of the Russian monarch, whose assumption of the title of

Emperor (in Russian "Imperator", in Turkish "Padi-shah") instead of that of Tsar was now expressly recognized, the right "to make representations in favour of the new church" which by the same treaty Russia was empowered to build in Constantinople. Ten years later the Tatar Khans of the Crimea and the Kuban country in Cis-Caucasia acquiesced in annexation by Russia, and Turkey was forced to accept the arrangement by a convention signed in Constantinople in January, 1784.

These striking successes on the part of Russia produced their reaction, for the western European Powers were not prepared to allow the Russian Emperor to become the Sultan's sole heir, perhaps, even, to the extent of placing the Byzantine crown on his head in S. Sophia. No longer was Christendom solidly leagued against the Turks; Western nations were now prepared to offer them their support against Russia, but demanded commercial privileges in return. It was in these confused circumstances in the East, and with the French Revolution gathering momentum in the West, that Sultan Selim III succeeded his well-intentioned but feeble uncle Abdul Hamid I in April, 1789, three months before the fall of the Bastille.

At this point it will be convenient to introduce the subject of the Janissaries; first, because that celebrated corps was the backbone of the Ottoman Empire during the period of its military expansion and supremacy; secondly, because it was the immediate cause, through the problems it presented when the Empire had become disorganized and those at the head of affairs were no longer strong and resolute enough to keep the Janissaries in order, of the first efforts towards converting

Turkey into a modern State organized on European lines.

The name Janissary is the Western corruption of the Turkish words *yeni cheri* ("new troops"), a name given to the corps at its foundation because it superseded the older armed bodies of *akinji* (Turkoman horsemen) and *piadé* (footmen). The latest research¹ casts doubts on the details of the account of several Turkish historians, endorsed by von Hammer and generally accepted in the West, that the Janissaries were founded in 1330 by Sultan Orkhan on the advice of the Vizier Kara Khalil Chendereli, who caused them to be blessed by Haji Bektash, the supposed founder of the Order of dervishes that bears his name. It is, however, beyond dispute that certainly before the capture of Constantinople, and in all likelihood as early as the fourteenth century, the Sultans maintained a corps of bought or captured Christian slaves, whose numbers were brought up to the requisite strength by the forcible impressment of Christian children when prisoners were not available in sufficient quantity. Nor was its relationship to the Bektashi Order as ready-made as was supposed by Gibbon. It was only as their power grew that the Bektashis, whose free and comprehensive views enabled them to be, in a sense, a link between Islam and Christianity, gradually captured the Janissary body, with the result that the Janissaries adopted Haji Bektash as their patron and became definitely affiliated with the Order. The connexion was officially recognized in 1591, when the Head of the Order was given the honorary rank of

¹ Cf. F. W. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans* (Oxford, 1929), pp. 483-493.

Colonel of the Janissaries, and Bektashi dervishes were attached to all their barracks and marched with them on their campaigns.

The essential characteristic of the Janissaries, who received their first regular organization from Mehmed the Conqueror, namely, that they were composed of Christian youths recruited by means of a forced levy to fight the battles of a Moslem Power, renders them unique in military history, while their rule of celibacy (abrogated at a later stage of their development) suggests an affinity with the Christian Military Orders that arose in the Holy Land during the Crusades and in Spain and Portugal during the struggles with the Moors. In other characteristics, those of a blind obedience to their chiefs and almost fanatical powers of endurance, they may be likened to the *fedais* ("devoted ones"), who formed the *corps d'élite* of the Assassins. The Janissaries, like the Bolshevik army of a later age, were well paid, well clothed and, above all, well fed. So largely, indeed, did the question of rations loom in the life of the organization that its nomenclature and its symbolism were derived to some extent from the kitchen and its appliances. The corps as a whole was called the *ojaq* (hearth), the battalion was the *orta* (literally, "the middle"), while each of the barracks was known as the *oda* (room). The Commanding Officer of an *orta* was called the *chorbaji* (literally, "soup-maker"); his next subordinates were the *achji-bashi* ("head cook") and the *saga-bashi* ("head water-carrier"). The ceremonial life of the *orta* centred about the cauldrons (*qaxan*) in which its soup and pilav were cooked, and these cauldrons became the equivalent of the regimental colour. Around them the Janis-

saries collected not only to eat but to take counsel, often, indeed, to conspire; and to overturn them was their formal gesture of rebellion, signifying that they would no longer eat the Sultan's food. If the cauldrons were lost in battle, the officers of the *orta* were disgraced and the *orta* was no longer allowed to parade with them in public ceremonies.

For as long as its original rules were adhered to this body, at first the best and practically the only disciplined armed force in the Ottoman Empire, was the indispensable instrument of the conquering Sultans. Its prestige was immense, and successive Padishahs honoured it by enrolling themselves as ordinary Janissaries in one or other of the *ortas*, drawing their pay at the rate of seven aspres¹ a day. But in the course of time its rules, not only as regards the source of its recruits but also as regards its discipline, were relaxed: the Janissaries were allowed to marry; next, they secured the enrolment of their children into the corps; while the last levy of Christian children took place in 1683 in the reign of Mehmed IV. By the eighteenth century the departures from its original principles had increased sufficiently to render possible the following incident, recounted by a clever Greek named Elias Habesci, who had been Secretary to one of the Grand Viziers of Sultan Mustafa III:²

"The Armenian Patriarch, who resided at Constantinople during the late war [sc. with Russia], having created a sus-

¹ A coin now obsolete which was formerly the smallest monetary unit in Turkey. Its value was one-third of a para or $\frac{1}{120}$ of a piastre.

² *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1784).

picion, by some expressions in his sermons, that he was a Roman Catholic at heart, the Armenians complained to the Grand Vizir, and obtained an order to send him to the Gallies; but the Patriarch being apprized of his danger, immediately sent for a colonel of the Janissaries, to whom he made known his situation, and prayed to be enlisted into his company, which was accordingly done the same day, and he invited the Colonel, with the rest of the officers of his regiment to dine with him at his house the next day, which happened to be Sunday; he officiated as usual, and upon coming out of the church he found one party of Janissaries ready to conduct him to the Gallies, and another to protect him, but the former instantly retired, upon hearing from the latter that the Prelate was a Yengi-cheri, a new Janissary, and their officers joined the company at dinner, where they were all very merry at the expense of the Grand Vizir, whose order to arrest the Patriarch was the subject of ridicule."

Even foreigners could now receive commissions in the corps, for Habesci relates that in his day the French Consul in Smyrna, a Monsieur Peysonnel, "became an officer of the Janissaries and, being greatly beloved by the party he commanded, prevented many calamities that would have befallen the French by this circumstance".

By this time the Janissaries had degenerated into a lawless, undisciplined praetorian guard of the worst sort, a real danger to the Empire of whose power they had once been the mainspring. In the capital as in the provinces, they were the most disorderly and turbulent section of the population. Always inclined to be unruly, even in the days of the great Sultans such as Selim I,

they were now completely out of hand, a scandal and an outrage. Uncontrolled, extortionate, a law unto themselves, they made and unmade Ministers, deposed Sultans who sought to curb their excesses and placed on the throne princes of their own choice. If they disapproved of the Government they set fire to Stambul, whose dwelling-houses, being generally built of wood, burned easily; it is recorded that in the reign of Ahmed III alone (1703-1730) they were responsible for no fewer than 140 such fires. We shall see later how their suppression by Mahmud II in 1826 rid the Empire of the canker that had been gnawing at its vitals for two centuries, and heralded the beginning of a new era in the development of the Turkish State.

The forerunner of the two bold reformers among the Sultans, Selim III and Mahmud II, was Selim's uncle Abdul Hamid I, whose inauspicious reign from 1773 to 1789 was marked by the Treaty of Küçük Qainarji and the advance of Russia at Turkey's expense summarized above. Abdul Hamid was, as has been said, a well-intentioned ruler and, albeit weak both in character and intellect, had sufficient sense to perceive that the Empire could only be regenerated from the state of decay into which it had sunk by a reform of the part which was at once the rottenest and the most vital, the army. So he imported some French officers in the hope that these might succeed in reorganizing the Janisaries and thus took the first step towards the Westernization of his country. In one other respect he made a notable departure from the habits of his predecessors by refusing to observe the usual practice, of which he himself was a conspicuous victim, of immuring the heir

to the throne in that outwardly beautiful but carefully guarded kiosk in the Seraglio which bore and still bears the sinister name of the *Qafés*, "the cage". On the contrary, he treated Selim with every mark of trust and affection and allowed him complete liberty.

When Selim succeeded to the throne, he brought to the government of his to all outward appearances tottering Empire a type of mind unusual among the rulers of Turkey. Not only had he enjoyed the unwonted privilege of freedom both intellectual and physical during the reign of his predecessor; he was well educated, a poet and a musician, he was alert, enterprising and untrammelled by prejudice or tradition. It was not altogether without significance that the beginning of his reign coincided with the beginnings of the French Revolution, and Selim was one of the first of the sovereigns of Europe to recognize the Republic. Sharing his uncle's views as to the urgent necessity for reforming the army and possessing the ability and determination which were lacking in the ineffective Abdul Hamid I, he established military schools, secured European officers to act as instructors, bought model ships from England for his navy and imported shipwrights from France. He modernized his frontier fortresses, remodelled the whole artillery system, adopted the dimensions of the French cannon and began to build the cannon foundry which has given its name to the well-known Top-khané quarter of Galata. He created a corps of engineers and caused a work of Vauban to be translated into Turkish. Selim III and Mahmud II were the first Ottoman sovereigns possessing any strength of character and individuality since Murad IV (1623-1640), the conqueror

of Baghdad and the last Sultan to return to his capital victorious from a campaign which he had led in person. Under them Turkey made a new start.

Selim's reforms, affecting in particular the departments of war and finance, went by the general name of *nizam-i-jedid*, a term which may be translated "the new organization" or "the new institutions". The most significant single item of the reforms was the establishment of a new military force, drilled on Western lines and clothed in a distinctive uniform, to serve as a counterpoise to the Janissaries, for Selim realized that an effective reform of that corps was out of the question. Nominally this force was affiliated to the Janissaries, in the hope of appeasing the susceptibilities of the latter, but it was generally known as the army of the *nizam-i-jedid*, taking its appellation from the general scheme of which it was one of the essential parts. The new militia promised well and grew in numbers. Unfortunately it had against it not only the Janissaries but the corrupt officials who were naturally hostile to all reform, with whom there combined the retrograde and the fanatical among the Moslem population, alarmed and indignant at the Sultan's new technical schools and at his well meant but premature efforts to promote the emancipation of Turkish women. In 1807 the opposition came to a head with a revolt of the Janissaries, who demanded the abolition of the *nizam-i-jedid*. The provincial governors sided against the Sultan, who was forced to yield. Selim was dethroned and the Janissaries made a puppet emperor of his cousin, Mustafa IV, whose function it was to give the semblance of legitimacy to the anti-reform rebellion and, during the

fourteen months he remained on the throne, to undo Selim's work and send the supporters of the reform movement into exile.

But Selim's efforts had not been altogether fruitless. The *émigrés*, mainly composed of young army officers trained in Selim's schools and imbued with his ideas, found a leader in the energetic Pasha of Ruschuk¹ in what was afterwards Bulgaria, Mustafa Bairaqdar,² who was devoted to Selim's person and interests and raised a counter-revolutionary army which marched from Adrianople on the capital to restore him. They arrived just too late to save the Sultan but in time to save his policy. With the victorious Bairaqdar already thundering at the inner gate of the Seraglio, Mustafa caused the unfortunate Selim to be strangled by the *Qizlar-agbasi*, the Chief of the Black Eunuchs, then ordered the gates to be opened and his cousin's body to be thrown before him. "Take Sultan Selim to the Pasha of Ruschuk", he is related to have said, "since he demands him." Mustafa's only brother, Mahmud, who shared Selim's captivity, would have shared his fate too had he not been successfully concealed in a neglected corner of the palace under a heap of rugs. For by a vicissitude in the fortunes of this usually prolific family not wholly attributable to its fratricidal tradition, Mustafa and Mahmud were the only male members of the house of Osman now alive; and, with Mahmud dead, Mustafa counted on the Bairaqdar being compelled, however reluctantly, to spare him in order to prevent the dynasty's extinc-

¹ The letters *sch* in Ruschuk are pronounced as they are in "mischief".

² The word "Bairaqdar" means "standard-bearer".

tion. Mahmud was now brought out of his hiding-place and set on the throne, and for the time being Mustafa was relegated to the *Qafés*. These momentous events took place on the 28th July, 1808, when Mahmud was twenty-four years of age.

Mahmud II, whom Halidé Edib Khanum describes¹ as the Peter the Great of the Ottoman Empire, was determined to pursue the policy of his cousin and preceptor, but his experiences impressed upon him the need to wait until he was master of the situation. For within four months of his accession Mustafa Bairaqdar, whom he had immediately appointed his Grand Vizier, was overthrown by the Janissaries in a desperate and successful attempt to retrieve their supremacy. The Bairaqdar perished in the arsenal in which he was besieged by the Janissaries, having blown himself up, according to some accounts, in one of the towers rather than be taken alive; and the Janissaries, having once more the upper hand, killed all the new troops whom they encountered and forced the young Sultan to grant them an armistice. Mahmud, knowing that his position was precarious and that at any time his masters might decide to restore Mustafa, whom hitherto he had been reluctant to execute—indeed, voices to this effect were already to be heard—was now constrained in self-preservation to make an end of his unworthy brother, and was thenceforth the only male of the race of Osman alive until the birth of his own sons.

If Mahmud can be compared with Peter the Great (although the two monarchs were confronted with

¹ *Turkey faces West*, 1930.

widely different conditions), he may be compared no less justly with Louis XI. When he came to the throne, the Ottoman Empire seemed to most observers both inside and outside its frontiers to be on the verge of collapse, and powerful and ambitious provincial governors were preparing their plans for carving out for themselves hereditary dominions from the body of the expiring Empire, while some of the feudal *Deré-beyis*¹ of the rich valleys of Anatolia were seeking to consolidate their ancestral possessions. Mahmud had to cope not only with rebellious Moslem vassals such as Ali Pasha of Yanina, Husein Agha of Gradishka, the "Dragon of Bosnia", Pasvanoghlu, Pasha of Vidin, Abdallah Pasha of Acre and the yet more formidable Pasha of Egypt, Mohammed Ali, and his son Ibrahim; he was faced with such far-flung revolts as those of the Greeks in the Morea and the Wahhabis in Arabia, combined with the unsuccessful war with Russia that ended with the Peace of Adrianople in 1829. The Treaty of Adrianople opened the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus and the Black Sea to the merchantmen of Russia and other Powers at peace with the Sultan; and, if it did not diminish the latter's territory to any considerable extent, it markedly diminished his prestige abroad. Henceforward to the end of his reign Mahmud was, so far as his foreign policy was concerned, under the

¹ Lit. "Lords of the Valley": the vassal dynasties which from the beginning of the eighteenth century grew up in some of the provinces of Asia Minor, descended from tribal chieftains or high Ottoman officials. Some of these dynasties, especially that of the Karaosmanoghlu, who from their capital of Mánissa (Magnesia) controlled the hinterland of Smyrna, maintained benevolent, efficient and popular administrations.

domination of Russia, albeit much against his will; and Russia now came nearer than she had ever come before to the consummation of her designs on the Sultan's capital. The Treaty of Khunkiar Iskelesi in 1833 bound the reluctant Turkey still more closely to the Russian Empire.

But we are not concerned here so much with Mahmud's external relationships and his foreign campaigns as with the revolution which he brought about in the internal organization of his dominions. Of this, the central factor was the suppression of the Janissaries, which, as he came to realize after seventeen years of experience of their lawlessness, could only be effected by their literal extermination. During these years Mahmud was patiently preparing his stroke, partly by acquiring with gifts and appointments the goodwill of some of the Janissaries' supporters, partly by causing individual Janissaries of importance to be secretly made away with. Despite his westernizing tendencies, which earned him from his Moslem subjects the sobriquet of *Giaur Sultan*, the "Infidel Sultan", he was at pains to remain on good terms with the *ulema*, who, much as they might disapprove of many of Mahmud's proceedings, were reconciled by his defence of orthodox Sunni Islam in suppressing the heresy of the Wahhabis and by such details as his care to adhere to the Eastern robes of tradition when formally attending mosque, although at other times he affected a simple mode of dress more or less *alla franca*. Thus, by biding his time, by consolidating his position, by conciliating the clergy¹ and with

¹ For the use of this term as applied to the *ulema*, cf. p. 188.

the help of a carefully organized system of espionage, the Sultan was slowly undermining the institution which, as he knew, was fatal to the survival of the Empire. In 1811 his vassal Mohammed Ali set him an example by the massacre of the Mamluks, which the determined Pasha of Egypt caused to be carried out before his own eyes. We have already seen how the Janissaries had enforced the suppression of Selim III's well conceived "new model army". In 1825 Mahmud II felt himself strong enough to repeat the experiment of creating a force of trained regular troops, taking the precaution on this occasion to obtain from the Sheikh ul-Islam a *fetva* to the effect that it was the duty of Moslems to acquire military knowledge. So the formation of the *eshkenjis*, as the new standing army was now called, was promulgated by Imperial decree at a Grand Council, and the great dignitaries of State swore to accept the decree's provisions. The Janissaries reacted in the traditional manner. On the 12th June, 1826, were held the first drills under the new order. On the 16th June the Janissaries overturned their cauldrons. Mahmud, who was at Beshik-Tash on the other side of the Golden Horn, crossed the water to the Seraglio and produced the standard of the Prophet from its place of custody and displayed it to the people. He filled the city with faithful troops and called upon the Janissaries to submit to the new dispensation. The *ulema*, consulted by the Sultan, issued the following *fetva*: "If unjust and violent men attack their brethren, fight the aggressors and send them before their natural judge". The Janissaries remaining defiant, war was now formally declared on the breakers of the public peace and

guns were trained on the Et-meidan, the square in which they habitually mustered. Ibrahim Agha, the Commandant of the Artillery, known by the nickname of Kara Jehennem ("Black Hell"), made a last appeal to them to surrender. On their refusal he opened fire, and by the following day this once renowned body had ceased to exist and the Sheikh ul-Islam had formally proclaimed its extinction. Its suppression in the provinces followed promptly upon the events in the capital.

"That celebrated militia", wrote the young Stratford Canning, then Secretary of the Embassy on which later he was to shed such lustre,¹ "which in earlier times had extended the bounds of Empire and given the title of conqueror to so many of the Sultans, which had opened the walls of Constantinople itself to their triumphant leader, the second Mohammed, were now to be swept away with an unsparing hand to make room for a new order of things, for a disciplined army and a charter of reform. From their high claims to honour and confidence they had sadly declined. They had become the masters of the government, the butchers of their sovereigns, and a source of terror to all but the enemies of their country. Whatever compassion might be felt for individual sufferers, including as they did the innocent with the guilty, it could hardly be said that their punishment as a body was untimely or undeserved."

With the destruction of the Janissaries Mahmud was able to resume into his own hands the supreme power in his somewhat though not drastically shrunken Empire, a power which had been severely limited in the previous reigns by that of the Janissaries and of powerful Grand

¹ S. Lane Poole, *Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe*.

Viziers. The Seraglio was now once more the fountain of authority and not, as had been the case for close on two centuries, the Porte. Mahmud restored that palace government which was to become so marked a feature of the reign of his grandson Abdul Hamid II. Indeed, it was his success in this direction that saved Mahmud, whose passion for Westernization led him far in advance of public opinion, from the disaster that overtook Amanullah of Afghanistan a century later. Many of his reforms dealt with externals and sometimes offended his Moslem subjects without necessarily effecting equivalent advantages, as when in 1834 he struck coins bearing his portrait and thereby brought upon himself an insurrection which was suppressed, indeed, with a loss of 4000 lives but in the event led to the recall of the issue. As Stratford Canning wrote with his usual penetration:

"The government (sc. of Turkey) is radically bad, and its members, who are all alive to its defects, have neither the wisdom nor the courage to reform it. The few who have the courage equal to the task know not how to reconcile reformation with the prejudices of the people. And without this nothing can be effected."

Canning wrote those words in 1809, shortly after Mahmud's accession and before he had been able to assert himself; but even later in the reign Metternich felt constrained to give him the advice "to remain a Turk".

Although von Hammer brings his monumental history of the Ottoman Empire to a close with the Treaty of Küchük Qainarji, he includes among the interesting and

important appendices of his 17th volume,¹ dealing with the dignities, posts, political divisions, public institutions and other particulars of the organization of the Empire, twenty-five pages of detail concerning the reforms in the internal administration carried out by Mahmud II. It is significant that these reforms affect every branch of the Government except that of the *ulema*, for Mahmud was determined to give the *ulema* no excuse for joining those who denounced him as the *Giaur Sultan*. The effect of these reforms and of the abolition of the corps of the Janissaries was to make an end of mediaeval Turkey; and it was inevitable that there should disappear amid much that was bad much also that was picturesque.² One of the most conspicuous outward changes was that of the official dress of state functionaries from the floating oriental robes, with their silks, brocades and fur-lined pelisses, their embroidered sashes and their gigantic turbans, to a type of dress approximating to the European. How picturesque were the dresses now suppressed may be judged by visitors to the Military Museum in the former Church of S. Irene outside the Seraglio, where are exhibited specimens of the robes and uniforms abolished by Mahmud.³ Equally

¹ Of the French edition.

² But not, apparently, the respect paid to the science of astrology. The Khatt-i-Sherif of 1834 reorganizing the departments of State was dated Tuesday, "the 26th Shaban, at twenty minutes past four o'clock, being the hour adjudged to be the most propitious for its promulgation".

³ The old official dress of Turkey is described in detail, and illustrated with coloured plates, in Mushir Arif Pasha's folio volumes *Les Anciens Costumes de l'Empire Ottoman depuis l'origine de la monarchie jusqu'à la reforme du Sultan Mahmoud* (Paris, 1863, *sqq.*).

picturesque, if equally extravagant, were some of the Court appointments that followed in their wake. No more was the Seraglio to be the centre of the most lavish Court in history, with its thousands of Palace guards and pages, its *bostanjis* and *paltajis*, its *chaushes* and its *solaqs*. No longer was it to support the charges of the *bülbüljibashi* (Chief Keeper of the Nightingales) and the *tutijibashi* (Chief Keeper of the Parrots), of the *dülbend-agma* (Keeper of the Turban) and the *ibriqdar-agma* (Keeper of the Ewer), of the *qapaniji* (Keeper of the Robe of State) and the *sorghuchji* (Custodian of the Heron's Plume).

The exodus from the Seraglio of the host of parasites with their sonorous sinecures effected by Mahmud may be likened to the purge of the Manchu Court in the Forbidden City through the mass expulsion of the eunuchs carried out in 1923 by the young Hsuan Tung, the last Emperor of China, who is perhaps better known in the West as Pu Yi and is now Emperor of Manchukuo. Coinage, weights and measures, public holidays, the establishment of a Government Gazette, were among the many matters dealt with by the indefatigable reformer in addition to the simplification of the Court and the all-important task of re-creating the armed forces. He sent young officers to be trained in the military schools of Western Europe; he toured his provinces, a thing which no Sultan had done before except when riding at the head of his troops on a campaign; he gave some security to his officials by formally relinquishing the right enjoyed by himself and his predecessors to confiscate the property of deceased functionaries. And in the external appearance of his subjects Mahmud

effected the greatest sumptuary change experienced by the Turkish people until the days of the Angora Republic. It is one of the minor ironies of history that the fez, which Mustafa Kemal abolished as being a symbol of an effete and Islamic Orientalism which he wished to eradicate from the Turkish nation, should have been regarded by the Turks of Mahmud's day as one of the most obnoxious innovations of the *Giaur Sultan*, when he imposed on his *muslimin* this head-dress borrowed from the despised and rebellious Greek *rayahs*.

"*That Mahmud and his advisers*", wrote the late D. G. Hogarth,¹ "*could carry through such reforms at all in so old a body politic is remarkable: that they carried them through amid the events of his reign is almost miraculous.*" Mahmud II lost Greece, he lost Egypt in all but name, he was involved in conflict with England, with France and, above all, with Russia; he suffered, in the latter's favour, a reduction of his rights over the Danubian Principalities; he had to concede autonomy to the Serbs. Nevertheless, when he died in 1839, he left his Empire stronger than he found it. For, with a tenacity astonishing in the face of the almost insuperable difficulties by which he was harassed without a respite from inside and outside his dominions, he had succeeded in making himself master in his own house; and, if the house was now a smaller one, it was more compact and more easily controlled. It must not be forgotten that the provinces he had lost were not populated by Turks and had been a source of weakness to the State rather than a source of strength. And if Mohammed Ali had succeeded in

¹ In *The Balkans*, by several writers (Oxford, 1915).

carving out for himself an hereditary and quasi-independent satrapy on the banks of the Nile, Mahmud had broken successfully the other rebellious Pashas and *Déré-beyis*, who would have done likewise in their respective provinces; he had centralized authority in the Empire which generations of weakened control in the capital had allowed to become centrifugal. And without his achievement it is unlikely that the reforms associated with the Tanzimat and the Khatt-i-Humayun, which will be dealt with in the following chapter, could have been conceived.

The moribund appearance which the Ottoman Empire presented to the outside world at the beginning of the nineteenth century was to a certain extent deceptive. Despite the military, financial and administrative weakness of the State, its decentralization and lack of cohesion, Turkey possessed an element which was essentially what the French call *viable*, and that element resided in the Turkish people itself. The loss of provinces, which in a State differently constituted would imply a corresponding loss of strength, of life-blood, produced in the Ottoman Empire a positive increase of strength when those provinces were inhabited by discontented or disloyal *rayahs*. The reign of Mahmud had the result of conserving that strength and of canalizing it into directions which ultimately enabled Turkey to survive the emancipation of the remaining Balkan States, to survive the war with Italy and the two Balkan Wars, to survive the terrific strain and the amputations caused by the Great War of 1914-1918, and to be resurrected in an altered and rejuvenated form in the third decade of the twentieth century. The changes wrought by

Mahmud II in the fabric of the Turkish State were the precursors of the changes wrought in it a hundred years later by the Government of Angora. They constituted the first deliberate break with the traditions of Byzantium.

THE ERA OF THE TANZIMAT

THANKS to the work of Selim III and Mahmud II, the Ottoman Empire had now begun to assume in part the semblance of a modern State administered on uniform lines. The autonomous or semi-autonomous dynasts in the Moslem districts had been eliminated, provincial government had been centralized within a symmetrical administrative framework, there was now something like an organized Civil Service. But in one important respect a wide gulf was still fixed between Turkey and the countries of the West, namely, that not all categories of the Sultan's subjects were equal before the law. The Moslems constituted the ruling and privileged caste, to which were attached, however, certain onerous obligations from which the *rayahs* were exempt; non-Moslems lay, despite advantages by no means to be underrated, in other respects under definite disabilities.

Even the diminished heritage to which Abdul Mejid succeeded on the death of his father, Mahmud II, embraced within its borders one of the most varied assemblages of race, custom, language, culture and civilization that have ever come under the control of a single Government. The new Sultan ruled in Europe over Turks, Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, over Moldavians and Wallachians later to be welded into Rumanians, over

Albanians, Bosnians, Jews, gypsies; in Africa, over Egyptians, Copts, Berbers, negroes of many stocks; in Asia, in addition to some of those already enumerated, over Armenians, Kurds, the ancient races and Churches of the Nestorians and the Jacobites who still speak the Syriac tongue, over devil-worshipping Yezidis, over the Sabaeans from the banks of the Tigris who constitute the only living link with the moon-worshippers of ancient Charran, over the tiny remnant of the Samaritans, over Druses with their mysterious amalgam of ill-assorted beliefs, over Lazes, who are a Moslem branch of the Georgian race and, last but not least in numbers or importance, over the Arabs. And the Arabs under his sway were a microcosm in themselves, embracing every type of Arabic-speaking person from the pastoral inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula, organized in tribes with a natural tendency towards inter-tribal warfare, to the dwellers in the great cities of Syria and Iraq with their ancient civilizations, from the wild and nomad Beduin in their black "tents of Kedar" to the settled *fellahîn* in their stone-built villages and the lordly Effen-dis in the palaces of Damascus. Again, if Athens and Corinth and Sparta no longer acknowledged the Padi-shah's rule, he was still master of Imperial Constantinople, master or overlord of the three other Patriarchal seats of the Holy Orthodox Eastern Church, Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem; he still reigned over Adrianople and Salonika, Scutari in Europe and Scutari in Asia, Smyrna and Konia and Brusa and Trebizond, Aleppo and Beirut, Nazareth, Bethlehem and Hebron, Baghdad and Basra, Medina and Mecca, the sacred cities of Arabia and of his faith. Within his domains and lands

under his suzerainty the civilizations of Sumer and Akkad, of Babylon and Nineveh, of ancient Egypt and Minoan Crete had come into being, Moses had first proclaimed the One God, the Founder of Christianity had assumed human form and had given His new dispensation to mankind, S. Paul had established the Seven Churches of the Apocalypse, the Prophet of Islam had lived his fateful life. On his coasts the Philistines had battled with the Hebrews, from them the Phoenicians had ventured upon their fantastic voyages. In his Anatolian highlands the Hittites had created their widespread Empire, on their fringes survived the remains of some of the most famous cities of Greek and Greco-Roman antiquity. The site of the nine towns of Troy lay within his borders, and the sites of six of the Seven Wonders of the World.

It is doubly true to describe this anthropological and ethnographic collection as a mosaic of races; for, as in a mosaic each tessera is of one colour only, frequently distinct from the colour of the next, so its races met within the Ottoman Empire without mingling, while the *millet* system on which the State was based added constitutional and legal barriers to perpetuate the cleavage already established by differences of faith, social type and cultural aspirations and by the absence of elements making for uniformity and fusion. Not only were the non-Moslem *millets* alien to and in some cases antagonistic to the peoples embraced within the *millet* of Islam; they were alien to, and generally antagonistic to one another. Nay more, there existed, as we shall see later, the sharpest antagonism between Slav and Hellene within the single *millet* of Rûm.

The keynote of the reigns of the brothers Abdul Mejid and Abdul Aziz, that is to say, of the years 1839 to 1876, was the continuation, at all events in theory, of the reforming work of their father by means of enactments aiming at the removal of the legal disabilities of the *rayah*. Mahmud's premature death had not left him the time to pass from the destruction of the old order to the completion of the new, but his elder son and successor, Abdul Mejid, proceeded without a break to the next stage. Ascending the throne in July, 1839, by November of the same year he had issued from the pavilion of Gül-Khané ("the Rose-Chamber") the Khatt-i-Sherif (Imperial Rescript) embodying the comprehensive reforms commonly known as the Tanzimat.¹ The charter of the Tanzimat affected to remove the disabilities of the non-Moslem sections of the population by guaranteeing the lives, property and honour of the Sultan's subjects, irrespective of creed or race, while it aimed at regularizing internal administration by reforming the incidence of taxation. It created a Council of State, a Penal Code² and a State Bank; it provided for secondary education; it placed conscription on a more equitable footing and limited the period of military service; it abolished, ephemerally, the farming of taxes. It is interesting to speculate as to the probable course of Turkish history had the Khatt-i-Sherif of Gül-Khané and its sequel, the Khatt-i-Humayun, been carried into effect; but it was not altogether the young Sultan's fault that these reforms, so excellent in theory, proved largely abortive in practice. In the first place,

¹ Plural of the Arabic *tanẓīm*, organization, ordering.

² Cf. p. 193.

Abdul Mejid possessed none of his father's virile character and ruthless resolution. Although liberal-minded, kindly and well-meaning, he was a feeble voluptuary lacking both the will-power and the physical and mental vigour necessary to impose his reforms on a reluctant population. For the Tanzimat pleased neither Moslem nor *rayah*; it was, for example, the opposition of the Christian *sarrafs* (money-changers) of Constantinople which broke down the attempt to abolish tax-farming. Farthermore, the new Sultan had, like his father, to cope with foreign complications. It was not until he had been two years on the throne that the problem of Mohammed Ali was liquidated by that turbulent satrap's being granted the hereditary pashalik of Egypt, with the transmission of the dignity to his descendants in the order of primogeniture, a keenly desired concession; in the later years of the reign he was faced with the renewed pressure of Russia, which culminated in the Crimean War. It was therefore to his credit, even though much of the impetus and pressure came from his Crimean allies, that he persisted with his reforming policy, reiterated in the Khatt-i-Humayun ("Illustrious Rescript"), which he issued on the 18th February, 1856. This edict "confirmed and consolidated" the guarantees of security of personal property and of the preservation of their honour to all subjects of the Empire, without distinction of class or religion, promised in the Tanzimat; it confirmed the privileges and spiritual immunities granted by previous Sultans to the non-Moslem communities. Patriarchs were to be nominated for life, so that an end might be put to the scandal of frequent depositions; the ecclesiastical dues on which they and

other heads of non-Moslem religious bodies had hitherto subsisted were abolished and replaced by fixed salaries, assessed according to the rank and dignity of the ecclesiastics concerned. Elective assemblies, partly clerical, partly lay, were set up for the temporal administration of the property of the *millet*s, who were given permission to repair, when necessary, their churches, schools, hospitals and cemeteries "according to their original plan". Distinctions tending to make any class of the Sultan's subjects inferior to another class on account of their religion, language or race, were effaced from the administrative protocol. All forms of religion were to be freely professed, nobody could be compelled to change his faith, nor was any man's religion to be a bar to public employment. All legal proceedings were to be transacted in public and the evidence of witnesses was to be received in the courts without distinction of race or creed. Prison administration was to be reformed, torture abolished, the organization of the police "revised in such a manner as to give to all the peaceable subjects of my Empire the strongest guarantees for the safety both of their persons and property". It was made lawful for foreigners to acquire landed property. Taxes were to be levied without religious or racial discrimination; and, "the equality of taxes entailing the equality of burdens", Christians and members of other non-Moslem bodies were made subject to the obligations of the law of recruitment. Public works were to be undertaken in the provinces; an annual budget was to be drawn up and published; banks and other similar institutions were to be established and the monetary and financial system of the State was to be overhauled.

It will be apparent, even from the above brief summary, that the Khatt-i-Humayun would have converted Turkey, had it been implemented, into something like a model State. But one of the outstanding features of the Ottoman Empire in its decadence has been the contrast between theory and practice in its institutions. The statute-book might contain the most admirable provisions; their enforcement was another matter. Yet it would not be altogether correct to regard the Tanzimat and the Khatt-i-Humayun as nothing more than window-dressing, whereby Sultan and Viziers, determined that they should remain a dead letter, hoped to dupe and appease prying and critical Western Powers. Many circumstances caused the reforms to fail, foremost among them the very nature of the Empire, whose essential characteristic had been the barriers between its component peoples. Other reasons were lack of driving-power on the part of Abdul Mejid, the hostility of the conservatives, which paralyzed the activities of the would-be reformers and, as in the case of the Tanzimat, the dislike of some of the reforms on the part of the intended beneficiaries themselves. What the Orthodox hierarchy thought of the clause substituting fixed salaries for such dues as they had previously been able to extort from their flocks will be referred to in another chapter, while the provision admitting all sections of Ottoman subjects to the army was rendered abortive by the opposition of Moslems and Christians alike. The former asserted that their lives would be in danger if the Christians were armed; the latter declared that they would not fight under the standard of the Prophet or against other Christians. But the two charters of liberty

of Abdul Mejid's reign were not wholly sterile. Ministries of Justice and Public Instruction were set up, the law was codified, judicial processes were improved, schools were opened, banks were founded; while it was something to have decreed, if only on paper, the equality in the eyes of the State and of the law of every class of the Sultan's subjects.

No discussion of this phase of Ottoman history would be complete if it did not include a reference to the remarkable man who exercised almost throughout the fifth and sixth decades of the nineteenth century a paramount influence over Turkish affairs. Stratford Canning, some of whose youthful but penetrating comments on conditions in the land where he was to play so outstanding a part have been quoted in the previous chapter, first came to Turkey as Secretary to the British Embassy in 1808, when he was only twenty-two years of age; but such was his capacity, so resolute his character, that the British Government did not hesitate, on the departure of his chief in 1810, to appoint him to be *chargé d'affaires* and to leave him in this responsible position during the ensuing two important years. In 1824, after having served as Minister in Switzerland and the United States, he returned to Turkey, now as Ambassador, and held the post until 1829, when he exchanged diplomacy for the House of Commons. Two years later he was once more in Constantinople, on a special mission; and in 1842 he entered upon his last and most famous tenure of the Embassy to the Porte, which did not end until 1858. During these sixteen years no single individual so powerfully affected the course of Turkish policy as did Canning, who became Lord Stratford de Redcliffe

in 1852. Arbitrary, quick of temper, of an imperious disposition and of exceptional vitality—he lived to be nearly ninety-four—but patently honest and a true servant of humanity, the “Great Elchi” was determined that, if the Ottoman Empire were capable of salvation through reform, saved it should be. And he believed that reform was possible. He had convinced himself that, with a well-disposed Sultan such as Abdul Mejid, Turkey’s vices could be cured and the Empire preserved, although it is questionable how far he had been led to this view by his antagonism to Nicholas I, who in 1833 had refused to receive him as Ambassador to his Court. But, great as was his influence over the Turks, no one was more severe to their faults or to claims on behalf of their faith which he considered to bear unjustly on non-Moslems. It was he, not Gladstone, who first advocated their expulsion from Europe “with bag and baggage”; and, when he had brought it about that the death penalty should no longer be inflicted on those who abandoned Islam for Christianity, he described the achievement as “the first dagger thrust into the side of the false prophet and his creed”. Canning sought, says Kinglake in his great History of the Crimean War, “to make the Ottoman rule seem tolerable to Christendom by getting rid of the differences which separated the Christian subjects of the Porte from their Mohammedan fellow-subjects, and placing the tributaries on a footing with their masters”. In effect, the results of his efforts, like those of the Tanzimat and the Khatt-i-Humayun themselves, were mainly superficial; and even his admirer Kinglake, writing as far back as the eighteen-sixties, is constrained to question “whether his

Turkish policy could be made to consist with the principle on which the Ottoman system was based". On the other hand, a later writer¹ says that "so long as Lord Stratford de Redcliffe remained at Constantinople justice, toleration, good government made progress such as could hardly have been conceived before"; and he will be remembered as a noble figure, who fought for the right with all his great power and impressed himself, his character and his will on the Government to which he was accredited to an extent which can rarely, if ever, have been equalled by any other diplomatic envoy.

It is probable that no question connected with the history and politics of the Near East has aroused more controversy than that of the relative positions of and treatment accorded to Moslems and non-Moslems under Ottoman rule. None has been more acrimoniously debated, none has been canvassed with more enthusiasm, with more passion and, be it added, in a more partisan spirit. It is a question which has mobilized the -philes and the -phobes with their charges and counter-charges, their propaganda and their appeals to sentiment rather than to reason, which has caused the spilling of much blood and of yet more printer's ink. It is a question in regard to which sympathy has been allowed to prevail over sanity, zeal over discernment; it is a question regarding which the advocates outside Turkey of the one cause or the other have sought to stampede public opinion rather than to sift the facts, to indict rather than to judge. It is therefore a question on which it is as difficult (in view of the accumulated mass of prejudice this way or that) as it is necessary to

¹ W. H. Hutton, *Constantinople* (London, 1900).

clear the mind of preconceived opinions in order to arrive at the truth. And the truth is to be sought somewhere between the extremes represented on the one hand by the picture of the *rayah* as *ex hypothesi* and in every case the innocent victim and martyr, and, on the other, by that of the Turk as invariably the patient gentleman subjected to almost intolerable provocation on the part of his Christian fellow-subjects. In this connexion the derivation of the term *rayah*, which in the Ottoman Empire denoted a member of a recognized non-Moslem *millet*, is not without significance. The origin of the term is the Arabic noun *riaya*, meaning literally those who are pastured, that is to say, a flock or herd and hence, by analogy, the governed; and in certain respects the position of the *rayahs* in the Ottoman Empire bore a distinct likeness to that of a flock or herd.¹ Confined in their separate pens, within which they were suffered to live their own lives in their own way so long as they were obedient and gave no trouble, their designation was not drawn without reason from the metaphor of the sheepfold.

During the reigns of Abdul Mejid and Abdul Aziz the Near Eastern question, which has been defined as the problem of filling up the vacuum created by the gradual disappearance of the Turkish Empire from Europe,² remained acute, although the Treaty of Paris, in 1856, provided a settlement that endured, in part,

¹ It is an interesting fact that in Maltese, which is an ancient Semitic language, one of the words for a bishop, *raay*, is derived from the same root, thus preserving the literal meaning of pastor of a flock.

² W. Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, 1801-1927*, re-issue of the 3rd edition with appendix (Cambridge, 1934).

until Russia next invaded Turkey in 1877 and precipitated the events that led to the more comprehensive settlement of the Treaty of Berlin. With the exception of the Emperor Nicholas I, who openly advocated the ending and partition of the Ottoman Empire,¹ the rulers of Europe were in favour of its reform and preservation; and, the more that Turkish Governments contracted foreign loans, the more the nations who had subscribed them were interested in Turkey's survival. This apart, there was, even before Abdul Hamid II applied his talents to breaking up the Concert of Europe, not much unity of purpose among its members.

Russia was directly interested in two categories of the Sultan's subjects, which overlapped though they did not coincide, those of the Orthodox faith and those of Slav blood, on whom she sought to impose what Count Aehrenthal subsequently described as "an ethnological Papacy"; France and Austria were interested in protecting the Roman Catholics; Great Britain genuinely desired a reformed Turkey. When the Emperor Nicholas, in 1853, offered her Egypt and Crete as her share of the Empire to be dismembered, he was informed that our only interest in Egypt was concerned with our communications with India. In fact, the main preoccupation of British Near Eastern policy at this time² was to

¹ He made specific proposals to this effect to the British Government in 1844 and again in 1853. On the latter occasion he said to the Ambassador, Sir Hamilton Seymour: "We have on our hands a sick man—a very sick man; it will be, I tell you frankly, a great misfortune if one of these days he should slip away from us, especially before all necessary arrangements were made".

² For an exhaustive study of this policy *cf.* H. Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea* (London, 1936).

prevent Russia's expansion at Turkey's expense from becoming, as it was believed to be intended to be, a menace to India. Certainly that fear was, as we know now, sometimes exaggerated and the "Russian bogey" not always as menacing as he was made out to be. Unfortunately, the suspicions which it engendered led to inconsistencies in our Turkish policy which sometimes had the appearance of combining friendship towards the Turk with the encouragement of the aspirations of those seeking to throw off his yoke, and caused other Powers to attribute our diplomacy to that British perfidy which was then so cardinal a point of Continental belief. "The Russians are not the only people", as Sir Charles Eliot remarks in one of his characteristic asides, "who have begun by interfering on behalf of oppressed Christians, and ended by somewhat irrelevantly taking a piece of Turkish territory." On the other hand, it can be urged that in Great Britain concern for the Christian population of Turkey was not the manifestation of Government policy alone but was also the expression of popular feeling. And to this feeling the number of reports called for by Parliament during the reigns of Abdul Mejid and Abdul Aziz on the internal state of Turkey, and made public, bears witness.

Only the Turk himself evoked nobody's sympathy, despite the foreign interest extended to the Greeks, the Rumanians, the Bulgars, the Serbs, the Armenians. Perhaps it was partly his own fault, for he had not even begun to be interested in himself as one of his Padi-shah's oppressed or suppressed nationalities, while to outsiders he was identified with the defects and vices

of his Government. Those critics of the Ottoman Government who in their charges against Turkish administration made the Turkish people the fellow-defendants of their rulers failed to realize how often the real Turks, that is to say, the Anatolian peasants, far from being identifiable with the Osmanli official, were regarded by the latter as merely the raw material of the State, almost as its helots, no more to be petted or protected than the least considered of *rayahs*. The Turkish section of the population had travelled far indeed from the early days of the Turkish advance into Europe, when the Turkish people constituted a nation in arms jointly reaping the benefit of their joint conquests.

Among the British Parliamentary Papers on Turkey to which allusion has been made one of the most enlightening is that containing the "Reports received from Her Majesty's Ambassador and Consuls relating to the condition of Christians in Turkey", presented to the House of Commons and published in 1867. This print is a valuable commentary on the period we are considering, partly because it was published twenty-eight years after the proclamation of the Tanzimat, eleven years after that of the Khatt-i-Humayun, and is thus able to measure the efficacy or otherwise of those reforms so admirable and comprehensive on paper, partly because every part of the Empire in which there were Christians comes under the examination of the Consular Officers whose reports it contains. These officers were specialists in their task, able men who in almost all cases had spent their entire official careers living amongst and studying the various races of the

Ottoman Empire, and it is clear from the reports that the writers, without exception, were actuated by that sympathy with the peoples with whom they had to deal which has always been one of the characteristics of British officials in the East. It is likewise clear that all have been at pains to sum up the situation of Turk and *rayah* conscientiously and with impartiality. Naturally, conditions varied in the several provinces of this still wide and diverse Empire, both on account of differences of race and on account of the sentiments, efficiency and attitude of the individual Turkish governors. In some of the Consular districts the Christians were at a serious disadvantage *vis-à-vis* their Moslem fellow-subjects, in others their prosperity was in marked contrast to the penury of the bulk of the Mohammedan population. It is therefore not possible to draw any uniform conclusions applicable to the twenty-five Consular districts dealt with, but a certain broad impression emerges none the less from the reports. In the first place condemnation of the general features of the central Government, its inefficiency, its venality, its unprogressive and unintelligent administration, is almost universal; equally general is the conclusion that the defects of the Turkish Government bore heavily on the Moslem no less than on the *rayah*. This aspect of the matter is well summarized in the following paragraph of the report of Mr. Sandwith, Vice-Consul at Larnaca in Cyprus:

"Though they [sc. the Greeks] have just cause then to complain of the inferior position which they hold in the eye of the law in the instances already mentioned, both Mussulmans and Christians have equal cause to be dissatisfied with

the maladministration which, in these days of commercial activity, arrests the development of the resources of the island. The Government derives a revenue of 230,000l. from Cyprus, and the expenses of administration amount at most to 30,000l., the surplus of 200,000l. finding its way to the Treasury at Constantinople. Nothing whatever is spent on the improvement of the country, no roads are constructed, no bridges thrown across the winter torrents. But these and other instances of a careless or vicious administration which could be enumerated are not exclusively detrimental to the interests of the Greek population, and, therefore, I refrain from dwelling on them here. But I think that there can be no doubt that the evils which press equally upon Turks and Greeks are more intolerable than those of which the Greeks alone have cause to complain."

That the provinces existed mainly to supply the central Government with funds instead of the central Government developing the resources of the provinces has always been a basic complaint with critics, however well disposed, of Ottoman rule.

Secondly, the inferiority of Christian to Moslem evidence in courts of law is generally admitted and deplored, although, as the following quotations will indicate, several Consuls add to their condemnation a mitigating explanation. My first quotation is from the report of Mr. Maling, Vice-Consul at Kavalla in Thrace:

"The great test of the equality of Christian and Mussulman before the law, the admission of Christian evidence, signally fails before the experience of the late ten years. Christian evidence is utterly rejected in the lower Criminal Courts and only received in the higher when corroborated by

Mussulman. Only in the tribunals of commerce, where unsworn depositions are made, is it admitted. But as virtually the Spiritual Courts are paramount and leave no jurisdiction to the others, Christian testimony is practically ignored altogether as the Spiritual Courts will take no account of it. These Courts exercise their proper, as well as their usurped prerogatives, on grossly arbitrary and corrupt principles. A Mussulman's simple allegation, unbacked by evidence or even by his oath, will upset the best founded and most incontrovertible claim. The nearest Court of Appeal being 100 miles away, the Christian is, of necessity, in most cases a helpless sufferer.

"That this system should receive the support and countenance of conscientious Mussulmans, as it does, can only be explained by concluding that they regard it as a necessary defence against the Christian, whose immeasurable superiority in intellect, education and aptitude for industrial and all other pursuits would beat the Turk out of the field altogether, but for the arms which the executive and tribunals put into his hands."

Similar and equally comprehensive is the comment of Mr. Consul Stuart from Yanina:

"The administration of justice is extremely defective in this country. The tribunals, with the exception of the Mehkemé, or Court of the Sacred Law, are all composed of standing members who exercise the functions of judge and jury, and who are chosen in given proportions from the different religious denominations: the President being always a Mussulman. All these Courts are characterized by the deepest corruption and venality. Judgments are sold with but little attempt at concealment; so that in suits between Ottoman subjects, and sometimes, too, when others are concerned, the verdict is commonly in favour of the party which pays best. The proceedings of the Courts,

moreover, are out of all reason dilatory. As a rule the examination of a case depends on the pleasure of the Court, and is entreated as a favour rather than demanded as a right. Judgment is but too often suspended for no other reason than to give time for underhand solicitations, and to see which of the litigants will bid highest for the verdict.

"Such is the general character of the Courts of Law in this country. No Government can be blameless that sanctions or permits a system so fraught with mischief to the first interests of society. All the odium, however, must not be thrown on the Turks; a large share of it belongs to the Christians; first, to those who are members of the different Courts, and who are in general more dexterous and not less keen than their colleagues in turning to account the opportunities at their command; secondly to the mass of the Christian community who, while continually complaining of the injustice of their rulers, are ever ready to profit by the vicious administration of the law, and are by no means, it is believed, desirous that it should be changed for the better."

Consul Skene from Aleppo puts the case even more bluntly:

"If a Turk has an advantage over a Greek adversary in the religious sympathy of his judges, the Greek has generally more money to bribe them with, and if a Greek has not the advantage of supporting his case by Christian evidence he has an equal facility of subpoenaing Musulman witnesses ready to swear to anything for a couple of dollars."

Thirdly, there is a very general unanimity of praise of the local Turkish officials, coupled with the criticism that they are prevented by the rotten system of their government from carrying out any reforms and that

in their official positions they suffer from absence of security of tenure, with the consequent lack of continuity in local administration.

Not less general is the conclusion that the Moslem subjects of the Porte were victims of Turkish maladministration equally with the *rayahs*. The following sentence in the report from Beirut of Mr. Consul-General Eldridge puts succinctly what many of his colleagues say at greater length:

"From what I have observed during a residence of nearly four years in this country, I should be inclined to say that in the large towns, as a rule, they [sc. the Christians] obtain an equal share of justice with their Mabometan fellow-subjects, though it would be easy to report special and exceptional cases to prove that Christians suffer oppression at the hands of the authorities; but on the other side it would be equally possible to demonstrate that the Mabometans suffer from the acts of their rulers to an equal or greater extent than their Christian fellow-subjects."

Equally universal is the conviction that the *rayahs*, far from resenting their exclusion from military service, regarded as one of their greatest privileges the fact that for the small sum of about four shillings a year they secured exemption from duties and risks which it would have distressed the vast majority intensely to have to undertake and undergo. On this point Consul Calvert, writing from Monastir, voices the opinion of himself and his colleagues in the following terms:

"The exceptional tax paid by non-Moslems in Turkey is the military exemption tax. So distasteful to the Turks is the obligation to serve in the army, that they would be glad to have

the option of compounding upon almost any terms for the tax upon their own life and blood. So far, therefore, from being any grievance to the Christians, this tax must be considered as representing the only real privilege they enjoy."

When we come to the position among the Christians themselves, two points emerge clearly, first, the financial oppression of the *rayah* by his own bishops; secondly, the circumstance that Christians of the Slav races invariably displayed greater anxiety to escape from the spiritual domination of the Greek hierarchy than from the political control of their Turkish lay rulers. This subject will be discussed more fully in the chapter dealing with the Christian *millets*.

The Ambassador, Lord Lyons, transmitted these reports to the Foreign Office with a covering despatch in which he sought to formulate his own conclusions. The quotation which I append from his despatch is a penetrating, restrained and obviously fair summary of a difficult and contentious question:

"It is certain that the Christian subjects of the Sultan are increasing in numbers, in enlightenment, in wealth and in general prosperity; and it is apparent that they have made and are making in these respects a progress outstripping that of the Mussulmans. Christians and Mussulmans both suffer from the defects of the Government, and it is to be observed that in the long lists of grievances of the Christians which are commonly produced, the great majority of the articles are simply the results of a system of Government in itself very far from perfect, and rendered oppressive by an extremely faulty administration. These grievances affect Christians and Mussulmans alike. The reputation of the Porte will certainly not be in-

creased by pointing out the fact that all its subjects, without exception, have great and well-founded cause for complaint; but it is right to correct the false ideas conveyed by representations which neglect to distinguish between those evils which are universal and those which are peculiar to the Christians. It is difficult for the Agent of a foreign Government to guard against being misled on this point. The Christians constantly bring complaints to him, while the Mussulmans are not equally in the habit of seeking foreign aid and sympathy.

“In order to form a fair opinion of the conduct of the Ottoman Government and to estimate justly the success which has attended the endeavours of the Powers of Europe to ameliorate the condition of the Christians, it is necessary to look back as well as to look forward. To those who remember what Turkey was thirty or forty years ago, the improvement in the position of the Christians and in particular the change in the bearing towards them of the Sovereign, and the High Ottoman functionaries, appear immense. Nor is the continual progress of the Christians towards equality with the Mussulmans imperceptible from year to year to an attentive observer. But the traces of four centuries of haughty domination on the part of the Mussulmans, and of abject submission on the part of the Christians, cannot be speedily effaced. The status of the Christians in the Empire is still very far indeed from what it ought to be.

“The mass of the Mabometans cannot be brought to look upon their fellow-subjects as their equals. The result is that the pride and self-respect of the Christians are frequently wounded, and these wounds rankle more than would deeper injuries. All posts under the Government are nominally open to Christians; but, in fact, they are never placed in the highest posts, nor are the offices which are confided to them by any

means so numerous or so important as a fair consideration of the respective numbers and intelligence of the Mussulman and non-Mussulman population would require. In some tribunals, and in some cases, Christian evidence is still not received or not allowed due weight.

“The Christians pay a special tax in lieu of being subject to the conscription. Thus they share neither the horrors nor the burdens of military service, and, as matters now stand, have small reason to desire to do so. In short, very little progress has been made towards enabling the Christians to feel that the Ottoman Government is, as regards them, a national Government. They submit to it as a less evil than anarchy and confusion; and each Christian race appears to value it chiefly as a safeguard against what appears to be to each the great object of dread, the domination of any of the other Christian races in the Empire. To say that no advance has been made of late years towards a more satisfactory state of things would be very unjust, but it can hardly be doubted that, with a little more energy and a little more goodwill on the part of the Ottoman Rulers, the progress might have been much more rapid.”

If it were possible, by generalizing, to sum up in one sentence the respective advantages and disadvantages of the position of Turks and *rayahs* in the Ottoman Empire of the nineteenth century, that sentence might run as follows: that the Turks had the advantage in dignity and precedence at the cost of providing the Empire with its cannon-fodder, while the Christians were able, by means of their better abilities, keener commercial enterprise and immunity from military service, to redress, and in some cases more than redress, the balance of prosperity, though not of dignity, in their favour.

THE CHRISTIAN MILLETS

I

THE history of religions and the development of religious institutions offer many examples of the pursuit of a theoretical unity, at all events of a theoretical uniformity, contradicted by the failure to achieve it in practice. In Islam, as will be seen in Chapter V, the early conception of a single Khalif as the spiritual and temporal head of the entire Mohammedan world was soon to be shattered in the political sphere by the national incompatibility between Persians and Arabs and by the centrifugal tendencies of the Arabs themselves, while, in the sphere of doctrine, does not a Persian poet himself remind us of the "two and seventy jarring sects" and the *Summa* actually foresee no fewer than seventy-three? Similarly, the underlying theory of the Christian Church as gradually, after the Apostolic age, it assumed organized form, was that of its oneness, its non-divisibility. All communicants belonged to the one Church, catholic, orthodox and universal; those who refused to conform to her doctrines were outside her gates, schismatics cut off from her communion. As time went on and theological speculation increased, the Church found it necessary to define and promulgate her teaching by means of Oecumenical or General

Councils, composed of bishops representing all parts of the Christian world; and, until the fifth century, despite minor and fleeting schisms, one creed was used everywhere and unity was maintained. Then, in 431, came the third General Council, that of Ephesus, which was rejected by the followers of Nestorius, who held that Jesus was not one person but rather two, namely the son of Man, the son of David, born of Mary, whose human body was the dwelling-place of the Logos, the Word, the Son of God. This, the first permanent breach in the unity of Christendom, was followed, twenty years later, by the refusal of Eutyches and those who thought with him, the Monophysites, to accept the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon on the subject of the dual nature of Christ. The Council of Chalcedon acknowledged in our Lord "two natures without mixture, without change, without separation, without division"; the Monophysites, whose beliefs were the converse of Nestorianism, argued that His human nature was overshadowed to such an extent by His divinity that He had to all intents and purposes only one nature, the divine. The secession of the Monophysites led to the separation of the peoples known to us to-day as Jacobites, Copts, Abyssinians and Gregorian Armenians from the main body, which was now confined to the Christians who obeyed the five Patriarchs—those of Rome (the Pope), Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem—and the Archbishop of Cyprus, the latter made autocephalous by the Council of Chalcedon.

The three earliest of the Patriarchates, in the order of seniority, were Rome, Alexandria and Antioch. Con-

stantinople and Jerusalem were only made Patriarchates at the Council of Chalcedon; three-quarters of a century previously Constantinople had been nothing more than a local bishopric of Byzantium under the Metropolitan of Heraclea. But in 330 the Emperor Constantine, turning, in the words of Dante, "the eagle against the course of heaven",¹ converted little Byzantium into the great city that bears his name and made of it the capital of the Roman Empire. This change could not fail to modify profoundly the position of the bishop of the new Imperial residence. The bishop of the Old Rome had owed the acceptance of his primacy not a little to the fact that he was the bishop of the Emperor's city; the bishop of the new capital was not slow to benefit by this order of ideas. Within fifty years of the change a General Council had ruled that "the Bishop of Constantinople shall have the primacy of honour after the Bishop of Rome, because that city is New Rome". So the Emperor's bishop had not only become independent of his own Metropolitan; he had gone over the heads of the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch.

It was, indeed, inevitable that this should happen. In the first place, the hierarchical organization of the early Christian Church followed consciously that of the Roman Empire, whose civil divisions into Prefectures, Dioceses and Provinces, ruled respectively by *praefecti*, *vicarii* and *praesides*, served as the model for the Patriarchates, Exarchates and Metropolitan sees of the ecclesiastical world. Secondly, the Roman Empire, after it

¹ "Posciaché Constantin l'aquila volse
Contra il corso del ciel."

Par. VI., i.

became Christian, looked upon the Church as essentially an established body, closely linked with and inseparable from the conception of the State. Constantine, indeed, had allowed the bishops to govern the Church and preferred to remain "the bishop of things outside"; but his successors regarded themselves and were regarded by their subjects in an ever-increasing degree as head of the Church and State alike. Necessarily, therefore, the Emperor's bishop, the bishop of the Imperial Court, assumed an importance commensurate with that of his cathedral city and secured, in the eyes of the Eastern Christians at all events, a position not only more important than that of the Patriarchs of Antioch and Alexandria but more important than that of the Pope, especially after Rome, occupied by barbarian hordes, was politically lost to the Empire. His title of Oecumenical—that is, Universal—Patriarch, assumed at the end of the sixth century, although it did not imply jurisdiction over the other Patriarchs, indicated his newly won position of *primus inter pares* among his brothers of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem.

We have seen, then, that until the fifth century there was only one Church, and that the first breach in its comprehensiveness was made by the Nestorians in 431, the next by the Monophysites in 451. We have seen how the Bishop of Byzantium became, through the transfer of the Imperial capital from the Old to the New Rome, the Oecumenical Patriarch, the most powerful prelate in the eastern division of what was still the Universal Church. The next development is the growing estrangement between Rome and Constantinople,

leading to ultimate separation and schism. When the breach was complete the Patriarchate of the West became the Church of Rome, while the four Eastern Patriarchates formed with the Church of Cyprus the nucleus of what is now the Holy Orthodox Eastern Church.

The reasons for this estrangement were numerous and compelling. In the forefront was the difference in race and language between Westerns and Easterns. The rise of nationalities had begun; the common citizenship of Romans and Constantinopolitans no longer served to disguise the fact that the former were now Italians, the latter Greeks. After a while the common citizenship ceased to exist even in theory. First the Ostrogoths, then the Lombards set up kingdoms in Italy in defiance of the Emperor in Constantinople; the Popes entered into friendly relations with these barbarians; finally, in 800, a Pope actually crowned a barbarian King as Roman Emperor in direct violation of the rights of the true line in the New Rome. And the political separation completed the separation in language: the Byzantines forgot their Latin; the Italians did not learn Greek. Meanwhile the Popes were looking askance at the growing importance of the Patriarchs of Constantinople, while the latter grew to resent more and more what they regarded as the irksome pretensions of the former. If the Romans distrusted the Greeks as shifty intriguers, the Greeks were exasperated by the interferences of the Popes in their ecclesiastical affairs and by their constant insistence on the Roman primacy. Nor was it only a matter of race, speech and differences of national temperament, important as those factors

were: Rome also exacerbated affairs by taking sides in one of the bitterest religious struggles that ever agitated the minds of the Byzantines. Early in the eighth century the Eastern Empire began to be convulsed by the iconoclast controversy, which was settled for the time being in 753 with the condemnation of images. The Isaurian Emperors had fought with might and main to bring about this result, while the Popes on the other hand, who supported images, went so far as to anathematize the iconoclasts at the Synod of the Lateran in 769, and thus to declare what was virtually a religious war on the Imperial party in Eastern Christendom. When, therefore, in 867 Photios, whose disputed election to the Patriarchate of Constantinople had not been recognized by Rome, retaliated by excommunicating the Pope and his followers on doctrinal grounds, the minds of men were already prepared for separation by the political and racial divergencies that had been growing between East and West. Of the five doctrinal arguments advanced by Photios in justification of his act of excommunication, the most important was the addition by the Romans to the creed of the word *Filioque*, whereby they affirmed that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father *and the Son*. The Romans urged that this addition was merely a local Latin use, which they neither claimed nor sought to impose on the other Patriarchates; the Greeks based their position on the anathema pronounced by the Council of Ephesus against anyone who modified or added to the creed without general consent. On the death of Photios the quarrel was patched up, and for another century and a half communion between East and West was restored. But the

schism of Photios had given a powerful fillip to anti-Roman feeling in Constantinople which the subsequent course of history did less than nothing to modify. "*The troubles of the ninth and the eleventh centuries cut Christendom in half along a line that jealousies, misunderstandings, quarrels of all kinds had already long marked out*";¹ and when, in 1053, the Oecumenical Patriarch Michael Cerularius assumed the mantle of Photios and renewed the attack on Roman practices and beliefs (denouncing especially, on this occasion, the use of unleavened bread in the Eucharist), the breach was complete. The other Eastern Patriarchs followed Constantinople, and henceforth, with only two brief periods of reunion, the Churches of East and West go their separate ways. The Fourth Crusade, which, instead of defending the Crusading States in the Holy Land against the Saracens, attacked, plundered and seized the Christian city of Constantinople, overthrew the Byzantine Empire and set up a Latin Empire in its place, was responsible for the culmination of Greek bitterness against the Franks. The two truces—they were nothing more—which were subsequently patched up were rendered possible only through the desperate need which each party had of the other. Although the Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus had retaken Constantinople from the Franks in 1261, he still feared that he might have to defend his capital against another Crusade, while the Pope was striving to preserve what remained of the Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine from total submersion. So the Second Council of Lyons restored the Union in

¹ Fortescue, *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, 3rd edition (London, 1911).

1274. But the people of Constantinople, still smarting at the outrage of the Fourth Crusade, rose against it: and within a decade it was formally repudiated by Michael's successor, the Emperor Andronicus II.

The last of these unnatural reconciliations took place in 1439, when the Eastern Empire was at death's door. Again, only dire necessity on both sides made reunion possible. The Emperor's territory had now been reduced by the relentlessly advancing Turks to little more than the capital and its immediate environs; Pope Eugene IV, for his part, was in difficulties with an Anti-Pope¹ and with the hostile Council of Basle and looked to reunion to give him the necessary accretion of strength wherewith to consolidate his position in Italy. So the penultimate Eastern Emperor, John VII, came to Italy with a magnificent retinue and with the Oecumenical Patriarch Joseph, who did not live to return to his land but died in Florence and lies buried there in the Church of Santa Maria Novella. After more than a year of wrangling, not only over questions of doctrine but over futile minutiae of etiquette and precedence,² the Union was restored for the last time, in 1439, by the famous Council of Ferrara-Florence in the decree beginning "*Laetentur coeli*" ("Let the Heavens rejoice"), and remained in force until the Greeks, now Turkish *rayahs* with nothing more to hope for from the West, rejected it in 1472, nineteen

¹ Duke Amadeus VIII of Savoy, Anti-Pope as Felix V; cf. p. 114, *n*.

² John, with his Empire at its last gasp, could not forget that he was the successor of Constantine, and in his own eyes *de jure* the Lord of the Christian world. The Pope wanted the Patriarch Joseph to kiss his foot and insisted that Joseph's throne should be three steps lower than his own.

years after the capture of Constantinople by Mehmed the Conqueror. But the Council of Florence, if its work failed to live, was the occasion for some of the most sumptuous pageantry in the history of Christendom; and visitors to the Riccardi Palace in Florence may still admire, in Benozzo Gozzoli's wonderfully graphic frescoes, the ceremonial swan-song of the Byzantine Empire.

As it will have been inferred, the Orthodox Church does not differ fundamentally from that of Rome in doctrine; in all essentials the beliefs of the two Churches are the same. But it differs markedly in organization. The Roman Church is one body under one head and has, apart from its affiliated Uniate Churches, only one liturgical language. The Orthodox Church, being sprung not from one Patriarchate but from several, has no sole head but is a federation of independent bodies bound together by the fact that they are in communion with one another, with no central authority in matters of discipline and with only that of an Oecumenical Council in matters of faith. It has no single liturgical language; the services of the church are performed in whatever language happens to be that of the country. At the time of the schism, as we have seen, the component parts of the Orthodox Church were the Patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem and the Church of Cyprus. The Church of Russia, originally a part of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, became autocephalous under the Patriarch of Moscow in 1589.¹ Nearly all the remaining "auto-

¹ For a delightfully written and historically penetrating account of how Boris Godunov extorted the independence of the

cephalous and isotimous” branches of the Orthodox Church are the national Churches of countries which were formerly provinces of the Ottoman and Russian Empires. Thus the Church of Georgia, at first subject to the Patriarchate of Antioch, had become autocephalous in the year 601, was forcibly absorbed by the Church of Russia in 1811, and recovered her independence in 1917; while the latest recruits are the newly formed Churches of the Baltic Republics and the Church of Albania. In the case of the Ottoman Empire—and this circumstance has an all-important bearing on the subsequent history of the peoples concerned—Turkey’s European provinces were ecclesiastically subject to the Patriarch of Constantinople until the rise of the Balkan nationalities in the nineteenth century. It was only when those provinces had wrested their independence from the Sultan that the Churches of those provinces secured from a reluctant Phanar¹ their independence of the Patriarch.

For the sake of clearness the Eastern Churches may be grouped in three categories, of which the first consists of the several autocephalous bodies composing the Holy Orthodox Eastern Church.

The second category is composed of the Churches, in communion neither with the Orthodox Church nor

Russian Church from the Oecumenical Patriarch Jeremias II, *cf.* the chapter entitled “De Byzance à Moscou: Les Voyages d’un Patriarche” in the Vicomte E. M. de Vogüé’s *Histoires Orientales*.

¹ The quarter of Stambul on the shore of the Golden Horn, taking its name from its ancient lighthouse, which was allotted by Mehmed the Conqueror to the Oecumenical Patriarchate and became in a sense the Vatican of Orthodoxy as well as the residential quarter of the leading Greeks of the capital.

with the Church of Rome, which rejected either the Council of Ephesus or that of Chalcedon. These are the Nestorian (or Assyrian), the Jacobite, the Armenian, the Coptic and the Abyssinian Churches.

The third category is formed by the Uniate Churches. From some of the Churches of the first category and from each of those of the second there have seceded at different periods offshoots, which acknowledge the general supremacy of the Pope. These Churches have retained in varying degrees their original constitutions, discipline, languages and rites, but are in communion with the Church of Rome.

2

Mehmed the Conqueror, a youth of only twenty-five when he entered Constantinople, was eminent not alone as a warrior; he was also a shrewd and able statesman. His dynasty had watched with displeasure—for at that time the Turks entertained an exaggerated belief in the power of the Papacy and its ability to bolster up the Eastern Empire—the negotiations for union between the Churches of East and West that had been brought to an ephemeral conclusion at the Council of Ferrara-Florence, and his father Murad II had tried to render them abortive by offering to relieve the wants of the Byzantine Court from his own treasure.¹ Mehmed himself was well aware that his new Christian subjects were numerous and, if disaffected, capable of giving trouble; and he did not want to suffer the economic loss which would have been caused by their

¹ Gibbon, ch. lxvi., quoting Phrantzes.

mass emigration. Moreover, he believed that with an energetic Pope like Paul V a new Crusade was a possibility to be reckoned with. On the other hand, he was equally well aware that many of the Byzantines' most influential leaders had proclaimed their preference for the maintenance of the schism even under the rule of the Turk to ecclesiastical union with Rome under the rule of their own Emperors, and he concluded that hatred of the Papacy might well make of the Orthodox, if wisely handled, not only docile but willing subjects. When, therefore, he adopted the precedent of his predecessors on the Constantinopolitan throne¹ by his investiture of the new Orthodox Patriarch, he was following custom indeed, but following it consciously, not automatically. In going a step farther by the grant of his *berat* and the privileges of official rank in the Ottoman Empire to Gennadios II, Mehmed deliberately aimed at binding the most important Christian institution in his dominions, the Orthodox Church, to his person and his throne; and this could best be done, as he thought, by conferring on its head a sort of Imperial patriciate and making him a part of the Imperial machinery. How successful this policy was to prove, how the Oecumenical Patriarchate was to become not only an integral part of the State but even the agent of Ottoman policy, will appear in the course of this chapter.

The Byzantine Empire had been no more national

¹ To a certain extent, too, the precedent of his own predecessors, who had been according recognition in their Asiatic provinces to the Orthodox bishops nominated by the Patriarchs as the civil and religious heads of the Orthodox communities. Cf. *Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. iv., p. 625.

from the Greek point of view than its Ottoman successor was to be national from the Turkish; and its official designation of "Roman", which was maintained to the end of its life, tended to become an artificial, non-national term exactly as the term "Ottoman" was to become in its turn. The Byzantine Empire had never been Roman save in tradition, while, if the language of its administration was Greek, it was so little Greek in national feeling in the modern sense of the words that it accepted among its Emperors, as we have seen, men of the most diverse racial origins. It obeyed one master, alike of State and Church, it acknowledged one faith, it had, officially and ecclesiastically, one language; but there was as wide a racial variety among its inhabitants as in the Empire which succeeded it. It is evident that under such conditions some unifying element was bound to take the place which was occupied in States otherwise constituted by nationality, and that element was membership of the Orthodox Church. It is because of the important fact that among the subjects of the Basileus Orthodoxy was the equivalent of nationality elsewhere that creed, and not a political, racial or linguistic allegiance, became and remained the dominant classification of the same peoples when they became the subjects of the Sultan. And it was through this identification of citizenship of the Empire with adherence to the Orthodox faith that the term "Roman" came ultimately to be applied not only to Greeks but to Slavs and to Orthodox Arabs.

The subjects of the East Roman or Byzantine Empire, from its foundation under Constantine the Great to its fall under Constantine XII, were not only accustomed

to describe themselves as Romans; they would have regarded any other name as inappropriate. The term "Hellene", which is that used by the Greek of to-day to designate his national status or national aspirations, would have been rejected with indignation by the zealous Christians of Byzantium, even by those of them who were Greek in blood and language, because of the pagan connotation which it bore in the mediaeval mind. When, therefore, the Ottoman Sultan took the place of the Byzantine Emperor on the throne of Constantinople, this name of Roman, Ῥωμαῖος, which the Turks contracted into "Rûm", survived as the designation of all Ottoman subjects of the Orthodox faith, irrespective of their race or language.

"Nor was the designation"—I quote from the Report of Sir Anton Bertram and myself to the Palestine Government on the affairs of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem¹—"an official designation only. The members of the Orthodox Church in the Turkish dominions thought of themselves as 'Romans'. To this day, Orthodox peasants, not only in Greece but even at times in Serbia and Bulgaria, speak of themselves as 'Romans'. . . . The word 'Roman' thus included not only the Greeks of Hellas, the islands, the capital city and the various Greek centres of Asia Minor but also the Serbs, the Rumanians and the Bulgarians of the Balkan Peninsula, and the Arabic-speaking Orthodox communities of Syria, Palestine and Egypt. The history of the Christian populations of Turkey in modern times is to a great

¹ Report of the Commission appointed by the Government of Palestine to inquire into the affairs of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem. By the Commissioners, Sir Anton Bertram and Harry Charles Luke (Oxford University Press, 1921).

extent the history of the disintegration of this artificial unity. In the Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem the Arabic-speaking Orthodox population long ago ceased to have a common national consciousness with its Greek ecclesiastical authorities. In Turkish eyes Greek bishops, Greek monks and Arabic-speaking laity were all alike 'Roman', and were so officially described;¹ but this official designation had ceased to correspond with the facts. On the one hand the Arabic-speaking Christians had become, to a certain extent, identified in sentiment with the Arabic-speaking population around them and described themselves as Arabs, while on the other hand the Greek ecclesiastics and monks had acquired a new national consciousness or, rather, had retained their old national consciousness under a new name. They conceived of themselves no longer as 'Romans' but as 'Hellenes'. . . . With the gradual liberation of the Greek race, which began with the Greek War of Independence, the word 'Hellenes', as a national designation, revived; and nowadays all those who either are, or conceive themselves to be, members of the Greek race, whether in the Empire or in free Greece or in any other country, have come to develop a common consciousness as 'Hellenes'. The existence of this conception was never officially recognized by the Turkish Empire. The Orthodox subjects of the Turkish Empire were known as Roman ('Rûm'), whatever national or other consciousness they might see fit to cherish."

In the pagan Roman Empire, uniformity of citizenship had prevailed over diversity of blood, and *civis Romanus* was a definition applied to men of many races. When, after the division of the Empire, its eastern half was no longer inhabited or ruled by Romans yet kept

¹ Cf. the appendix to this chapter, pp. 103-104.

the name of Roman; when these "Romans" ceased after the schism between the Eastern and Western Churches to be Roman in religion, even to the limited extent of recognizing the Pope as one of the five Patriarchs of the Universal Church, and when they ceased after the fall of the Byzantine Empire to be Roman in allegiance to the Christian successor of the Caesars on the throne of the New Rome, the retention of the name by the members of the Orthodox Church in Turkey became a contradiction in terms. For what had happened was that a body the criterion of whose membership was a particular spiritual allegiance centred in the East (and repudiating Rome) had taken over the name which had originally denoted membership of a political organization emanating from the West. The Turks, as has been said, described the Ottoman Orthodox as Rûm; the Seljuq Turks called their Sultanate of Konia Rûm because it was conquered from Byzantium; while "Romaic" is even now the name which the modern Greek, whether in Greece itself or outside it, gives to the popular as opposed to the literary form of his language.

3

It is a common solecism, both in England and elsewhere, when reference is intended either to the Orthodox Church as a whole or to various of its component autocephalous parts, to speak of them loosely as the "Greek Church". The origin of this solecism lies in the historical phenomena, mention of some of which has already been made, first, that the *primus inter pares* of the heads of the autocephalous Orthodox Churches, the

Oecumenical Patriarch, had his seat in the capital of the Byzantine Empire; secondly, that until the resurrection of the independent Slav kingdoms of the Balkans in the course of the nineteenth century Rumanians, Serbs and Bulgars¹ were spiritually subject to the Patriarchs of Constantinople; thirdly, that the latter, as a Greek national consciousness began under Ottoman rule to develop in the Phanar, pursued a policy of Hellenization by appointing none but Greeks to the bishoprics and by using every endeavour to suppress Slavonic culture and the Slavonic languages in favour of Greek. It is only, as has been said, since the Slav kingdoms obtained their national independence of the Sultan that their inhabitants secured their spiritual independence of the Oecumenical Patriarchs and were able to revive their national Churches under prelates of their own races. And so, while in the Ottoman Empire the Orthodox were termed "Roman", outside it the popular mind has been led to regard "Orthodox" as an interchangeable term with "Greek" by a confusion of thought which the Greeks themselves have done nothing to discourage. To such an extent has there been confusion between the conceptions of Greek and Orthodox that, in the Greek War of Independence, the Constituent Assembly which met at Troezen in 1822 proclaimed that "all inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire who believe in Christ are included in the designation of Hellenes". And the Phanariote Pitzipios² could write as recently as 1855 that "the Christian populations of the East are

¹ But not the Montenegrins, who had maintained their independence of Sultan and Phanar alike.

² *L'Eglise orientale* (Rome, 1855).

composed, as everyone knows, of Greeks and of a large part of those who follow the Greek rite and on that account are designated Greeks". The confusion of thought in English-speaking countries is helped by the fact that the word "Greek" has been used in English to translate not only the Turkish and Arabic "Yunan" (*i.e.* Ionian), which means a subject of the modern Greek State founded in 1830, but also the word "Rûm", the designation applied, as we have seen, by Turks and Arabs not alone to all Greeks (including those of the Diaspora) but likewise, for the reasons explained above, to the members of the Orthodox faith, irrespective of race, throughout the Ottoman dominions.¹

Nevertheless the Greeks, whatever the names under which they thought of themselves or by which they were known, were to play a determining part in the life of the Ottoman Empire and in the destinies of their fellow-Orthodox under the Sultan's rule, whether these were of Greek blood or not. Yet their beginnings under the Turkish dispensation, after the first flush of the Imperial favour had begun to fade, were dreary enough. The Orthodox Church, at first the sole instrument of their activities, was servile under the Sultans not only

¹ The official name of the Orthodox Church as a whole is "The Holy Orthodox Eastern Church"; and of the total membership of this Church Greeks form about 9 per cent, the remainder being composed of Slavs, Rumanians, Balts, Albanians, Caucasians and Arabs. The only Church to which the name of "Greek Church" can correctly be applied is that autocephalous branch of the Orthodox Church which is under the jurisdiction of the Holy Synod of Greece, in other words, the national Church of the modern Greek State.

on account of the changed conditions but because it had already learned to be servile under the Christian Emperors, and it now seemed to concentrate its energies upon internal feuds. Exhausted by the factiousness and intrigues of which the Phanar has ever been a centre, the Patriarch Gennadios resigned his thankless task after a reign of five troubled years, and his successor, Joasaph Kokkas, equally unable to endure the quarrels of his Synod and the turbulence of his clergy, threw himself down a well. It is true that he was rescued, with the result that the Greeks, in the words of Finlay, "were spared the scandal of hearing that their Patriarch had voluntarily plunged into the pains of hell to escape the torment of ruling the Orthodox Church on earth", but his deliverance also made it possible for the Turks to deprive him both of his beard and of his throne because he refused to countenance a marriage between a Turkish courtier and a Christian lady, the widow of the Duke of Athens. This Patriarch may well merit our sympathy and our respect, but under his successor, whose name was Mark, first appeared the scandal of simony which for the next three centuries was so terrible and unfortunately so outstanding a characteristic of the Oecumenical throne. Finlay does not hesitate to say that, after the Turkish conquest, "simony became a part of the constitution of the Orthodox Church". Greek emigrants from Trebizond, whose independent Empire had fallen in 1461, coveted the Patriarchal throne for one of their number and proposed to the Sultan an annual tribute of 1000 ducats if he would oust Mark in favour of their candidate, a monk appropriately named Simeon. The bargain was concluded, but in the follow-

ing year Dionysios of Philippopolis came forward with the offer of double that sum. Simeon followed in the wake of Mark but may have found his consolation in the fate of Dionysios, who was accused of having carried servility to the Turkish authorities to the extent of having submitted to the initiatory ceremonies of Islam. Dionysios had to convince his doubting Synod by ocular evidence that the charge was baseless, but was none the less deposed. Soon the price of the Patriarchate increased by leaps and bounds as the possibilities of this new source of revenue came to be realized. For a short time its official valuation was at the rate of 3000 ducats a year, but the appetite of Sultan and Viziers, favourites and intermediaries was quickly whetted by ambitious prelates only too eager to outbid each other, almost invariably at the expense of their flocks. In 1583 the brother of a wealthy merchant paid 12,000 ducats to be elected in the place of Jeremias II, the Patriarch who, as we have seen above, was forced to grant the independence of the Russian Church to Boris Godunov. Then Metrophanes III bought the see for 24,000 ducats. In 1620 Timothy II was called upon by the Grand Vizier to pay 100,000 ducats on the ground that he had created 300 Metropolitans during his eight years of office. And another Patriarch went so far as to apply to the Sheikh ul-Islam for a *fetva* on a question of the succession to a certain bishopric. He obtained his *fetva* in the desired sense by means of a bribe which he proceeded to recover from the see. In Cobham's catalogue of the Patriarchs of Constantinople¹ we find the following remarkable statistics. Of 328

¹ Cf. p. 16, n.

vacancies between A.D. 36 and 1884

140	were by deposition
41	by resignation
3	Patriarchs were poisoned
2	„ „ murdered
1	Patriarch was beheaded
1	„ „ blinded
1	„ „ drowned
1	„ „ hanged
1	„ „ strangled

so that only 137 closed their term of office by a natural death, a circumstance rendering it surprising to read that one Patriarch, Kallinikos III, should have died of joy on hearing of his election in 1726. Thus we see that frequency of deposition is another outstanding feature of the history of these unfortunate prelates. "Formerly", wrote Elias Habesci in 1784, "*they held their places for life; at present they are removed by banishment to the isle of Princes, six leagues from Constantinople, as soon as a competitor offers to gratify the Grand Vizier with a larger present, or annual tribute, than the possessor. These removals became so frequent that the patriarchs in exile found it necessary to build a large, commodious house, which they adorned with spacious gardens for themselves and their successors.*" Many Patriarchs have had two, three, four and five reigns; one, the celebrated Cyril Lucar, had as many as six. Cyril Lucar, unhappy as was his ultimate fate, yet rose superior to the sordid influences of his environment and of his times to pursue objects worthy of a Christian and a bishop, but he was an exception among his brothers. The chronicles of the Phanar in this dark

period do not afford edifying reading; one is reminded of Dante's vision of outcast prelates wandering wretchedly in one of the abysses of his *Inferno*, poor figures lacking the qualities of courage and greatness that might have made them tragic:

E vidi gente per lo vallon tondo
Venir tacendo e lagrimando, al passo
Che fan le letanie in questo mondo.

It may be thought that few of the occupants of the Oecumenical throne can have risen to the height of their sacred office, and such a judgment would be easy enough to justify. At the same time we should in fairness remember that public opinion in the Near East expects of the episcopate qualities rather different from those demanded of it by public opinion in the West: "*In regions where races clash and unredeemed populations struggle against a foreign yoke, a bishop must have nothing of the priest about him except his robes. Unless he combines the courage of a soldier with the guile of a diplomatist and fitness for high command, he may be a saint but he is no fit pastor of militant nationalities. So long as the Near East is not delimited according to right and according to race, saintliness is a positive defect unless it is corrected by the masterfulness of a ruler.*" These words are the translation of the opening paragraph of a review, in an Athenian newspaper of the 29th June/12th July, 1915, of the career of the Bulgarian Exarch Joseph. The review was naturally hostile to its subject, for the life-work of the Exarch, from his election in 1877 to his death in 1915, was accomplished at the expense of Hellenism in European Turkey. But the review acknowledges that, in the Churches militant of Macedonia, the qualifications of Slav and Hellenic

prelates must perforce be alike, and it sets out these qualifications with complete frankness. The preceding pages have necessarily painted a dark picture of the Orthodox hierarchy under Turkish rule, while the succeeding ones will endeavour to explain why the Eastern bishop in the Ottoman Empire was servile to his masters and tyrannous towards his flock. It is certainly not for nothing that in Romaic Greek a bishop is called *δεσπότης*, the despot. The appointment to higher offices in a Church by a non-Christian Eastern Government must lead to bribery and intrigue and to the elimination of the best men, a circumstance which explains why great men have been rare among the bishops of the Ottoman Empire. As Canon Wigram so truly says, in his wide experience of the Eastern Churches, "it is not often that sheer force of lofty character can prevail and win high office in the Church under a Government that does not care for loftiness of character and dreads strong men anywhere".¹

It will be readily understood that the importance of the Oecumenical Patriarchs under Ottoman rule was due less to their spiritual influence than to the administrative jurisdiction which they exercised as holders of the Sultan's *berat*. True, they were in a sense the successors of the Basileus in his ecclesiastical capacity, but their religious authority had been sadly degraded by the circumstances set out above. Infinitely more important was the fact that the possession of the Sultan's *berat* constituted them the civil heads of their flock, the

¹ *An Introduction to the History of the Assyrian Church* (London, 1910), p. 97.

political chiefs of their nation, *millet* or *ἔθνος*, the ethnarchs of their community, the spokesmen of their people before the Imperial throne. Indeed, for a few years after the capture of Constantinople they were more than the ethnarchs of the Christians of the Orthodox faith: the Conqueror's original *berat* gave them jurisdiction over all Christians in the Empire, of whatever Church and rite. Eight years later, Mehmed, fearful of so much power in the hands of one authority, set up in his capital an Armenian Patriarch whom he placed not only over the Armenians but over the Latins, the Jacobites, the Nestorians and the Copts,¹ whom he withdrew from the competence of the Orthodox primate. Yet, even when shorn of these communities, the Oecumenical Patriarchate exercised influence, for good or for ill, over great numbers of men of many races and tongues, however precarious might be an individual Patriarch's tenure of his throne.

The influence of the Oecumenical Patriarchate and, on a lesser scale, of the Patriarchates of Alexandria, Jerusalem and Antioch,² operated in two principal directions, racial and political. In the racial field it aimed at the cultural Hellenization of the Slav and Arab Orthodox; in the political sphere it sought to make the Orthodox Church the handmaid of the Sultan and the instrument of Ottoman policy. In the pursuit of the first of these aims the Phanariotes saw to it that the bishoprics and other lucrative offices of the Church

¹ In the course of time each of these communities, and several others, were constituted into separate *millet*s; cf. p. 99.

² Until the Patriarchate of Antioch passed, in 1900, from Greek into Arab control.

became a perquisite of the Greek clergy, in the non-Greek no less than in the Greek provinces; suppressed the use of the Slavonic tongues in the liturgy and imposed the Greek language in their place; burned Slavonic church books; destroyed the old autocephalous Slav Churches of Ochrida and Ipek and annexed their faithful and their revenues to the Oecumenical see. The author of *Turkey in Europe* paints a melancholy picture of Phanariote ecclesiastical rule in the Balkan Peninsula:

"The Phanariote clergy in Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia and Macedonia were little more than a body of rapacious and extortionate tax-gatherers sent to fleece the Slavonic populations for the Patriarch of Constantinople. They exacted payment for the performance of all religious functions under various names. . . . Monasteries were let to the highest bidder, who turned out the monks or not as he chose. The Slavonic clergy had no education, influence or chance of promotion; they were often kept by their Greek superiors as domestic servants, and beaten in church during divine service if they happened to anger their masters. The morals of these latter were in harmony with their corruption and tyranny. The road to their favour generally lay through the mistresses whom they openly kept, and their demands were a terror to the village maidens or to those interested in the latter's chastity."

Such a régime may well seem indefensible to us, and yet there is something that may be said on its behalf. It disseminated a measure of Greek culture and of knowledge of the Greek language about the Balkan Peninsula, then educationally at a low ebb, although it must be admitted that it did so at the cost, if not of destroying, at least of driving underground the surviv-

ing traces of the indigenous cultures of Rumanians, Serbs and Bulgars and of delaying their revival until the nineteenth century. Again, its ambition to unite all the Orthodox in Turkey in Europe under one ecclesiastical authority and to bind them still closer together by a single liturgical language was doubtless an impracticable but in the circumstances of the time not necessarily an unworthy ideal; and Greek was the obvious and, indeed, the only possible language for such a purpose. So far as the Greeks themselves were concerned, the Phanar created and cultivated a sort of Hellenic national feeling which helped to make possible the subsequent foundation of modern Greece. Even in this respect, however, there is not agreement among the authorities as to the value of the Phanar's contribution to the cause of Greek nationalism. Von Ranke, and with him a section of modern Greeks, hold that it was the Phanar that upheld the torch of Hellenism through the dark centuries of Turkish oppression, while Finlay maintains that the Phanar was to such an extent the servile instrument of Turkish policy as to be positively anti-national from the Greek point of view. On the one hand, we read of Greeks declaring, in the early years of the new kingdom, that they still looked to the Patriarch as their natural leader rather than to the "*roitelet d'Athènes*". On the other hand, some of the British Parliamentary Papers of the middle of the nineteenth century alluded to in Chapter III¹ are eloquent as to the extortion practised by the Greek hierarchy upon

¹ See, in particular, *Reports received from Her Majesty's Consuls relating to the condition of Christians in Turkey, 1860*, presented to both Houses of Parliament in 1861.

their flocks, both in the sees inhabited by Greeks and in those inhabited by Slavs and Rumanians. The attitude of the bishops is illustrated by an incident related in connexion with the grant of the Khatt-i-Humayun, which, it will be recalled, included a clause substituting fixed salaries for the dues which the episcopate had hitherto been able to squeeze from their flocks. When the Metropolitan of Ismid (Nicomedia) heard the Imperial rescript read and then replaced, in accordance with the protocol, in its envelope of crimson satin, he is reported to have exclaimed: "Pray God it may remain there".¹ If the Greek peasants thus suffered at the hands of their bishops, the plight of the non-Greek Orthodox in the Ottoman dominions was worse, especially in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Contemporary writers of various nations bear witness that in the days of the greatness of the Ottoman Empire the Sultan's dominions were better administered and economically more productive than many parts of Christian Europe, and that the mass of the *rayah* peasantry enjoyed more personal liberty and a larger measure of the fruits of their toil under the Padishah than did their contemporaries under many of the Christian rulers.² But with the decay on the one hand of the efficiency and power of the Sultans, on the other of the ideals of the Orthodox hierarchy, the condition of the *rayahs*, particularly of the Serbs, the Bulgars and the inhabitants of the

¹ Engelhardt, *La Turquie et le Tanzimat* (Paris, 1882), vol. i., p. 142.

² Cf. Sir T. W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, 2nd edition (London, 1913), chap. vi. of which deals at length with this theme.

Danubian Principalities, became less and less tolerable. These luckless people lay beneath a double yoke, that of Turkish pasha and Greek bishop, while the lot of Moldavians and Wallachians was perhaps the least enviable of all, for in the Principalities the civil no less than the ecclesiastical administration was in the hands of Phanariote Greeks.

Hitherto, in referring to the Phanariotes, I have had in mind the Oecumenical Patriarch and his hierarchy, but a lay element now begins to assume an almost equal importance. In 1669 the Grand Vizier Ahmed Kiöprülü, finding that the primitive diplomatic methods of earlier times could no longer cope with the increasing complexities of Turkey's relations with foreign Powers, decided to enlist in this connexion the services of the clever and prosperous Greek plutocracy, the successors rather than the descendants of the old Byzantine aristocracy,¹ who had established themselves around the Patriarchal palace in the Phanar quarter. His first step in this direction was to appoint his secretary, a Greek of Chios, to the influential post of Dragoman to the Sublime Porte. Then came the selection of another Phanariote to be Dragoman of the Fleet, and similar appointments followed until, in the eighteenth century, the Hospodarships of the two Danubian Principalities became the almost invariable perquisites—and the summit of the ambition of—this class of Phanariote laymen.

The Hospodars maintained a pomp and luxury in their capitals of Jassy and Bucharest that became and remained a byword and afforded a grim contrast with

¹ These had either been killed in 1453 or had emigrated abroad.

the poverty of the Rumanian villages, which were bled to support their foreign masters, civil and ecclesiastical. Similarly, the other leading Phanariotes who took a large share, as middlemen, in the administration of the Empire were equally notorious for the exactions they levied on their co-religionists, while the Bishops' tours of their sees were tax-collecting raids rather than pastoral visitations. These high officers, spiritual and lay alike, had secured their posts by means of a heavy outlay of *bakhshish*; and this outlay, no less than the means of maintaining the state which they affected, had to be recouped from the tiller of the soil and the small trader.

The free hand which their Turkish masters gave the Phanariotes over the masses of the Orthodox was conditional on their unquestioned loyalty and their obligation to serve the régime in any way they might be called upon to do. It was the price which the Orthodox Church had to pay for its official status, its internal autonomy and its freedom to work its will on those within its jurisdiction. Consequently the laity were exhorted by the clergy to obedience; and, at the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence (which actually began in the Danubian Principalities), the Phanar looked doubtfully on the movement and the Oecumenical Patriarch, Gregory V, actually anathematized the insurgent leaders and called upon them to lay down their arms. Even this step did not prevent the unfortunate Gregory from being hanged outside the gate of the Phanar, together with six other bishops, on Easter Sunday, 1821; but it was the general attitude of the Phanar, as manifested in this case, that led the Greek

kingdom, once it was safely established, to withdraw its territories from the spiritual jurisdiction of the Oecumenical see and to set up, in 1833, its own autocephalous Church. It was only in 1850 that the Phanar, reluctantly and under Russian pressure, recognized the Church of the Greek kingdom as independent.

4

In the preceding pages have been discussed the political relationship that existed between the Ottoman rulers and the leaders of their Christian subjects and the political tendencies and development of the Orthodox Church in the Empire, the most powerful and the most characteristic of the recognized Christian bodies under the Sultan's rule. Let us now leave these topics to examine briefly the detailed framework of the *millet*s.

The heads, both central and local, of the *millet*s were chosen by the *millet*, but the choice was subject to the Sultan's approval, communicated in the form of an Imperial *berat*, which alone enabled the nominees to assume their offices and take possession of their temporalities. The *berat*, a typical specimen of which is printed as an appendix to this chapter, may be likened to a mediaeval investiture in the Holy Roman Empire. The heads, both central and local, of the *millet*s had, as has been said above, their place—a high one—in the official hierarchy of the State, of which they were regarded as functionaries; they were granted the title of honour (*rütbe*) in the Ottoman honorific list suitable to their rank; and, after the institution of Ottoman decorations in the nineteenth century, they received

appropriate grades in the Orders of the Osmanié and the Mejdidié. They were *ex officio* members, in the provinces, of the provincial administrative councils, while those at headquarters had the right of audience of the Sultan. The heads of the *millet*s represented their flocks in their general and personal affairs *vis-à-vis* the Sublime Porte.¹

The autonomy of the *millet*s was based, as we have seen, on ancient custom, which was reinforced in the nineteenth century by specific edicts² whose general spirit is incorporated in the Khatt-i-Humayun. Their government was conducted by the head of the *millet*, generally assisted by a council composed of clerical and lay members. The *millet*s were autonomous in spiritual and in certain administrative and judicial matters. Their jurisdiction embraced, in the religious sphere, clerical discipline; in the administrative sphere, the control of their properties, including cemeteries, education and churches; in the judicial sphere, marriage, dowries, divorce and alimony, civil rights and, in some *millet*s, testamentary dispositions. Sentences pronounced by the courts of the *millet*s, if within their competence, were executed on their behalf by the State. In the case of *millet*s whose spiritual heads, such as the Pope and the Katholikos of Echmiadzin, supreme Head of the Gregorian Armenian Church, resided outside Turkey, they were obliged to be represented in their relations

¹ The Patriarchates, Archbishoprics, Bishoprics, monasteries, churches, etc., of the several Christian *millet*s at the beginning of the twentieth century are best shown in Major R. Huber's two maps, *L'Empire Ottoman: Carte Statistique des Cultes Chrétiens*, published by Baader & Gross, Cairo.

² For the texts of these cf. George Young, *Corps de Droit Ottoman*, 7 vols. (Oxford, 1905-1906).

with the Government by a dignitary dwelling in the Ottoman Empire, as the Porte consistently refused on principle to treat on internal matters, whether civil or religious, with foreign authorities. It was for this reason that the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople was the head of the Armenian *millet* in Turkey although spiritually subordinate to the Katholikos of Echmiadzin.

By the beginning of the twentieth century the Christian *millet*s had come to number fourteen, which may be grouped as follows:

A. *The Orthodox*

The Orthodox in Turkey, originally comprised within one *millet*, were ultimately divided into four, namely:

1. The *millet* of Rûm proper, that is to say, the Patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem;
2. Serbs;
3. Vlachs;
4. Bulgarian Exarchists.

B. *The Monophysite Churches*

5. Gregorian Armenians;
6. Nestorians;
7. Jacobites.

C. *Churches acknowledging the Supremacy of the Pope*

8. Roman Catholics of the Latin rite;
 9. Melkites
 10. Maronites
 11. Syrian Catholics
 12. Uniate Armenians
 13. Chaldaeans
- } Uniate Churches.

D. *Protestants*

14. In 1850 the Protestants (mainly Armenians by race) were constituted into a separate *millet*.

The Jews formed a *millet* whose head was the Grand Rabbi of Turkey.

That the *millet* in the Ottoman Empire should have rested on an ecclesiastical rather than a racial basis, that its membership should have been determined by the spiritual community to which a man belonged rather than by his mother tongue or his racial affinities, that it should have been composed of those "*dont la religion*", in the words of a French writer, "*est aussi la patrie*", must not surprise us. Amid the ethnological tangles and competitions of that Empire the racial affinities of an individual were seldom free from doubt or at least dispute, while there could be no doubt as to his spiritual allegiance. And if it be urged that people may change their spiritual allegiance, so in the Ottoman Empire could they change, and frequently did change, their racial or "national" inclinations as they came under the influence of the various propagandist organizations which, especially in Macedonia and Epirus, competed for their suffrages during the period of the rise and consolidation of the Balkan states.¹ There is another point to be borne in mind in connexion with the *millet* system, namely that the *millet* kept its members together, gave them cohesion and a rallying-ground and, in the case of the smaller ones, such as the Jacobites and

¹ A typical instance is the case recorded by Lord Noel-Buxton of the Macedonian village priest who was a good Bulgar till 1913, then a Serb for two years, a Bulgar again from 1915 to 1918 and then once more a Serb.

the Nestorians, no doubt preserved them from assimilation or submersion. If a *rayah* had not been a member of this or that *millet*, he would have had no civil status, would in fact have been comparable to a man of no nationality to-day; while, but for the system, the smaller Christian Churches must have been extinguished.

It may not be out of place to amplify, before the close of this chapter, the statement made in Chapter I that the Ottoman Turk envisaged his state as a geographical unit Imperial and comprehensive in character, with an impress that was not only Islamic but to some extent also Christian. It is well that we should remember that the founder of the House of Osman established his dynasty and his rule in part on Christian foundations. Osman married his younger son and successor, Orkhan, to the daughter of the Greek Lord of Yar Hissar in Bithynia, the celebrated Nilufer ("lotus-flower") renowned for her beauty after whom the river of Brusa still takes its name; and this alliance served to cement Turkish political connexions with the Christian aristocracy of north-western Asia Minor, some of whose members were willing enough to align themselves with the cause of the new and growing power. The elder of Nilufer's sons was Sultan Murad I, from whom all subsequent Sultans of Turkey were descended, so that indigenous Christian blood flowed in the veins of the entire dynasty. Indeed, Sultan Orkhan had two Christian wives, for he subsequently married Theodora, daughter of the Byzantine Emperor John VI Cantacuzene. Later Sultans had likewise, through the *harem*, Christian relations both inside and outside the Empire

and kept up friendly relations with their non-converted kinsfolk, as did many of the important renegades and Janissaries. These circumstances contributed to the tolerance of the Ottoman Government towards its *rayahs*, which, but for outbursts of Moslem fanaticism when the wars between the Turks and the Western nations took on a Crusading aspect, generally prevailed until the growth of nationalist and separatist feelings among the Christian peoples of the Empire created a reactionary feeling against them on the part of the Mohammedan population.

It must also be remembered that the form in which Islam was adopted by the early Turkish conquerors was not always rigidly orthodox but was capable of blending with the Christianity of Asia Minor. Shrines and tutelary saints in those parts were, and are even now, sacred to both faiths, and the Bektashi Order is a striking example of a Turkish organization in which Christian and Moslem elements were capable of mingling. Other examples of the same blend are the Qizil-bash ("Red-heads") to be found both in eastern and western Anatolia, the Stavriotai or crypto-Christians of Trebizond and adjacent villages of Lazistan, the Linobambakoi ("Linsey-woolseys") of Cyprus. To-day these sects, shrunken (save for the Qizil-bash) almost to nothing and wholly without influence, are of interest mainly to students of anthropology, folk-lore and comparative religion; but they are survivals of an epoch when Islamic orthodoxy in the government of the Ottoman Turks was not as un-deviatingly pursued as it came to be once the seat of the Empire was firmly established in Europe.

APPENDIX¹IMPERIAL OTTOMAN *BERAT* APPOINTING
DAMIANOS AS PATRIARCH OF JERUSALEM*Imperial Cypher*

SULTAN ABDUL HAMID AL-GHAZI, SON OF ABDUL MEJID

Necessity having arisen for the appointment of a person to fill the vacant post of Roman Patriarch of Jerusalem and of the Holy Sepulchre, and of the places subject thereto, the holder of this my *Berat*, Damianos Effendi, Bishop of Philadelphia, being a wise and capable man endowed with the capacity of directing religious matters, having been elected Patriarch in accordance with the Law, the record of this proceeding was submitted and the election was approved by my high Ministerial Council, and the matter having been referred to my Imperial self I have issued, in pursuance of the authorization sought for, my sacred Imperial Iradé thereupon, and on behalf of my Imperial Divan I have given to the said Patriarch this my high *Berat*, and I order as follows:

The said Damianos Effendi is Patriarch in accordance with the ancient custom over the Roman sect dwelling in Jerusalem, and in the Holy Sepulchre and in the regions subject thereto and over their religious affairs.

The Metropolitans, Bishops, Monks, and Nuns who are in the District subject to his Patriarchate, Jerusalem, Mount Sinai, Gaza, Ramleh, Jebel Ajlun, Acre, Safad and the Districts subject thereto, and the Monks who dwell in the Monasteries of the Georgians, the Abyssinians, the Syrians, and the Copts and all the remainder of the Roman Sects, great and small, shall acknowledge the said Damianos as

¹ Translated from the original Turkish by Mr. F. O. J. Ongley for Bertram and Luke's *Report on the Affairs of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem*.

their Patriarch. In the same way as those who were Patriarchs before him held he shall also hold and administer.

Let no opposition be made to his righteous decisions in matters referred to him concerning his Patriarchate.

Let no unauthorized persons take from his hand the ancient Churches and Monasteries of my Empire and enter them.

Let there not be any disturbance or constraint in the Monasteries and Churches held and administered under his protection by persons without my order saying they will inspect them.

Let there not be any interference by other persons when he submits for dismissal and appointment and punishment, in accordance with the Law, Bishops, Priests and Deacons who are deserving of dismissal or appointment in places within his Patriarchate.

Let there not be interference by the Treasury, Orphans' Trusts, and their officials, and by other persons, when he or his representatives take over the estates belonging to him, according to custom, of deceased monks.

Let there not be done, or caused to be done, betrothals by certain village priests, of persons whose betrothal is not permitted and contrary to law, without his permission and knowledge.

Let none other than he and his representatives interfere and intervene if in places in his Patriarchate a woman leaves her husband or if a person is going to be married or divorced.

Let there be heard in a lawful manner by the testimony of Roman witnesses the bequeathals which are accepted of whatever is bequeathed to the Churches, Poor and Patriarch, made by deceased Priests in accordance with their law.

Let there be heard in a lawful way the testimony of Roman witnesses when he takes over the moneys and other things which the Romans of my Empire, whether Monks or Priests or other clergy, shall have dedicated, offered or bequeathed for the sake of the Holy City.

Let there not be an appointment made from another

country, but let an appointment be made through his instrumentality when it is necessary to appoint another in the place of a Metropolitan or Bishop in his Patriarchate who has died or been dismissed.

Let actions concerning the Sheri Law be heard in my Sublime Porte and respect be paid when he submits matters concerning the laws in the Holy City from his clergy.

Let there not be opposition by officials and others in the places where he sends men to collect alms by asking them what they come for and why they remain so long.

Let there not be interference by officials when he travels in places which are dangerous; the best way to go and be saved from bandits is to disguise himself and to carry arms contrary to ancient custom.

Do not cause him to be troubled by persons forcibly wishing to serve him without his permission.

Let none trouble him when he carries in his hand the staff special to himself.

Let not the Qadis and Naibs inflict fines and penalties when in places subject to his Patriarchate marriages are solemnized, divorces are granted, and compromises of disputes between Christians are effected, and in accordance with their law oaths are administered in their churches and the punishment of excommunication is inflicted.

Let no one interfere when he or his representatives review the accounts of the monks who, being his representatives in the churches and monasteries, embezzle the Patriarchal revenues.

Let restraint be made through his instrumentality of monks who have no church or monastery and who wander about from place to place and cause disturbances.

Let him not be troubled by demands for Octroi and other dues by keepers, guards and others at the landing-places and gates when bringing provisions for his own consumption, the produce of vineyards, and wax, oil, honey and other goods given by Christians as charity.

Let no official or any other person interfere with his

holding and administering, in the same way as they have been *ab antiquo* held and administered, the vineyards, gardens, *chiftliks*, mills, fields, meadows, houses, shops, fructiferous and non-fructiferous trees, and holy water appertaining to his churches as well as monasteries and the goods and flocks made *vagf* to the other churches like them.

Written on the 16 Rebi ul-Evvel, 1315 (1897).

THE Prophet Mohammed had paved the way for, had in fact created, a spiritual and temporal monarchy embracing all true believers, a monarchy in which the spiritual and the secular authority were concentrated in the hands of one person, the Khalif, a word meaning "successor", "lieutenant" or "vicar". But Mohammed, who left no son, had omitted in his lifetime to designate his successor; and, after his death, angry disputes arose as to the selection of the first Khalif. The most prominent candidate was Ali, the nephew of Mohammed and the husband of his favourite daughter, Fatima; and Ali would probably have been elected but for the opposition of the Prophet's widow, Ayesha. "The Mother of the Faithful" regarded Ali, who had supported an accusation of adultery against her, with the deepest hatred and, being a woman of great influence in Mecca and Medina, was able to induce the Moslem notables to set him aside and to choose her father, Abu Bekr. Abu Bekr reigned for two years and was then succeeded by his nominee, Omar, the conqueror of Jerusalem; Omar was succeeded by the feeble, incompetent Osman.

Under the first three Khalifs the all-conquering

Arabs carried Islam into Palestine and Syria, Persia and Egypt; but Osman prepared the way for the disruption of the new Empire by appointing as Governor of Syria a certain Muawiya, the son of the Prophet's arch-enemy Abu Sofian and a member of the powerful family of the Omayyads. This and other impolitic acts brought such unpopularity upon Osman that he was murdered in A.D. 655, whereupon Ali finally became Khalif and also, unconsciously, the rock upon which Islam split into its two principal divisions of Sunni and Shiah.

The first step towards schism was Ayesha's refusal to acknowledge the new Khalif, a refusal also maintained by Muawiya. Muawiya gave as his reason Ali's omission to punish the murderers of Osman. In point of fact he himself had designs upon the Khalifate and, with the support of the Syrians, resisted by force Ali's demand for his submission. In the meantime the political centre of gravity of the Mohammedan Empire had shifted from the two Holy Cities of the Hejaz. Ali, turning for support towards Persia and Mesopotamia, concentrated his forces on Kufa in Iraq, while the headquarters of Muawiya were at Damascus. The civil war which ensued was more than a personal or a dynastic struggle; it represented the struggle between the Syrian and the Persian elements, the Semite and the Aryan, for the dominant position in the Moslem world.

In 661, after five years of war, during which he steadily lost ground, Ali was murdered at Kufa, whereupon his elder son Hasan, much against the wishes of his younger son Husein, abandoned the contest by resigning his claim to Muawiya. The latter was now sole

Khalif and the Mohammedan world once more politically united, for the present under the leadership of Syria. Spiritually, however, the breach between the two parties grew ever wider; and in Persia Ali became posthumously the object of veneration far greater than that which he had enjoyed in his lifetime, became, in fact, the central figure of that branch of Islam which is known by the name of Shiah. He was soon believed to be an incarnation of the Divine Spirit, as great as, if not greater than Mohammed himself and the heir to all the latter's authority. The Shiahs regard the first three Khalifs, Abu Bekr, Omar and Osman, and still more the Khalifs of the Omayyad dynasty founded by Muawiya, as heretics and usurpers; Ali, to them, is the Prophet's immediate successor.

The name of the other principal division of Islam, that of the Sunnis, requires a sentence of explanation. It is derived from the word "*Sunna*", meaning "tradition", the name given to the corpus of authoritative religious writings which grew up, as a complement to the Qoran, under the Omayyad Khalifs. The *Sunna* includes an elaborate codification and interpretation of the reputed sayings of Mohammed as handed down by his immediate disciples, and it comprises precepts and regulations issued by the Khalifs, which make it unacceptable to the Shiahs. The four Sunni schools, the Shafi, the Hanbali, the Hanafi and the Maliki, of which something will be said in Chapter VIII, differ only in their interpretation of minute points of ritual and law and are all equally orthodox; there is no ill-feeling between them, and in the Omayyad Mosque of Damascus each has its prayer-niche

under the same roof. Whatever stress, however, may be laid upon the doctrinal questions on which Sunni and Shiah divide, it cannot be doubted that the fundamental causes of the breach were political and racial. Religious differences have become intensified in the course of time, during which Sunnism and Shiism have marked out their respective paths more clearly, but they were much less intense at the time when the two main streams of Islam began to pursue their separate courses.

The Omayyad Khalifate was brilliant but short-lived. Luxury, indulgence and "*Syra mollities*" reigned at the Court of Damascus in the place of the primeval simplicity of the desert; the patriarchal administration of the early Khalifs disappeared before the mass of new political and economic questions brought into being by the extension of the Empire. The Khalifs generally ignored the religious side of their office, even toying at times with religious liberalism and free thought; the proselytism of Christians was discouraged, partly owing to the tolerance of the Khalifs, still more, perhaps, because of the additional taxes which were paid by non-Moslems. In 750 the Abbasids, descendants of the Prophet's paternal uncle Abbas, overthrew the Omayyads and established the seat of the Khalifate at Baghdad. Here they reigned until 1258, when the Mongol Hulagu captured Baghdad, and the Eastern Khalifate, as a State, expired.

I use the expression "Eastern Khalifate" advisedly, because, soon after the advent of the Abbasids to power, the character of the Khalifate underwent two vital changes. In the first place, the theory of a sole

Khalif at the head of the entire Moslem world was contradicted in practice by the rise of an Omayyad (Sunni) Khalifate in Spain, and of a Fatimite (Shiah) Khalifate—or, rather, anti-Khalifate—in North Africa. On the fall of the Omayyads a member of that family, Abd er-Rahman, grandson of Khalif Hisham, escaped the fate which overtook nearly all his relatives, and fled to the Sahara. Incessantly pursued by order of his enemies, the Abbasids, who desired completely to exterminate the Omayyad race, he maintained a precarious existence by passing from one tribe of the desert to another. Meanwhile the Arabs in Spain, weary of the internal disorders caused by the selfish ambitions of their petty Emirs, had decided to end local dissensions by the creation of a separate Khalifate in Moslem Spain, since the bonds between Spain and the Khalif in the East had become so loose that the latter was no longer a reality in the Peninsula. On account of his illustrious descent the fugitive Omayyad was selected for the dignity, and accepted it from a deputation which sought him out in his African hiding-place. He landed in Spain in 755, and the western Khalifate which he inaugurated endured until the fall of Granada in 1492.¹ The Fatimite Khalifate was of slightly later origin. The Fatimite Khalifs, so called from Fatima, the Prophet's daughter, belonged to the Ismailieh sect of Shiahs and claimed to be descended from the Imam Ismail, seventh in descent from Ali. The first Fatimite Khalif, Obaidallah, professed to be the Mahdi and founded his capital, which was accordingly called

¹ The title of Khalif was not formally assumed by the Spanish Omayyads until 929, in the reign of Abd er-Rahman III.

Mahdia, in what is now Tunisia; in 972 the fourth Fatimite, Moizz, entered Cairo, which thereafter became the seat of the Fatimite rulers. In 1171 Saladin put an end to the sovereignty of the Fatimites; and Egypt, which for the previous 200 years had been under Shiah administration, became once more, and remained, Sunni.

The second change which overtook the Abbasid Khalifate was the gradual loss by its holders of real control over their Empire. More and more the Abbasids degenerated into *rois fainéants*, while the power passed into the hands of "Mayors of the Palace" and of the Governors of provinces, who, for the most part men of Turkish race, became to all intents and purposes independent Emirs. Ere long the Khalif's prerogatives in the more distant portions of his Empire were confined to being prayed for in the *khubté*¹ in the mosques on Fridays, and to the appearance of his name on the coinage; at the beginning of the thirteenth century he was a little more than the nominal head of Sunni Moslems, and barely retained jurisdiction over his own capital. What remained of his political powers finally disappeared with the fall of Baghdad in 1258, but the spiritual function of the Khalifate survived. A scion of the Abbasids, one Abul Qasim Ahmed, who was accepted as a son of Zahir, the thirty-fifth Abbasid Khalif, evaded the vigilance of Hulagu's Mongol hordes and sought refuge with Sultan Bibars in Egypt. The Mamluk or Slave Sultans

¹ A sort of bidding-prayer only delivered on Fridays, containing a commemoration of the Companions of the Prophet and previous Khalifs, and supplications for the reigning one.

had but recently wrested Egypt from the Eyyubid dynasty founded by Saladin, and Bibars made masterly use of the opportunity afforded by the presence of an Abbasid to acquire moral authority for his upstart power. He installed Abul Qasim as Khalif in Cairo under the title of Mostansir-billah, and Mostansir promptly conferred upon Bibars the title of Sultan, even going so far as to address to him a homily (preserved in the life of Bibars) explaining his duties—truly a delightful touch. Soon afterwards Mostansir was killed in an unsuccessful attempt to reconquer Baghdad, but Bibars maintained his policy of preserving the Khalifate in Cairo, that it might give legitimacy to his own power. So would Napoleon I have led the Papacy to France. Another Abbasid was discovered by Bibars and was proclaimed Khalif under the name of Hakim biamrillah, although no more attempts were made to re-establish the Khalifate in Baghdad. The Mamluks laid down the principle that the Khalif should not leave Cairo except when accompanying the Sultan on an expedition; and thus, as long as Egypt remained independent, the descendants of Hakim enjoyed their dignity—a Moslem Papacy bereft of its Temporal Power, maintained by and under the protection of Moslem kings.

For one brief moment, indeed, did one of these nominal Khalifs enjoy the taste of authority. On the deposition of the Mamluk Sultan Faraj, for the second time, in 1412, the two Emirs principally responsible for his removal agreed to obviate causes of jealousy between them by installing as Sultan a third person. Requiring a nonentity, they selected the Khalif Mustain,

the Emirs reserving to themselves separate spheres of influence. The spiritual and political powers of Islam, at all events as regards Egypt, were thus united once again, and quite fortuitously, in the hands of an Abbasid;¹ but Mustain, evidently doubting his good fortune, demanded an undertaking before he was invested as Sultan that, should he be forced to abdicate, he should be allowed to resume his office of Khalif. His precautions proved justified although the undertaking was not observed. Within six months of his being placed on the throne the Emir in whose sphere of influence lay Egypt became dissatisfied with being only the power behind the throne and desired the titular authority as well. He therefore demanded of the ecclesiastical authorities a declaration that a man of action was required at the head of affairs. The luckless Abbasid was consequently deposed from his Sultanate and soon afterwards was also deprived of the title of Khalif.²

For two hundred and forty years after the death of Bibars the Abbasid Khalifate survived in name, but the conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I in 1517 heralded its end. Of the Chevalier d'Ohsson's well known statement in the *Tableau général de l'Empire Othoman*³ that the last Cairene Abbasid Khalif, Mutawakkil, made formal cession of the Khalifate to

¹ Within the same half-century there was an example in Western history of what was in a sense the converse of this situation, namely the election in 1439 of Amadeus VIII, Duke of Savoy, as Pope (or Anti-Pope) Felix V; cf. p. 75, n.

² Cf. D. S. Margoliouth, *Cairo, Jerusalem and Damascus* (London, 1907), p. 109.

³ Paris, 1787, *sqq.*

the Turkish conqueror there appears to be no documentary corroboration;¹ but Selim, after allowing Mutawakkil to exercise for a few months what little authority had remained to him, then reversed his policy and banished him to Constantinople. In the reign of Selim's successor, Suleiman the Magnificent, Mutawakkil was permitted to return to Cairo and actually, in 1523, performed once more, and for the last time, his old function of investing a Sultan of Egypt in the person of one Ahmed Pasha, a provincial Governor who had rebelled against Suleiman's authority and had contrived for a short period to make himself independent. But when Mutawakkil died in Cairo in 1543, a pensioner of the Ottoman Government, there was no question of recognizing a successor of his own line; in practice, if not as yet in form, the Khalifate had been assumed by the Sultans of Turkey.

2

The assumption of the essential functions of the Khalifate by the great warrior-Sultans who followed Mehmed the Conqueror had the important and unhappy effect of giving to Turkish military expansion in the West an Islamic religious character. Wars waged primarily to annex desirable territories and to employ soldiery too turbulent to be kept without occupation at home now took on something of the character of those early Arab irruptions whose object had been to carry the sword of Islam into the lands of the infidel, with the inevitable result that the Christian rulers and

¹ Sir T. W. Arnold, *The Caliphate* (Oxford, 1924), pp. 146-147.

peoples defending their frontiers against the invader came to regard themselves in the light of Crusaders struggling to sustain the Cross against the assaults of the Paynim. Thus there was awakened in the Turk, originally, as we have seen, not ill disposed towards Christians as such, a religious fanaticism—a Semitic rather than a Turanian characteristic—which possessed him at times and then reacted unfavourably on his Christian fellow-subjects. On the other hand, it was not long before the Sultans lost interest in this addition to their attributes. In 1575 one Ahmed Firidun, secretary to the Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokolli, compiled a volume of diplomatic correspondence preceded by a comprehensive collection of forms of address proper to be used in documents addressed to the sovereign. The compiler presented his work to the reigning Sultan, Murad III, the great-grandson of Selim I, and must therefore have felt confident of its completeness; but of sixteen alternative modes of address to the monarch in the collection not one included the title of Khalif.¹ It was not until after a long interval, not, in fact, until the latter part of the eighteenth century, that the Turks, hard pressed by Russia over the Treaty of Küchük Qainarji, endeavoured to save some shred of their influence over the Tatars now being detached from their rule by demanding that these should remain under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Sultan as the “Supreme Khalif of the Mohammedan law”. In adopting this attitude, namely that of claiming for the Sultan a right of spiritual oversight or protectorate over Moslems outside his territories, the Ottoman Govern-

¹ Cf. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, p. 164.

ment were following the precedent set by the Kings of France and the rulers of Russia when claiming to protect Latins and Orthodox respectively in Turkey.¹ At this time it was for European consumption that the Sultan's position as Khalif was emphasized by the Turks; while, conversely, its development in the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries took place, as we shall see in Chapter VI, in the world of Sunni Islam.

The soundness of the title whereby the House of Osman became possessed of the Khalifate will be discussed later; I would now refer briefly, for the sake of clearness, to the development of the Shiah branch of Islam. The mainspring of the Shiah faith is Iran; outside the Persian borders it is only professed in parts of Iraq, the Yemen and the Caucasus, by about one third of the Moslems of India and by certain small and detached communities living as *enclaves* in Sunni lands. Shiism is based upon the glorification of the name and family of Ali, and found its natural home in Persia through the marriage of Ali's son Husein to Shahbanu, daughter of Yazdagird III, last of the Sasanid kings of Persia. "*In the descendants of Shahbanu and Husayn the Persians saw the heirs of their ancient kings and the inheritors of their national traditions, and in this patriotic feeling may be found the explanation of the intense devotion of the Persians to the Alid faction, and the first beginnings of Shiism as a separate sect.*"²

With the exception of the Fatimites, who were heretics, the Shiahs have had no Khalif. They ignore

¹ Cf. pp. 21-22, 25.

² Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, p. 209

the three predecessors of Ali, they execrate his successors as the usurpers of his rights. Their pontiff is designated the Imam; and the first Imam was Ali. And while they are by no means united (for the Shiah have split into many sects), they are divided among themselves principally on the question as to which particular branch of Ali's descendants has inherited the dignity of the Imamate. Their main body, the Imamieh, whom we may regard as the exponents of Shiah orthodoxy, believe in a succession of twelve Imams, namely Ali, Hasan, Husein and Husein's direct descendants from father to son, ending with Mohammed Abul Qasim. The latter is called the Imam al-Mahdi and is believed not to have died but to be withdrawn from the world. He will reappear in the last days to reign over the universe for seven years with equity and justice, assuming the title of Mahdi, which means "Director".

The Shiah were unaffected, owing to the fact that the Khalifate is to them a foreign institution, by its assumption on the part of the Sultans of Turkey. The importance of the Turkish Khalifate lay in the extent to which it was accepted among Sunnis. The generally recognized qualifications for the Khalifate are: election by the Assembly of the Faithful; descent from Mohammed's tribe of the Qoreish; and possession of the Sacred Relics, which consist of the Prophet's mantle (*Khirqa-i-Sherif*), some hairs of his beard, and two of his teeth, a piece of stone bearing the impress of a foot said to be his, his holy standard (*Sanjaq-i-Sherif*) and the turban of the Khalif Omar.¹ Farthermore, the Khalif is

¹ A description of the sacred relics is to be found in d'Ohsson's *Tableau général de l'Empire ottoman*, vol. i., pp. 261-269.

expected to be the principal ruler of Islam, an amendment of the theory that he was to be its only one. How far could the Khalif in Constantinople conform with these requirements? As regards election, he conformed technically, for on their accession the Sultans went through the form of election as Commander of the Faithful at the hands of the *ulema*. The sacred relics were in their keeping, having been surrendered by Mutawakkil, the last Abbasid. The Ottoman Sultan was unquestionably the greatest prince in Islam and *de facto* ruler of the holy cities of Jerusalem, Medina and Mecca. He possessed, in fact, more of the externals of the Khalifate than did the majority of the Abbasids, his predecessors, and he was thereby enabled to ignore what no theological ingenuity could disguise, namely, that he was not an Arab of the tribe of the Qoreish.

This was the only flaw in his claim to be of practical importance, for it cost him the recognition of the Moors. Ahmed IV, Emir of Morocco (1578-1603), taking advantage of the disappearance of the Omayyad Khalif from Spain and of the Abbasid from Egypt, proclaimed himself the Khalif towards the end of the sixteenth century, since when the Moors have regarded their ruler as Khalif on the twofold ground that he is descended from Fatima and is heir to the Spanish Khalifate of the West. The Moors were joined in their non-recognition by various Arab tribes of North Africa and Arabia and by certain religious Orders and brotherhoods, of whom the most important in this connexion was that of the Wahhabis. The founder of the Wahhabi movement was one Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab, born in Nejd at the beginning of the

eighteenth century. His aims were similar to those of the Reformers in Europe in the sixteenth century: he was, in the literal sense of the word, a Protestant, who desired to purify the lives of Moslems of laxity and vice and to strip from their beliefs the numerous accretions to the original teaching of Mohammed. But he was a reformer of the austere school, a John Knox rather than a Luther; he waged war not only against dishonesty and superstition, but against music, smoking and all amusements not expressly sanctioned in the Qoran and the *Sunna*. He insisted on the most scrupulous performance of the religious duties enjoined by the Prophet but was equally stern in condemning as pagan practices of later origin. Among these he included the mystical devotions of the Sufis, the veneration bestowed upon the relics and tomb of Sheikhs and, in particular, the adoration of the black stone in the Kaaba of Mecca. The venality of judges and the corruption of the *mutevelis* (trustees) of *Evqaf* (Moslem pious foundations) were sternly denounced. His teaching soon found such support among the Beduin that he was able to establish a Wahhabi State, which extended from Arabia into Syria. In 1806 Mecca and Medina fell into the hands of the Wahhabis, and the pilgrim "*was now compelled to take his religious duties seriously; the amusements which formerly had been provided at the season of pilgrimage, and are now provided once more, were forbidden, with the result that the stream of pilgrims declined appreciably*".¹ At this stage the Ottoman Government intervened; and in 1812 and 1813 the Wahhabis were driven by

¹ Roloff, "Die türkischen Sultane als Kalifen" in *Nord und Süd*, vol. 144.

Mahmud II respectively from Medina and Mecca, not to resume possession of the holy cities until 1925, when they expelled the Hashimite dynasty which had declared its independence of Turkey in 1916.

Before leaving the subject of the Khalifate I would repeat what has been said in Chapter I, namely that the office of Khalif implied the obligation to protect and defend Islam, not the right to define its beliefs. So far, therefore, as the Khalifate can be compared with the Papacy, it is with the Papacy of the great Crusading Popes, not with that of a Pius IX infallibly proclaiming *ex cathedra, urbi et orbi*, his teaching on faith and morals. It was a responsibility rather than a privilege; the extent to which this was the case may be gauged from the following somewhat fuller definition of its duties, quoted by Goldziher¹ from the Moslem theologian Ali al-Qari:

"It is necessary that there should be at the head of all Moslems someone whose duty it is to see that their laws are carried out, their decisions upheld, their frontiers defended, their armies equipped, their taxes collected, someone responsible for the suppression of disturbers of the peace, thieves and robbers, for the organization of religious ceremonies, for the giving in marriage of orphans, for the just distribution of booty of war and for the fulfilment of similar lawful needs which no mere member of the community is in a position to ensure."

And Goldziher adds:

"In a word, he is the representative of the State in its judicial, administrative and military capacities. As ruler he

¹ *Vorlesungen über den Islam* (Heidelberg, 1910), p. 217.

is no more than the successor of his predecessor, designated as such by human acts (by election, or by the choice of his predecessor) and not through any qualities inherent in his personality. Above all, the Sunni Khalif is no teacher."

In this respect, therefore, he differs fundamentally from the Shiah Imam, who is the leader and teacher of Islam by reason of the personal qualities implanted in him by God.

3

By making of the Qoran a code of law as well as a book of spiritual revelation and by legislating therein so minutely that man's every action is regulated and prescribed, the Prophet Mohammed rendered it difficult for his followers to adapt themselves to the needs of epochs whose circumstances he did not foresee. Doubtless the precision of his injunctions is beneficial in that it leaves no room for uncertainty in the mind of the devout Moslem as to his course of action in a given case; it is an effective instrument in the mission field. The coherence and thoroughness of the Qoran and the simplicity of its central idea give Islam as a Church militant an unrivalled power to convert, drill and discipline barbarous races. But the same characteristics become a source of weakness in the religion of a great State compelled to entertain relations with Western Powers; and the Ottoman Turks, as having had more contacts with European nations than other Moslem races, suffered much from the rigidity of Islam. Recognizing all this, it is still possible for us, however, to overestimate the extent of the barrier which, in the past, Islam opposed to progress, for its cramping effect

was less potent in material things than in things of the spirit. In the sixteenth century it did not prevent the Turkish artillery from being more advanced and efficient than that of Western nations; more recently it enabled Abdul Hamid to carry out, under Moslem auspices, the construction of the Hejaz Railway.

Reference has been made to the salutary disciplinary effect of the Qoran. Islam, which means resignation, inculcates, as regards man's relations with the Deity, patient submission to the predestined will of God; hence it consecrates, in man's relations with the State or his fellow-men, obedience to properly constituted authority. To the nature of their religion the Turks, primarily a military race, owed the discipline which has been, in the course of their history, perhaps the greatest asset of their armies. Again, the absence of sacerdotalism, the non-interposition of an intermediary between God and man, foster in the individual Moslem a self-respect, a sense of personal responsibility, to which were due the enterprise and initiative of the Turkish soldier in warfare. In the theocracy of Islam no priestly caste acts as man's mediator with his Maker. The Imam is only the leader of prayer, a sort of precentor; the *ulema*, as students of Qoranic law, are at most but semi-ecclesiastics. And as the Turk who was a good Moslem learned to respect himself, so he learned to respect his elders and betters and not to withhold all respect from those fellow-Moslems, such as beggars, whom he could not regard as his betters. A grown-up Turk lax enough to drink wine or *raqi* would usually hesitate to do so in the presence of his father; similar diffidence was

even shown sometimes with regard to smoking. Near relationship did not engender what such Turks would regard as unseemly familiarity: young men addressed their elder brothers by the titles of *agha* or *agha beyi*, their elder sisters as *abla*, scarcely ever by name unless the difference in age was slight. They obeyed seriously the injunctions of their faith as to charity. Wealthy men would endow schools, equip some village with a water-supply, defray the expenses of an indigent pilgrim to Mecca, feed a certain number of poor from their kitchens every Friday. At the feast of Qurban Bairam they sent gifts of mutton to their poorer neighbours. Those less opulent bought bread for the street dogs, gave doles of food to beggars who called from house to house, paid for the contents of a goatskin of water to be dispensed free to all who asked. The solidarity of Islam did not permit them to suffer co-religionists to starve.

So much for the disciplinary effect of Islam on the Turk. As regards the stimulus which it exercised upon him I would quote what W. G. Palgrave, a shrewd student of Turkish character, wrote in 1870:¹

"A workman, who, in an ordinary way, cannot be got to make two windows on a line in the same length of wall, or make level the floor of a room ten feet square, never fails to direct the 'Kibleh' niche with unerring exactness, and to find to a hair's breadth the precise angle of the radius that points to Mecca. What love is to the world at large, that is Islam to the Eastern; it renders him architect, poet, metaphysician, carver, decorator, soldier, anything. Taught by Islam, men who

¹ *Essays on Eastern Questions* (London, 1872), pp. 44-45.

even in the long-drilled regiment can never dress a line or form a square with tolerable correctness, range themselves in the most perfect rank and file at the hour of prayer. . . . Every feature of the village tells the same tale. The cottages are the merest hovels—we here except Syria—half earth, half rubble; and no pretence, not to speak of ornament, but even of common symmetry and neatness, relieves their ugliness. Even the Beg's house is a clumsy barrack, sadly in need, too, of repair; its decorations are of the simplest and cheapest kind. But on the village mosque neat stone-work, subtle carving, elaborate art have all been lavished; here the injuries of time are immediately and accurately made good; here are to be found the best carpets, here the gayest colours, here the most scrupulous cleanliness."

Notwithstanding its faults, its rigidity, its stationary tendencies, it is Islam which made the Turks a powerful people; it is Islam which inspired a small and obscure Siberian tribe with the ardour and organization that enabled it to establish one of the widest Empires of modern history. One of the boldest, therefore, of the breaches with the past made by the Government of Angora has been its severance of Turkey's official connexion with Islam, since it has thereby eliminated the creative element of former Turkish greatness to replace it by another element, that of nationalism, whose potentialities among the Turks cannot as yet be assessed in full. Sir Valentine Chirol, a profound student of Eastern history and the development of Eastern peoples, expressed the opinion, in his Harris Foundation Lectures, that "it is difficult to see how far Turkey has profited by exchanging a narrow religious fanati-

cism for an equally narrow racial fanaticism",¹ but that view is perhaps unduly pessimistic; moreover, he wrote those words when the Khalifate had only just been abolished and four years before Islam was disestablished. Yet there have been few acts of state more momentous, more revolutionary, than the dethronement from its official position and from its place of power of that element which, for good and for evil, had dominated the life and organization of the Turk for seven hundred years.

In sweeping away the rabble of *mollas* and *softas* of the lazy and ignorant kind that did little to bring credit on the religion upon which it battered, the Nationalists undoubtedly rid the State of a useless and, indeed, harmful encumbrance which, composed of unruly and fanatical men without regular employment, had often been a source of anxiety even to the Hamidian régime and more than once had been disbanded by the Imperial Government. But not all *sariqlis*² were of this type. "*The ulema of high rank*", says Ostorog,³ "*were perhaps the officials most highly respected in Turkey, and many of them inspired respect not only by that bearing of a dignity touching on haughtiness which characterized them all, but by a fine, distant life of constant study and proud integrity*". And there is another class within Islam whose compulsory disappearance from Turkey it is permissible to regret, namely the dervishes. The dervishes represent the element in Mohammedanism which seeks a wider

¹ *The Occident and the Orient* (Chicago, 1924), p. 65.

² Cf. p. 189, n.

³ *The Angora Reform* (University of London Press, London, 1927), p. 50.

sphere, not only for its religious emotions but also for its religious speculations, than that generally afforded within the rigid and austere confines of Moslem orthodoxy. The purpose of all Sufi, that is, Moslem mystic, teaching is to enable the devout soul to return to and be reunited with God, with Whom it was once one but from Whom it has become separated by its birth into the world. The return journey to God is made along a "way" or "road" (*tariq*), whereby one of the dervish Orders is to be understood; the stages of the "way" are represented by the *zîkr*, that is to say, the ritual (differing in every Order) designed to produce the state of ecstasy wherein the mind is withdrawn from earthly things and brought into closer communion with the Divine. Thus we find that, while on the one hand the emotional needs of the dervishes find their outlet in the *zîkr*, on the other their speculative excursions lead them to what are often advanced forms of mysticism and metaphysics. This, with their anxiety to protect their religion from deadening encumbrances, caused Turkish dervishes to be looked at askance by narrow-minded and fanatical *ulema* of the old school, by men who thought that the devil spoke along telegraph wires until Abdul Hamid, in pursuit of his centralizing policy, covered even the most distant vilayets with so extensive a network of telegraphs that the wires came to suggest to the majority of Turks the Padishah's voice rather than the devil's. Again, the wideness of their views as regards Islam is extended to their attitude towards other religions, which with the more advanced among them is barely distinguishable from pantheism; and the dervish is thus both a member of an esoteric

Moslem confraternity and the most tolerant of Moslems. He is ready to see good in all religions and he generally dislikes religious persecution. Whoever in Imperial times, and especially before the Great War, has stayed, as the writer has had the good fortune to do, among the Mevlevi—known popularly in the West as Dancing—Dervishes at their headquarters in Konia and has been able to study their life as lived around the noble shrine of their founder Jelal ed-Dîn and his forty-odd successors under their hereditary chief, the Chelebi of Konia,¹ cannot but have been impressed by their dignity, their friendliness to strangers and their appreciation of the brotherhood of man.² In Konia, the ancient Ikonion, where halted Xenophon's Ten Thousand, where Paul and Barnabas preached the Gospel after their departure from Cyprus, where the Sultans of Rûm reigned in splendour and built their masterpieces of Seljuq art, where "Plato the Divine" is still revered among humble folk under the name of Eflat as a miracle-worker of the first magnitude, it was possible to form a juster impression of this once widespread Order than in Constantinople and other cities more accessible to tourists, where its ceremonies were apt to degenerate into spectacles provided for the curious. Sir Charles Eliot relates having heard on good authority that "*in the dangerous period in the winter of 1895-96, when religious and national feeling ran high in Turkey, it was mainly owing to the Mevlevi that the Softas of Konia were prevented from attacking the Christian population of the town*".

¹ Cf. p. 173.

² Cf. Sir H. Luke, *An Eastern Chequerboard* (London, 1934), chap. v., "The City of Dancing Dervishes".

And Sir E. Pears¹ quotes a Bektash Sheikh as saying that there is nothing in Christianity which need prevent a man from becoming a good Bektash.

If all Moslems had been of this type it would not be so necessary for us to remember that one of the essential differences between Christianity and Islam is that, while the former is one of the religions that provide martyrs, the latter is one of those that create them.

¹ *Turkey and its People* (London, 1911).

CHAPTER VI

YOUNG TURKS—PAN-ISLAM—YENI TURAN¹

I

THE barriers of the watertight compartments in which the races of the Empire existed politically and ecclesiastically began to separate their members in the formative years of their education. Each *millet* maintained its own schools, so that from their early youth onwards the children of Turkey grew up with the idea and, generally, the ideal, of separation before them. It was not until the era of the Tanzimat that there came into being educational institutions in which Moslems and *rayahs* were able to be taught side by side; it was not until 1868 that the opening of a French Lycée at Galata provided the opportunity of an education on Western lines to the boys of the Ottoman governing classes. For the first time could Turk and *rayah* now grow up together in the acquisition of a common culture; for the first time could future officials receive a training based on the theory and practice of the West. The result of these innovations on the trend of Turkish political development was momentous, for to them may be traced in part the theories and the policy of the Young Turks, which came to fruition in the revolution of 1908.

¹ *I.e.* New Turan.

The aims of those who in due course became known as the Young Turks and finally degenerated into the "Committee of Union and Progress" were originally twofold. On the one hand these reformers aspired to a constitution of the Western representative type, with an elected parliament and a consequential limitation of the autocratic powers of the monarch; on the other, they sought to break down some of the barriers of the *millet* system by making the various sections of the Sultan's subjects politically homogeneous. It must not be supposed that the statesmen and administrators of the Ottoman Empire have been without exception either rapacious and corrupt oppressors or else the servile instruments of ruthless and despotic Sultans. Among nineteenth century Turkish statesmen there were men of ability, honesty of purpose and a courageous desire to save the Empire, as they conceived it, by implementing in full the reforms that had already been granted on paper and by advancing yet farther in the direction to which pointed the Tanzimat and the Khatt-i-Humayun. For with all Mahmud's persistence the government of the Empire was still, when all was said and done, only semi-Europeanized; in spirit it was an Asiatic despotism governing in the interests not, indeed, of a single race, seeing how badly the Turks themselves fared under their own rulers, but in the interests of the ruling faith, of the governing class and, above all, of the principle that the Head of the House of Osman must be maintained astride the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, holding western Asia and south-eastern Europe under his autocratic sway. The course of the reigns of Abdul Mejid and Abdul Aziz had seen

that principle gravely impaired: the weakness of both rulers and the latter's disordered extravagance, the advance of the Rumanians, the Serbs and the Bulgars towards separate nationhood, the nervelessness at the centre of the State, all these factors led men to believe that the Sick Man had reached the final stage of his dissolution. A feeling of shame at this degradation began to inspire the more enlightened among Turkish men of affairs, and the new reformers found a leader in Midhat Pasha, whose family hailed from Ruschuk in Bulgaria. Midhat, who had been an admirable provincial governor, was a convinced constitutionalist, partly because he was inspired by genuine humanitarian instincts and an abstract love of justice, partly because he was sufficiently shrewd and realistic a statesman to know that only by drastic internal reform, self-administered, could the rapidly dissolving Empire stave off the *coup de grâce* which Russia was impatient to administer. There was clearly no time to be lost, and the circumstance that the time-factor was an essential feature of the situation must explain the premature imposition of a bi-cameral legislature of the accepted Western type on a country so unsuited as was Turkey to profit by such an institution. In December, 1876, Midhat, who had taken the lead in the deposition of Sultan Abdul Aziz in May, of Sultan Murad V in August of that year, presented himself before Murad's brother and successor, Abdul Hamid II, with the demand for the promulgation of his draft constitution. The new Sultan could not well refuse the request so vigorously presented by those responsible for the elimination from the throne of his two predecessors,

and on the 23rd December the constitution was granted by an Imperial *Khatt*.

*"A parliament was summoned; an electorate, with only the haziest notions of what it was about, went through the form of sending representatives to Constantinople; and the sittings were inaugurated by a speech from the throne, framed on the most approved Britannic model, the deputies, it is said, jostling and crowding the while to sit, as many as possible, on the right, which they understood was always the side of powers that be."*¹

It is idle to speculate on what would have been the fortunes of Turkey's first parliament had its career not been cut short when it had scarcely begun. In the spring of 1877 the Russians, crossing the Pruth, initiated the fourth Russo-Turkish War of the century, and the Empire, now fighting for its very life, had no energies to spare for democratic experiments. The Turkish Parliament was adjourned *sine die*, not to meet again until 1908. And when the Empire emerged from the contest, shorn of so much territory by the Treaty of San Stefano that that arrangement, imposed by the victors at the very gates of Constantinople in March of 1878, had to be revised in Turkey's favour by the Treaty of Berlin in the following July, Abdul Hamid, wisely cutting his losses, decided that the only hope of resuscitating Ottoman power lay in reversing the Empire's orientation. For a whole century, since the reign of Abdul Hamid I, Ottoman rulers and statesmen had looked for guidance to the West, since the reign of Mahmud II had worked actively at concealing

¹ D. G. Hogarth in *The Balkans: A History*, p. 360.

the oriental structure of the State behind a western façade. Abdul Hamid II, who had not expected to reign, at all events to reign so soon, quickly showed himself to be anything but a *fainéant* monarch. A review of the situation made it clear to him that his power in Europe was not only dwindling but doomed. The Empire had, it is true, been admitted by the Treaty of Paris in 1856 to the Concert of Europe, but this half-contemptuous act on the part of the Western Powers really meant no more than the concession to listen to the surgical discussions around its sickbed, to witness the amputations of its own limbs. For what had followed since its inclusion among the comity of civilized nations? Rumania and Serbia had secured their formal independence; Bulgaria, now in part autonomous, was on the high-road to the same goal. On the other hand, it was in Asia that there now lay the greatest part of the Sultan's dominions; moreover, his Asiatic subjects were the most acquiescent in his rule, the most amenable to autocratic methods, the least centrifugal. And the overwhelming majority of them belonged to the ruling faith of Islam. So Abdul Hamid decided—he could in the circumstances by which he was beset have come to no other decision—to reverse the European orientation of his grandfather, his father and his uncle, to have done with Europeanization since Europe sought not to accept but to devour or else to break away from him, and to turn to the continent of his origin and of his faith, whither had moved the centre of gravity of his realm. He determined, in short, that the Ottoman Empire must become not more European but more Asiatic, and for the achievement of this

purpose he found to his hand an instrument long disused, no doubt, but one again capable of doing good service in skilled hands, the Khalifate.

After the conclusion of the war with Russia and less than three years before France's growing preponderance in Tunisia culminated in the declaration of a French protectorate over that country, Abdul Hamid made the first public demonstration of the new policy upon which he had decided to embark by appointing the Tunisian General Khair ed-Dîn, the former Chief Minister of the Bey, as Grand Vizier. The sensation produced by this act was profound. It is true that not all previous Grand Viziers had been of Turkish blood; more than one Albanian had served his Padishah with distinction in the highest office of the State. But for the Sultan to select for this supreme post a man who was neither a Turk nor in practice one of his subjects was indeed an innovation. And, lest the meaning of this departure from precedent should fail to be properly understood by the world at large, Abdul Hamid was at pains to emphasize in the *firman* of the Vizier's appointment that as Khalif he claimed the right to the services of all Sunni Moslems throughout the world of Islam. It was a bold stroke on the part of the young ruler; it was an act of state of the first magnitude. For it was at once a call to the Mohammedan world to rally round the protector of their faith and a challenge to the West that the Sultan of Turkey was no longer the Sick Man alternately to be bullied and exploited but was a spiritual force capable of exercising a powerful appeal and, if necessary, of arousing anti-Western sentiment far beyond his political frontiers.

His next step was to woo the Moslem races under his own rule, at all events such of them as required delicate handling, namely the Arabs, the Kurds and the Albanians; the Turks themselves were too docile, too disciplined and too submissive to constituted authority to require any special efforts or blandishments on his part. He began to surround himself with Moslem Syrian secretaries and Kurdish henchmen, to draw his body-guard from the Albanian battalions. Moreover, he now manifested a solicitous interest in the affairs of Moslems in Africa, in India, in the Far East; he gave asylum to groups of warlike Chechens from Daghestan after the Russians had completed the penetration of their wild valleys on the Caspian slopes of the Caucasus. Acting on the same principle, he settled colonies of Moslem Circassians on his Arab marches when, dissatisfied with Russian rule, these stealers of horses and sellers of daughters but doughty and truculent fighters withal emigrated from their homes on the shores of the Black Sea; he established Bosnian Moslems in Palestine and elsewhere in his Asiatic provinces after the administration of Bosnia and Hercegovina was taken over in 1878 by Austria-Hungary. And then followed the conception of the Hejaz Railway, a grandiose project which facilitated and increased the pilgrim traffic to the Holy Cities of Arabia and thereby made Abdul Hamid's position as Khalif something of a reality beyond his own territories and undoubtedly enhanced his personal prestige both outside and inside Turkey. The Hejaz Railway was the most striking and the most successful concrete manifestation of the Pan-Islamic policy of Abdul Hamid II, who by now had also found a new

friend in the West, one whose friendship was destined powerfully to affect the course of Turkish history. The benevolent support which William II began at the end of the nineteenth century to extend to the ruler of the provinces across which lay the route to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf came to Abdul Hamid at the opportune moment when, in consequence of the Armenian massacres being perpetrated at intervals from 1894, he was being looked at askance by his brother monarchs in the Concert of Europe. In the autumn of 1898 William astonished Europe with a remarkable feat of ambidexterity: in October he made a spectacular entry into Jerusalem in the guise of a modern Crusader; a few days later in Damascus, forgetful, apparently, of the *Johanniter*-robes in which he had so recently postured, he hailed Abdul Hamid, whom the British and the French were beginning to know best as "the Great Assassin" and "the Red Sultan", as "his friend and ally whom three hundred million Mohammedans throughout the world revere as their Khalif". William obtained the concession for the Baghdad Railway and the privilege of sending German officers to reorganize the Turkish army; while Abdul Hamid, secure in the backing of his powerful and non-critical ally, prosecuted his task, which he performed with consummate adroitness, of playing the remaining Powers off the one against the other and of wrecking what remained of the now somewhat dissonant Concert of Europe.

As Abdul Hamid developed his personal authority as Khalif, so he developed his personal autocracy as a temporal ruler. Mahmud II had succeeded, as we saw in

a previous chapter, in transferring the seat of power from the Porte to the Seraglio, but under his sons the Porte had recovered much of its initiative *vis-à-vis* the Sultan. Abdul Hamid II once again gathered all the threads of government into the hands of the monarch, and in his villa of Yildiz Kiosk ("the Star Pavilion"), situated on a hill above the suburb of Beshik-Tash (for the timorous and suspicious Sultan had decided that the Bosphorus palaces offered too tempting a mark for the guns of potentially mutinous ships), set up a Palace government of an extreme type. Here, surrounded by his own creatures,¹ he issued his orders to every part of his Empire, not confining himself by any means to the regular channels but constantly short-circuiting his own ministers and reversing by direct telegrams to his Valis instructions issued by the Grand Vizier. Needless to say that this was not the atmosphere in which the reformers were likely to advance their cause. While dissatisfied Moslems from Russia and other Christian countries now found an asylum in various parts of Turkey, the Turkish constitutionalists, the Young Turks of the school of the Tanzimat and of Midhat, were constrained to go into exile and to carry

¹ For thirty years Turkey was governed through this Palace Secretariat, which was known as the *Mabeyn*. Its members were mainly Arabs, Albanians and Circassians, and few of them have left a savoury reputation behind them. An outstanding exception was one of its rare Turkish members, Tahsin Pasha, who during the thirteen years of his tenure of the post of Chief Secretary to Abdul Hamid, from 1896 to 1909, was next to the Sultan the most influential man in Turkey, entirely loyal to his master and a person of discretion and integrity who, unlike his colleagues, refrained from enriching himself or from deserting his post at the Revolution. He died destitute in Stambul in 1933.

on their propaganda from the safe distance of France and Switzerland. It was the day, in Turkey, of the spy and the *agent-provocateur*, and no honest, disinterested administrator was given a free hand to do his best for the country. It would have been no exaggeration to say that one half of the population of Constantinople was employed in spying on the other half. The police of the capital outnumbered the garrison; and it has been recorded that the number of the political exiles who returned to it on the restoration of the Constitution in 1908 exceeded 80,000.

But others besides Ottomans contributed to the unwholesome atmosphere that now prevailed in and emanated from the "Abode of Felicity".¹ In this ambient of suspicion carried to lengths that became ludicrous except to those personally affected, of delation so ubiquitous that no group of Turks of any position could afford to be seen talking together on the most innocent of topics and no man dared trust his nearest and dearest—in this ambient there flourished not only the indigenous informer and blackmailer but the less reputable type of European speculator and seeker of concessions from venal officials. It was the era of kilometric guarantees, the era of that spectacular rather than sound finance on the part of some of the European banks in Turkey that went not inappropriately by the name of "Bosphorescence". For a picture as graphic as it is amusing of the exploitation of Turkey by the rapacious foreigner, of the Turkish high official's cynical recognition of how the unscrupulous con-

¹ This is the translation of the Arabic *Der Saadet*, the official name at that time of the Ottoman capital.

cessionnaire attained his ends through his own corruption, of how both parties, each conscious of the other's roguery, transacted their nefarious deals with bland hypocrisy in the supposed interests of the progress of the State, the reader is referred to the brilliant Introduction to Sir Charles Eliot's *Turkey in Europe*. His Vali of Karakeui is an unforgettable picture of the Turkish governor of the old school who reluctantly declines a commission on the proposed introduction into his province of the "Antiseptic Dynamo" because antiseptic means the enemy of corruption and would "at once be understood as a seditious allusion to the Sublime Ottoman Government", while the Imperial Custom House would confuse dynamo with dynamite and accuse him of trying to import explosives; his discourse to his imaginary European interlocutor, whose business it is to make Orientals buy what they do not want, is a thing of genius. Nor was this foreign draining of the resources of the State confined to commercial concessions and financial speculations; it had also, as it seemed to patriotic Turks, political and territorial objectives. Consequently, as at the beginning of the reign, so again at its end there began to take form among Turks a sense of revolt at the degradation of an Empire that had once been great. All Abdul Hamid's diplomatic ingenuity, all his skill in finding in the Islamic world a counterpoise to his humiliations in Europe, could not prevent the growth among the Turkish intelligentsia of a feeling of indignation at the total loss of some European provinces, at the preparation of others for subsequent independence by foreign *gendarmérie* officers

and financial inspectors, at the undignified expedients, such as the creation of "Eastern Rumelia", which were devised in order to maintain the fiction of Ottoman sovereignty in regions whence the reality of the Ottomans' power had irretrievably departed. From the intelligentsia this feeling spread to the younger officers of the army, some of whom Abdul Hamid had caused to be trained abroad, little anticipating that this one of his few progressive measures would, by the irony of fate, result in the event to his disadvantage. Had Abdul Hamid been a martial, open-air man as was his grandfather Mahmud II, had he kept touch with his troops, he might have staved off the revolution of 1908, of which the agent was the army. But the suspicious and in his later years morbidly apprehensive Sultan preferred to lurk in Yildiz unseen by his subjects, viewing with distrust and keeping at arm's length all but the Albanian battalions of the army which with other handling might have remained the buttress of his authority.

2

Midhat Pasha did not live to see the resumption of his work. One of the first of Abdul Hamid's acts had been to send into exile the courageous leader of the reform party, who was rendered particularly hateful to the young autocrat by the sympathy and prestige which he enjoyed abroad. Compelled shortly afterwards, much against his will, to recall him as Vali of Syria under pressure by the British Government, who were anxious to see the reforms applied to an important province of mixed population by a reforming adminis-

trator, the Sultan came to the conclusion that only through a manipulation of the processes of the law would he be able to rid himself of the man who was in his eyes an obnoxious busybody and a dangerous foreign protégé. So he caused to be revived the story, which had obtained a certain amount of currency at the time, that Abdul Aziz had met his end not through suicide but by violence (according to the *mot* of the day he had "been suicided"), and cast the king-maker for the more sinister rôle of regicide. In 1881 there was accordingly staged a trial in which the Government were in effect both prosecutor and judge. The proceedings were a travesty of justice, and Midhat Pasha was condemned to death together with several alleged accomplices. Anxious to mitigate the bad impression provoked by the trial both at home and abroad, and yielding to British persuasion, Abdul Hamid commuted the sentence of death to one of banishment; but three years later, in May, 1884, the unfortunate man was strangled by the Sultan's orders at Taif in Arabia, his place of exile.

For thirty-two years Abdul Hamid maintained himself as the autocrat of Turkey, and in some respects he may be said to have been successful. He could claim to have made the Khalifate a reality of some practical value to himself, and to have embroiled his enemies and ill-wishers in mutual jealousies and distrust. He could claim, after 1878, to have kept the country out of major foreign wars. But, unlike his grandfather, he sought no radical cure for the organic ills of his Empire; at best, he could but patch some of its more gaping rents. And, if he took the bodies of his Armenian subjects, he took

the souls of his Turks; by the quality of his rule he undermined the morale and self-respect of Christian and Moslem alike. Yet even in Turkey there is a limit to human endurance. Early in July, 1908, two energetic majors of the 3rd Army Corps stationed in Macedonia and leading members of the Committee of Union and Progress, Niazi and Enver, organized revolutionary movements in the vilayets of Monastir and Salonika with such effect that within two weeks these vilayets were gained for the Committee. The leaders of the Committee had previously, with shrewd skill, managed to win the Albanians to their side; and by the morning of the 23rd July, encouraged by the evident hesitations and inertia of Yildiz, they felt themselves sufficiently masters of the situation to enter the *qonaq* in Salonika of Husein Hilmi Pasha, the Inspector-General of Macedonia, whom they had reason to suppose to be sympathetic to their cause, and there to proclaim the Constitution. Abdul Hamid now realized that he could count neither on the army nor on the Albanians, and that without these he was helpless; and on the following day there appeared in the Constantinople press an official announcement couched in these terms:

"There has been promulgated an Imperial iradé ordering the convocation of Parliament in the manner provided for by the Constitution, which is the work of His Majesty the Sultan. This Imperial decision has been conveyed by telegraph to all vilayets and autonomous mutesarriplik, who are requested to take steps to proceed with the election of deputies properly qualified in accordance with the terms of the Constitution."

Simultaneously the censorship of the press was taken off and police espionage was abolished; and immediately it was as if a miasma had lifted from the country, as if a nightmare had come to an abrupt end. A new optimism took the place of the former hopelessness; the most divergent and discordant elements of yesterday made a point of enthusiastic public fraternization.

"At Serres the president of the Bulgarian Committee embraced the Greek Archbishop; at Drama the revolutionary officers imprisoned a Turk for insulting a Christian; in an Armenian cemetery a procession of Turks and Armenians listened to prayers, offered up by their respective priests, for the victims of the Armenian massacres; at Samsun the Turks saluted the beard of a Greek prelate; at Tripoli Turks and Arabs joined in thanksgiving services. The Bulgarian bands surrendered, and the brigand Sandanski was received like the prodigal son".¹

Turkey, it appeared, had been converted overnight into Utopia; yet to some observers the new brotherhood of the Sultan's subjects seemed almost too good to be true.

It cannot be said of those who had prepared this movement and generally of the members of the Committee of Union and Progress that they were without exception men of the lofty stamp of Midhat. Nor were the most influential members of the Young Turk party exclusively men of Turkish blood. In 1891 a group of reformers had formed themselves at Geneva into a Committee to which they gave the name of "Union and Progress"; later they moved to Paris and in 1906 they contrived to transfer their activities nearer home, to that cosmopolitan Macedonian capital of Salonika

¹ W. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 476.

which had long been a centre of disaffection against the Sultan. At that time Salonika, a microcosm of Macedonia as a whole, illustrated well the mixture of diverse elements which has given the word *macédoine* its meaning in cookery: in addition to its Turks and to its large Greek population it contained Serbs, Bulgars, Vlachs, Albanians, Bosnians, Montenegrins, in fact, colonies of every race of the Balkan Peninsula. It then also contained the most numerous and important group of Jews within the Ottoman Empire, having become one of the biggest Jewish settlements in the world when Ferdinand and Isabella expelled the Jews from Spain. And, last in numbers but far from least in brains and influence, were the subtle Dönmés, members of that sect of outwardly Moslem crypto-Jews peculiar to Salonika. To this mixture was added a generous assortment of the racially indeterminate persons who, while born and bred in Turkey, were in the enjoyment of the protection of some foreign Power; and in this special atmosphere there now began to flourish the type of Freemasonry—unknown in English-speaking countries but notorious in certain parts of the Continent for its advanced and subversive political and anti-religious activities—embraced within the designation of the “Grand Orient”. The earlier reformers of the Tanzimat school had been Turks, good Moslems, men actuated by high ideals; the Committee of Union and Progress now derived much of its support from the Jews and Dönmés of Salonika and from that city’s Lodges, especially the “Macedonia Risorta”, while on many of its members who were Turks by race religion tended to sit but lightly. The latter included, especially among

the young army officers who had been trained abroad, the type of Turk—then very much of a novelty—who allowed himself to be seen eating pork, drinking brandy or wine and taking off his fez in public and was inclined to scoff at the practices of the devout old-fashioned Moslem. The men of the Committee ranged from the realist to the *boulevardier*.

The rapid and complete triumph of the revolutionaries was distasteful not only to the Sultan. While in England it was hailed with enthusiasm by the Liberal Administration of Mr. Asquith, it was not accepted in quite the same disinterested and optimistic spirit by those nations whom a reformed and efficient Turkey would deprive of their pretext for interference in its affairs or of their hopes of succession to a part of the estate when the Sick Man expired. Already the foreign officers had been recalled from Macedonia, the International Commission of Finance had ceased to function. If the rapturous honeymoon between Turk and *rayah* which followed the return of the Constitution were to evolve into permanent accord, the Empire would take on a new lease of life, would become strong, would disappoint the expectant heirs. Not much time, therefore, was lost. On the 5th October, 1908, at Timovo, the mediaeval Bulgar capital, Ferdinand of Coburg, up to that date tributary Prince of Bulgaria and the Sultan's Vali of Eastern Rumelia, proclaimed the union and complete independence of the two territories under himself as Tsar of the Bulgarians; two days later Austria-Hungary destroyed, in the words of the Italian Foreign Minister Tittoni, a diplomatic fiction by annexing Bosnia and Hercegovina, which she had

been administering since 1878; the Cretans proclaimed their union with Greece. From the circumstance that these changes in the *status quo* were adjusted after little more than formal protests by the new Ottoman Government, it may be inferred that the revolutionaries regarded them as the price to be paid for foreign contributions to their success; but they evoked sharp indignation on the part of the Moslem public outside the inner counsels of the Committee. This indignation found expression in anti-Christian feeling, whose effects were felt by Greek and Bulgar *rayahs*. It was the first rift in the lute.

During the early months of their régime the revolutionaries, unversed in the technique of government, had been content to leave the conduct of the administration mainly in the hands of experienced Ministers of liberal tendencies, while dictating policy through the Committee, which in the last resort was all-powerful. The Committee had not wanted to show its hand prematurely, but the course of events forced it to do so. In December, 1908, Abdul Hamid, in reluctantly opening the new Parliament, had protested in the speech from the throne against the encroachments of Austria-Hungary and "the Vali of the vilayet of Eastern Rumelia"; public opinion gathered momentum in the direction of the feeling that Islam was in danger; the *softas* combined with many of the rank and file of the garrison of Constantinople, who disapproved of the godless ways of their younger officers and of the Committee, also with the army of out-of-work spies and other elements whose interests were those of the Sultan, to foment this fear, which the skill of Abdul Hamid

then canalized into a counter-revolutionary movement that broke out on the 13th April, 1909, and for just under two weeks restored the autocracy. When the army of Macedonia had suppressed the reaction, had deposed Abdul Hamid and had set up his doddering brother Mehmed Reshad as puppet-Sultan to be the figure-head of its régime, the Committee assumed more complete control. Parliament, which in the eyes of the earlier reformers had represented the panacea for all ills, was now becoming little more than a sham. The effective debates took place, the final decisions were arrived at, behind the scenes, in the bureaux of the Committee and the inner circles of the Turkish Grand Orient.

What were the true aims of the Committee of Union and Progress? Its aims were set out, succinctly and accurately enough, in the Committee's designation. The new rulers of Turkey wanted progress and they wanted union; and, if their proceedings were often (perhaps oftener than was necessary) conspiratorial and occult, if some of their members were shady, some of their instruments ignoble and methods ruthless, if they not only combated, as it was right for reformers to combat, the ignorant fanaticism of the *molla* but in addition despised the simple faith of the old-fashioned Moslem layman, their ambitions were not wholly unworthy of respect. If they wanted to put an end to the autocracy of Abdul Hamid less on humanitarian grounds than because it was from the practical point of view a failure, they undoubtedly wanted to rehabilitate the power and prestige of the Empire; and they wanted to break down the barriers separating the *millets* to the extent to which this was necessary in order

to attain these two objectives. They included among their numbers, in addition to the realists, men who were altruistically desirous of making things better; and to some extent, although not entirely, they were justified in adopting the watchwords "Liberty, Justice, Fraternity". But if they were to abolish the watertight compartments within which the *millet*s had their political and social no less than their religious being, if they were to bring the heterogeneous inhabitants of the Empire to a common level, there clearly had to be a norm, a standard of uniformity. That standard was the Ottoman.

It is not easy to define precisely the meaning which the Young Turks of the Committee attached to their ideal of Pan-Ottomanism. They did not aim at the exclusive racial Turanianism of the subsequent Nationalists, as that policy involves the elimination from the State of racial elements that are not Turkish. The Young Turks were prepared to retain, and to collaborate with, the non-Turkish Moslems such as the Arabs, the Albanians and the Kurds, as with the Christians and the Jews. But these elements must bear the hall-mark of Ottoman. This involved on the part of the non-Turkish elements an exclusive loyalty to the conception of the Ottoman Empire, with the consequential abandonment of any national or racial ambitions of their own which they might have cherished.

That was, no doubt, all very well in theory; and it is difficult to envisage what other basis the Committee could have laid down for the restoration and reconstruction of the State. But in practice it meant that the non-Turkish elements were being called upon to sur-

render much that was of value in return for advantages that were of doubtful benefit to them and might never even be realized. Any separatist ambitions which these elements might have pursued were inconsistent with the new conception of the State and must be abandoned; and it was a poor consolation to those who had appreciated the real benefits of cultural autonomy within their *millet*s to be obliged to sacrifice some of these on the altar of a new uniformity that might prove to be the shadow without the substance. No doubt it might be gratifying in theory to the *amour propre* of the *rayah* to be admitted by the Constitution to service in the Ottoman army; but there happened again what had happened in 1856. In practice the concession pleased the Christians, who promptly demanded equality of promotion, separate units and service in their own provinces, as little as it pleased the Turks, who not only resented the possibility of Moslems being placed under the orders of Christian or Jewish officers but disliked the prospect of potentially disloyal Greeks and Armenians being trained in the use of arms and in the science of war. As the first delirium at the lifting of the Hamidian tyranny began to cool, as the rapture of the honeymoon gave way before the realities of the situation, it gradually became clear that the fundamental aims of the new régime, however logical, however great an improvement they promised on what had gone before, were not capable of attainment in the peculiar conditions which the Ottoman Empire presented. There was too deeply ingrained an animosity between the different *millet*s, whom previous administrations had striven to keep apart; there was too well developed a cleavage in their

several aspirations; there was still an invincible repugnance on the part of the Moslems to take their orders from those whom they could not yet accustom themselves to look upon as other than *rayahs* and consequently inferiors.

Had the Young Turks had more time at their disposal they might have made something better of a bad job; but time was against them. Not only were some of their own young men in a hurry, a condition not unprecedented in reformers; the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Crete revived Moslem-Christian antagonism at the very juncture when the success of their programme depended on untroubled relations. So it was not long before the ideal of fraternity (the Young Turks had carefully avoided the term "equality") faded before the reassertion of Moslem supremacy, with this difference: that the Moslems who were now in control were less devout, less God-fearing men than their predecessors and had acquired more of a Western veneer, while the non-Moslems had lost many of the concrete advantages they had enjoyed in the past in return for a status which, if improved in theory, was undoubtedly impaired in practice. I recollect well being told at Mudros in April, 1915, by Greek refugees from Aivali¹ that they had lived happily under the rule of Abdul Hamid and that it was only with the advent to power of

¹ In the eighteenth century the Greek population of Aivali, a town situated on the western coast of Asia Minor, opposite Mytilene, was endowed by the Sultans of Turkey with special privileges and with an independent municipality. No Turks were allowed to live in Aivali, which thrived, under the name of Cydonia, as a centre of Greek learning and industry until the Greek War of Independence.

the Young Turks that their existence had become intolerable.

Equally difficult is it to analyse the Committee's attitude towards Islam, for its attitude towards Islam was anything but clearly defined. If a Western parallel were to be sought, it might be found in the attitude of the Third French Republic towards the Roman Catholic Church in the last two decades of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth. The anomaly presented by Gambetta's "*Le cléricalisme, voilà l'ennemi*" and the Combes-Briand measures, combined with the French right to protect Catholic interests and establishments in Turkey, to which the Third Republic clung with no less tenacity than the Bourbon kings, may be likened to that of the personal irreligion of the Young Turks and their political antagonism to what may be termed the Moslem "clergy", combined with their maintenance of the preponderance of the Islamic elements in the State. It was significant of this attitude that the deposition of Abdul Hamid was brought about in the time-honoured way by reference to the *ulema*, that it was legalized by the issue of the Sheikh ul-Islam's *fetva*, declaring the deposition to be in accord with the Sheri (Islamic) Law because the Sultan, having infringed the law of Islam, had failed to discharge his duty as Commander of the Faithful. It was no less significant of the opposite tendency in the movement that, when the Sultan was actually apprised of his deposition, one of the four delegates of the Committee who proceeded to Yildiz to announce to Abdul Hamid that he had ceased to reign was the Jewish lawyer Emmanuel Carasso Effendi, one of the leading Grand

Orient Freemasons of Salonika and the one who had been chiefly instrumental in bringing about the close connexion between that brotherhood and the Turkish revolutionary leaders. The inclusion of this person in the delegation was repugnant to the Old Turks, as it was meant to be, and not altogether acceptable to all of the Young Turks,¹ but it was a portent of the new era.

As those French politicians who made use of Gambetta's war-cry at home were careful not to trumpet it abroad where it might have injured France's influence in the Levant, so the Young Turks, with all their association with agnostic elements and lack of respect for religion, with all their reversal of Abdul Hamid's anti-westernizing policy in the structure of the State, were determined to retain that part of his Asiatic policy which consisted in bringing other Moslem peoples within the orbit of the Khalifate. In other words, free-thinkers as were many of the Young Turk leaders, whether they were nominal Moslems or non-practising Jews, they were going to preserve what had proved itself the most successful plank of Abdul Hamid's platform, that of Pan-Islam. When the Cretans proclaimed their union with Greece, the Young Turk press threatened the Powers, if they gave effect to the Cretans' demand, with the active resentment of Moslems throughout the world. The Young Turks who came into power in 1908 were Ottoman Imperialists as much as were the representatives of the previous régime, but, as men of the left, believed in other methods

¹ Cf. the obituary notice on Carasso Effendi in *The Times* of the 8th June, 1934.

of government and hoped to keep the Empire alive by substituting for autocracy a limited monarchy and an administration on a wider basis than the capricious tyranny of one man. As Ottoman democrats, moreover, they did not contemplate, at all events in the early years of their rule, a racially exclusive policy of a Turanian character. On the contrary, they were just as eager to keep the Arabs, the Kurds and the Albanians, who, having no longer an Abdul Hamid to pet them, were beginning to show signs of Nationalist and separatist tendencies, safely within the fold as they were eager to influence the Moslems outside Turkey. So Sultan Reshad was as much exploited as Khalif by the Young Turks as Sultan Abdul Hamid had exploited himself in that rôle. When, for example, a manifestation of Albanian unrest produced a dangerous situation in Macedonia, the old man was taken to Salonika and thence to the plain of Kossovo, where he was made to officiate as Khalif in religious ceremonies intended by the Young Turk Government to revive Ottoman patriotism among the Albanians on a Pan-Islamic basis. The rulers of constitutional Turkey had not abandoned the theocratic conception of the Empire. Outwardly, Islam was still entrenched firmly as the State religion; and Islam is a faith which dislikes and transcends racial distinctions.

Nevertheless, the time was approaching when the aims of the Committee were to be narrowed and were to undergo a certain deviation from their original direction. The Committee's first principles had been those of the French Revolution, within which it had sought to free and to reconcile the peoples of the

Empire. The Committee was not, to begin with, Nationalist; its original policy was not Turkification but Ottomanization. That a change took place in the orientation of the Young Turks was not due to a change in their philosophy but to the pressure of external events. In September, 1911, the Italian Government surprised not only Turkey but the world by declaring on the Ottoman Government a war that ended in the loss of Turkey's last direct possessions in Africa and in the forcible transfer of Libya and Cyrenaica to the "full and entire sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy"; in the same month (October, 1912) that the Turco-Italian War was ended by the Treaty of Ouchy, Turkey had to face the Balkan League of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, who laid aside—only for the duration, as it was to prove, of the First Balkan War—their mutual feuds and hatreds to take joint action against the common enemy before Ottomanization should have the chance to prove successful in Macedonia. It is unlikely, given the nature of the problem and given the impatience and unskilfulness of the Young Turks, that it would have proved successful; at all events, that is an opinion which we should be justified in holding to-day. But its failure was not inevitable in the minds of Venizelos and his confederates in 1912.

These events, and their results, determined the change of the course followed by those who were steering the Ottoman ship of State. On the outbreak of the war with Italy Enver, cruel, ruthless, treacherous, avaricious, corrupt but, to do him justice, energetic, enterprising, fearless and determined, made his way

through Egypt to Cyrenaica and for a year and a quarter, despite the Treaty of Ouchy, organized and maintained a guerrilla war against the Italians with the aid of his Senussi levies. His war-cry was, of necessity, Pan-Islam; and it was logical for the Young Turks, however apathetically they might bear witness to Islam in their private lives, to appeal to the sympathies of the Mohammedan world both against Italy in 1911-1912 and against their Balkan enemies of 1912-1913 and the latter's friends among the Great Powers. So far as the territories of the Ottoman Empire were concerned, the rule of Islam was undeniably in danger, and the appeal to Pan-Islamic sentiment was not only an act of practical politics but reflected the realities of the situation. It was with the close of the Second Balkan War that a new conception began slowly to take the place of Pan-Islam in the political programme of the Committee, namely that of Pan-Turanianism, manifesting itself in the first instance tentatively and in conjunction with Pan-Ottomanism and Pan-Islam. The Turks' recapture of Adrianople, their earliest European capital, in July, 1913, did much to efface the memory of their *débâcle* in the First Balkan War and to heighten the credit of the Committee. In particular did it enhance the prestige of Enver, who as the moving spirit of the Turkish military revival had become the national hero of young Turkey. Sprung from an obscure family, unconnected by birth with the ruling class, Enver now took steps to approximate his social to his national position by marrying a daughter of one of the Sultan's brothers, Suleiman Effendi, and assuming thereby the right to prefix to his name the

title "Damad"; and General Damad Enver Pasha was fully conscious of himself in his capacity of Turk and conscious of the part which, he believed, should be played by the Turkish race in the Near and Middle East. At the same time, he did not on that account contemplate the abandonment of Ottomanism or of Pan-Islam. He and his colleagues envisaged the three policies being pursued simultaneously and side by side, each one being emphasized in whatever place, at whatever time, it was the most appropriate policy to apply. Ottomanism continued to be the keynote of internal politics; Turkish nationalism, the keynote of relations with the Tatars of Russia, some of whom were beginning to manifest sentiments of sympathy with their cousins in Turkey in their time of trouble; Pan-Islam, that of relations with the Arabs and other non-Turkish Moslems within the Empire and of the Moslem peoples of North Africa and elsewhere outside it. No doubt the policies were often inconsistent, were often incompatible with one another and were actually at times in conflict; and it was inevitable that one of them must ultimately prevail over the others. It was the Great War that hastened the failure of Pan-Ottomanism, that revealed the bankruptcy of Pan-Islam and that led to the victorious emergence of Turkish Nationalism or Yeni-Turan.

3

Close relations between the Ottoman and German Empires, although initiated, as we have seen, by William II and Abdul Hamid, were far from being

relaxed by the latter's fall. Shortly after the Revolution Enver was sent as Military Attaché to Berlin, where he was received with open arms by the military Pan-Germans and contracted friendships with the Crown Prince and several of the army leaders. Through Enver Germany not only maintained but reinforced her grip on Turkey; and when, in January, 1914, Enver became Minister of War, he concluded with the German Government an agreement whereby a German General, Liman von Sanders, was appointed to the effective command of the Turkish forces in the capital and at the Dardanelles. The appointment was cancelled in deference to a sharp protest on the part of Russia, but there can be little doubt that there was already at this time a secret understanding between Germany and Turkey, for which Enver was responsible on the Turkish side, while by the 2nd August, 1914, Turkey was formally committed to military intervention on the side of the Central Powers. During the months preceding the outbreak of the Great War this forceful man was active in the two directions of Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islam. So far as the former was concerned, he encouraged the Turkish Boy Scout movement, which was linked with Yeni-Turan and its symbol of the grey wolf, and accepted the office of Chief Scout, designated, in genuine Turkish words, *Bash Bogh*, in pursuance of the policy, then in its infancy and later to be implemented to the full by the Nationalists,¹ of purifying the Turkish language of its Arabic and Persian accretions and reverting where possible to words of Turanian origin. On the side of Pan-Islam he estab-

¹ See Chapter IX.

lished a Pan-Islamic Bureau, whose object it was to spread the influence of Turkey, and especially of the Committee, among the Moslem subjects of Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia.

Whatever their individual views on the value of the Khalifate, the Turkish leaders made one desperate effort to turn it to account on behalf of their arms when Turkey was dragged into the Great War. In the name of the Sultan-Khalif they proclaimed against the Allies the *jihad*, the holy war in defence of Islam, despite the circumstance, anomalous and unpropitious in this connexion, that they had entered into the contest as clients and at the heels of non-Moslem Germany. Only inside Turkey itself was the *jihad* not wholly a failure: there, to some extent, it facilitated the revival of the Hamidian policy of exterminating Christian sections of the population. But outside the Ottoman borders and partly, also, within them, the appeal fell flat. Indian Moslems and Moslem subjects of France fought loyally and without straining their religious consciences not only on the Western front but against their fellow-Moslems on the Eastern fields of battle, while in due course the Moslem Arabs¹ allied themselves with the Christian enemies of their own sovereign and rejected the political no less than the spiritual authority of him who had sought to exercise a double claim to summon them to fight on his behalf. Nevertheless, the failure of the proclamation of the *jihad* automatically to mobil-

¹ To speak of "Moslem Arabs" is not to be tautological. There are many thousands of Christian Arabs, belonging to several denominations, in Palestine, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq and Egypt.

ize the entire Moslem world under the banner of the Khalif did not at once entail the end of that military Pan-Islamism which was organized by the Young Turks and their companions in arms as a political and military weapon for use against the Entente. For a while, indeed, Pan-Islam now lay dormant, but it was to experience a considerable revival. The delay on the part of the victorious Allies to impose on Turkey, after the armistice of Mudros, that peace, severe but just, which Turkey expected and then was ready to accept, the proposal to deprive the Turks not only of Constantinople but of Smyrna and its hinterland, the Greek adventure in Asia Minor, the disunion among the Allies themselves, all these factors contributed to create at the end of the War a feeling of Islamic sympathy with Turkey more genuine and considerably more intense than the call to the *jihad* had been able to do at its outset. And this feeling was powerfully fostered by a new element which first appeared on the scene at the end of 1917, the Bolsheviks. While civil war was still raging in Russia and the Allied Powers were supporting the "White" Russians in their struggle with the "Reds", the Bolsheviks worked tirelessly and skilfully to keep the feeling alive and to direct it into anti-Entente channels. It was an odd alliance, for no two systems are fundamentally more incompatible with one another than are Bolshevism and Islam; it was moreover a new thing to seek to portray Great Britain, generally regarded by Moslems as a friend and protector, as the determined foe of the Islamic world. But the Allies had been at war with the leading Islamic power; they were now opposing the

Soviet. Thus the activities of the Bolsheviks and of the political Pan-Islamists converged upon a common purpose, which was that of hostility to the Powers of the Entente. By the autumn of 1920 the Bolsheviks were able, at Baku, to stage an oriental congress which was attended by a numerically important Turkish delegation; and this congress helped to pave the way for community of action between Soviet Russia and Nationalist Turkey after the fall of the Sultanate in 1922. Moscow and Angora, united in common opposition to what the former looked upon as anti-revolutionary and the latter as anti-national forces, were content, while pursuing their joint aim, to ignore for the time being their points of difference, points substantially diminished when Angora itself rejected Islam as the official religion and the spiritual focus of the Turkish State. But the course of Pan-Islam has been traced sufficiently for our purpose; it is necessary now to consider the rise of Turkish Nationalism, otherwise termed Pan-Turanianism or Yeni-Turan.

When the Young Turks entered the Great War they did not confine themselves to calling upon Moslems throughout the world to rally round the Khalif in defence of Islam. They also issued a proclamation in which there occur the following words:

"Our participation in the world war represents the vindication of our national ideal. The ideal of our nation and people leads us towards the destruction of our Muscovite enemy, in order to obtain thereby a natural frontier to our Empire, which should include and unite all branches of our race."

It will be observed that in these sentences the ideal

of Pan-Ottomanism has receded in favour of the newer ideal of Pan-Turanianism. The words I have quoted are not addressed, like the call to the *jihad*, to Moslems as Moslems; they are not addressed to the inhabitants, irrespective of race and creed, of the Ottoman-Byzantine Empire; they are addressed to the men, wherever they may be, of Turkish blood, whom the authors of the proclamation wish to unite within the limits of a single state. The fact that the Young Turks were able to issue an appeal of this sort at the same time as they proclaimed the *jihad* illustrates the difference between them and the Turkish Nationalists. The latter are men of a single purpose, pursue a single object, that of the racial purification and homogeneity of Turkey as a Turanian State. The Young Turks, more opportunists than idealists, were ready to mobilize every sort of impulse in those whom they could reach, be it racial or religious, and to mingle those impulses in such a way that each would play its part in helping to carry Turkey to victory. But, as the War progressed, it became more and more evident that it was not the peoples of the Ottoman Empire who were fighting on the side of the Central Powers, but the Turks. Of all the races of the Empire only the Turks—perhaps it would be not far from the truth to say that only the Turkish leaders—were willing participants in the contest; the united Empire of which the Young Turks had dreamed in 1908 was dissolving in the crucible of war. The independence of Albania, the defection of the Arabs, the extermination of the Armenians, were progressively transforming the Ottoman Empire of before the War into the semblance of the

Turkey as we know it to-day, while the despatch of the Greeks into Anatolia, that is to say, into the heart of the most Turkish of the provinces of Turkey, in 1919 completed the process of rousing the dormant national feeling of the Turks and brought it about that they, too, found their national identity, the last of the peoples of the Empire to do so. The Turks must be included without a question among the Ottoman nationalities finally liberated by the War.

With the Balkan defeat the Ottoman façade, that for so long had been cracking and had been shored up so often, was now at last crumbling in earnest, to collapse after the Great War; and, when it had fallen, there was revealed behind where it had stood the strangely different elevation of the new, nationalist Turanian mansion. We need not trace in too great detail the birth of this new Turkish sentiment, which in the decade between 1912 and 1922 caused the internationalism of the Pan-Ottoman idea to make way for the nationalism of the Pan-Turanian ideal. The seed appears to have been sown, quite unwittingly, by a French novelist, Léon Cahun, the first modern writer of fiction to whom it occurred to take as his theme the invasions and exploits of the great Mongol conquerors and slayers of men, Jenghiz Khan and Timur the Lame (Timur-lenk, Tamerlane), and to transmute their grim records of destruction into epics of nobility and high romance, acted by the super-men of Asia. These stories originally served for the entertainment of the French youth of the third quarter of the nineteenth century; but when, translated into Turkish, they made their appearance as *feuilletons* in the Stambul press, their effect was sur-

✓ prising. For the first time in their lives the young intelligentsia of Turkey, accustomed to the belittling of everything Turkish and to the records of their forebears in pre-Islamic times being passed over in silence even in their own schools, now read of heroic deeds and conquests on a scale staggering the imagination, performed by men of a race whom the world now affected to think of no account. And it was a Western writer who was extolling these Turkish conquerors, before whom Asia had bowed and Europe had trembled. The success in Turkey of Cahun's books was immense, their influence on the rising generation one that their author is not likely to have foreseen. Their effect was to destroy in their readers what to-day would be called their inferiority complex as regards the achievements and destiny of the Turkish people, and to substitute in its place interest, hope and pride of race.

The next stage in the development of this nascent feeling came with the disasters of the First Balkan War, when many of the Young Turks came to the conclusion that, after all was said and done and the soothing doctrines of *hürriyet*¹ had been exploited to the full, it was only in the Turkish masses that the Empire could find its mainstay; that these docile, inarticulate masses were in the long run the only element in the State on which its rulers could rely to the end. So they decided that, notwithstanding the lip-service it might be expedient to pay thenceforth to the ideal of fraternity, the instrument of their rule must be the Turkish people and none other; and in pursuance of this conclusion they aimed at giving the party an increasingly Turkish impress.

¹ Liberty; one of the slogans of the Young Turk Revolution.

Gradually there began to develop a Turkish national and cultural consciousness, which took the form of a growing realization that the Turkish section of the population was bearing the burden of Empire without corresponding rewards. It began to be felt that for all too long had the real Turk been the butt of the other races of the Empire and even of the Ottoman ruling class itself, non-national in its outlook and content to regard him as useful when there was fighting to be done or some other distasteful task to be performed but as too docile, too good-natured and too stupid to be otherwise considered or taken seriously. Halidé Edib well illustrates, in *Turkey faces West*, this attitude and the Turk's reaction to it by means of the popular and typically Turkish shadow-play or Punch and Judy show, in which the principal character, who represents the Turk, is called Karagyöz ("Black Eyes").¹

"From the very beginning of the play", she says, "one sees Karakeuz surrounded with endless difficulties. Every other personified race, Albanian, Arab, even the Jew, bully him, assault him, attack him, use him for their own purposes, and if necessary occasionally flatter him to make him serve their purposes all the more. Anyone watching the play says 'That fellow cannot survive', but when the last act comes everyone else is defeated and thwarted, while Karakeuz stands and grins after escaping from every possible difficult situation."

It began also to be felt that the Turks had been pulling more than their weight in fighting the battles of Islam, and slowly but surely there emerged a sense of irritation among Turks—the ultra-conservative and ultra-clerical

¹ Cf. p. 204.

elements excepted—at the preponderance of Arabic in their tongue and in the ritual of their faith. Movements arose for the purification of the Turkish language from foreign—mainly Arabic and Persian—influences and resulted in the establishment by the Government in 1913 of a Turkish Academy; later, when these movements had become sufficiently powerful, they led to what was regarded by the clerical elements as an impious proceeding and would have been unthinkable before the Revolution, the translation of the Qoran from Arabic, the sacred tongue in which it was revealed, into the Turkish vernacular. And as far back as 1911 the Young Turk party congress had resolved to promote the immigration into Turkey of members of other branches of the Turkish race from Turkestan and the Caucasus. It was these tendencies, cultural, linguistic, racial, aiming on the one hand at the assertion by the Turks of the Empire of their racial characteristics, hitherto suppressed or ignored, on the other at contact between the Turks of the Empire and Turkish groups outside it, that combined and gathered strength while Ottomanism was perishing, and produced, after the fall of the old, non-racial Empire, the new, essentially racial Republic.

For a length of time which must seem to us surprising in view of the many examples before them, the Turks had refrained from asserting their national feeling. They had seemed to be satisfied with the circumstance that they were, if mainly in theory, the dominant race in their Empire, that the provinces of that Empire were ruled by officials who, if Osmanlis rather than Turks, at all events belonged to the same *millet* as

themselves. They seemed not to be aware that the benefits derived by the individual Turk from this system were largely illusory and scarcely deserved to be regarded as adequate compensation for the fact that they alone paid the blood-tax which kept the Empire in being, that the wider the frontiers of the Empire, the farther from their homes the Anatolian conscripts were called upon to leave their bones. They saw Nationalism grow, and bear fruit, among their Greek, Rumanian, Serb, Bulgar and even Arab fellow-subjects before they felt that the time had come to develop the ideal among themselves. It now seems surprising to the non-Turkish observer that while the nineteenth century had witnessed throughout its length the spread of Nationalism among the Christian peoples of the Balkans, it was not until the twentieth century that the Turks began to realize that they alone of all its component races had no place of their own in the Empire which they had created, and began at long last to envisage the possibility of a Turkish instead of an Ottoman Turkey.

It will have become apparent that Turkish Nationalism does not represent a later stage of the policy of the Young Turk reformers; it is its precise converse. It was the original aim of the Young Turks to assimilate *rayahs* to Turks, to render homogeneous the diverse elements of the population of the Empire in a common Ottomanism. It is the aim, now achieved, of the Turkish Nationalists to purge the body-politic of the Turkish State of racial and linguistic elements that are not Turkish, and to keep the stock and mind and speech of the nation purely Turkish, purely Turanian.

SULTAN, KHALIF, REPUBLIC:
THE TRANSITION, 1918-1924

MEHMED V RESHAD, the Sultan who had been dragged into the War, died on the 3rd July, 1918, five months after the deposed ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid II, and was followed by Mehmed VI Vahid'ed-Dîn, the fourth brother in succession to occupy the throne of Osman.¹ On the 30th October, four months after the new Sultan's accession, the Turkish armistice was signed on board H.M.S. *Agamemnon* at Mudros.

At the time of the armistice what had been the Ottoman Empire was a cowed, inanimate thing, with no thought of resistance and with no hope save that the punishment, whatever form it might take, would come quickly. The Committee of Union and Progress was utterly discredited, the corrupt clique of leaders who at Germany's behest had dragged Turkey into the War were either in flight or under arrest, and a Government, formed from the Liberal Entente party, was in power in Constantinople, not only prepared but

¹ The dates of the four brothers and their cousin, the Khalif Abdul Mejid, are:

Murad V, 1840-1904; reigned May-August, 1876.

Abdul Hamid II, 1842-1918; reigned 1876-1909.

Mehmed V Reshad, 1844-1918; reigned 1909-1918.

Mehmed VI Vahid ed-Dîn, 1861-1926; reigned 1918-1922.

Abdul Mejid, b. 1868; Khalif 1922-1924.

anxious to collaborate with the Allies. Had a Peace Treaty been presented to Turkey at that time, she would have accepted almost any terms however drastic, would have resigned herself to the loss of any territories except the essentially Turkish provinces of western Asia Minor. The new Sultan was pathetically anxious for an understanding with Great Britain; his brother-in-law and trusted counsellor, Damad Ferid Pasha, who became Grand Vizier in July, 1919, was a friend of the Allies and had always been an outspoken enemy of the Committee of Union and Progress.

An act on the part of the Supreme Council restored to the Turks the vitality which seemed to have gone for ever, infused into them a patriotism probably more real than any which the War had been able to evoke and created the spirit of Turkish nationalism at the expense of the Allies. This act was the despatch in May, 1919, of Greek troops to Smyrna under the auspices of the Supreme Council, ostensibly to preserve order on behalf of the Allies. It is no part of the design of this book to describe the course of the advance of the Greeks into Asia Minor and their ultimate withdrawal or to appraise the motives and wisdom of their despatch. It is sufficient for its purpose to record that all Turks, even those most friendly to the Allies and most anxious for a *rapprochement* with them, were infuriated by the occupation of the richest and most essentially Turkish of their provinces by their secular enemy. Turkish patriotism had tended as a rule to be vague and intangible, generally exploited by politicians for selfish purposes. But on this occasion it was genuinely aroused among all classes by the prospect that the very

heart of their country was being occupied by, and was likely to be permanently handed over to the Greeks. Not unnaturally, the position of the Sultan and of Damad Ferid's Government soon became difficult. Imperceptibly as yet, but surely, that Turkish patriotic movement which was generated by the presence of the Greeks in Smyrna and was soon to earn the name of Nationalist was gaining ground. A forceful, energetic Staff officer named Mustafa Kemal had been sent in May, 1919, to Northern Anatolia as Inspector-General, and there, as the Greek adventure gradually fanned Turkish powers of resistance into life, he laid the foundations of a new and *ex hypothesi* anti-Allied Turkish military organization.

Mustafa Kemal, at Erzerum in his remote Anatolian highlands, well out of range of the guns of Allied men-of-war, could work with relatively free hands, tied only by his slender resources and the war-weariness of his human material. But, in so far as he was organizing against the Allies as personified by the Greeks, he was constituting himself a rebel against his own Sovereign. The Sultan and the Grand Vizier believed that Turkey's only hope of salvation lay in strict compliance with the terms of the armistice. Even had they not been sincere in this belief, it is difficult to see what other course lay open to them, since Vahid ed-Dîn, his Government and his capital would have been at the mercy of the Allies had they attempted any show of resistance. But their sincerity was not in question, and they appealed repeatedly to the Allied High Commissioners for help to suppress the mutinous Nationalists and to make themselves masters in their own house. The "house" was

sorry enough. In the area occupied by the Greek and Italian armies, most of the attributes of government were being exercised by the occupying Powers. Eastward of the Anatolian Railway Mustafa Kemal was in full control. In the narrow intervening area the Government's authority waned from day to day in favour of the Nationalists, and Turkish public opinion was tending more and more to regard its supporters as traitors to the nation.

Pitiable indeed was the plight of the Sultan and Damad Ferid. They were not less true Turkish patriots than were Mustafa Kemal and his followers, but their conception of the best interests of Turkey was that of loyalty to the armistice and co-operation with the Allies. The pathos of their position lay in the fact that the Allied Governments did not return loyalty for loyalty. The Allied formula was that the Nationalist movement was nothing but a quarrel between the Sultan and certain of his subjects, in disregard of the fact that in this case the Sultan's interests and those of the Allies were identical. They minimized the seriousness of the Nationalist movement; they refused the Sultan the means to crush it, a task which he, poor man, was only too anxious to be allowed to attempt; in fine, they adopted towards the whole business an attitude of polite disinterestedness.

On the 1st October, 1919, Damad Ferid resigned. His position had become untenable. Mustafa Kemal was about to set up an independent Government at Angora, and the Sultan's authority was reduced, like that of the later Byzantine Emperors, to little more than the environs of his own capital. There was no

locus standi in Constantinople for a pro-Ally Government, seeing that the Allies would not help it; and Ferid sadly made way for a Nationalist Cabinet under Field-Marshal Ali Riza, which proceeded to work hand-in-glove with Mustafa Kemal. The loneliest man in Turkey was the unhappy Sultan, who had now not even his faithful Grand Vizier upon whom to lean.

The new Government immediately proceeded to hold a general election, in which, with negligible exceptions, only Nationalists participated. Thus the Chamber of Deputies, when it met, was nothing but an instrument of the Nationalists, who, emboldened by the apathy of the Allies, became more and more enterprising. For example, on the 26th January, 1920, they seized an ammunition dump under the guard of the French in the Gallipoli Peninsula and removed the ammunition to Asia Minor, while in Cilicia they attacked the French on a serious scale. The Allied High Commissioners were able to force upon Ali Riza's Government the dismissal of the Minister of War and his Chief of Staff; but the situation became daily more strained and full of unexpected possibilities.

On the 21st February the First Battle Squadron of the Atlantic Fleet, with four destroyers, arrived off Constantinople in order to give a temporary stiffening to the British naval forces, and on the 3rd March the cabinet of Ali Riza resigned as a protest against what they termed "the Allied pressure" in connexion with the ammunition dump. On the 16th March the Allies proceeded to the military occupation of Constantinople.

After the Armistice there began to foregather in

Constantinople several Oriental Pretenders and *rois en exil*. Prominent among these was the ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi; another was the Sherif Ali Haidar Pasha¹ of the Dhawi Zeid branch of the Sherifs of Mecca, whom the Turks had appointed Emir of Mecca in 1916 when Sherif (afterwards King) Husein threw off his allegiance and raised the standard of Arab revolt; there was the ex-Grand Senussi, Seyyid Ahmed, who had been deposed in the previous year and was now living near Brusa. The circumstance that this man was thus in Turkey in 1918, when Vahid ed-Dîn came to the throne, led to an interesting departure from precedent. Normally since the accession of Mahmud II in 1808, and on occasions before that,² the girding of the Sultan with the sword of Osman in the Mosque of Eyyub, the ceremony which in the Ottoman Empire took the place of a coronation, had been performed by the Chelebi of Konia, the hereditary head of the Order of Mevlevi (Dancing) Dervishes, who came to Constantinople from his residence in Konia for the purpose. In the case of Mehmed VI Vahid ed-Dîn it was carried out by the ex-Grand Senussi, notwithstanding the fact that, as it happened, the Chelebi was then in Constantinople. Seyyid Ahmed still retained considerable influence in parts of the Moslem

¹ The Sherif Ali Haidar's wife was English; and, had events in the East taken a different turn and had Ali Haidar replaced Husein in the Emirate, the world would have witnessed the strange spectacle of an Englishwoman as the consort of the ruler of Mecca and Medina.

² For an authoritative study of the Girding of the Sultan in Turkish history, cf. F. W. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*, pp. 604-622.

world, and it was probably in order to stimulate sympathy for the Sultan in Islamic circles that he was invited to officiate.

But the position of Turkey's legitimate sovereign, girt though he was with the sword of Osman, was becoming more and more unreal. In April, 1920, Mustafa Kemal summoned a Constituent Assembly to meet at Angora to take the place of the Parliament in Constantinople which the Sultan had just dissolved, and set up a new Government on the 23rd of that month under the name of the Grand National Assembly. The Sultan's only asset was that, so long as the Allied occupation of his capital endured, his personal safety might be expected to be assured. Meanwhile, the San Remo Conference had at last worked out the terms of a peace treaty to be offered to the Turks, and in May, 1920, these terms were presented to the Government of Constantinople. The latter were not allowed, however, to discuss them: helpless, they had no option but to sign, on the 10th August, the Treaty of Sèvres, whose only practical result, seeing that it implemented in part the secret inter-Allied arrangements giving Italy and France spheres of influence in certain regions of Asia Minor remaining in Turkish hands, was to drive those Turks who were still wavering between the Sultan and Mustafa Kemal into the arms of the latter. Beyond rousing Turkish patriotism still farther, the Treaty of Sèvres remained a dead letter, for by now the whole of Turkey not in Allied occupation was in Nationalist hands.

From February to March, 1921, there met the first London Conference, one of whose objects was to seek

a solution of the Turco-Greek question. The Conference failed to achieve this object, but it gave, for the first time, international recognition to the Angora Government, which was represented in London together with that of Constantinople.

The London Conference having proved abortive, the Allies now washed their hands of the Turco-Greek struggle, which they pronounced to be a private war between Greece and the Turkish Nationalists. It is not necessary to the purpose of this book, which is not a history of Turkey, to recount the details of the fighting. Suffice it to say that it persisted with varying fortunes until Mustafa Kemal smashed the forces of King Constantine (who had been recalled to the throne in November, 1920) at the Sakaria river at the end of August, 1922, entered Smyrna on the 9th September, and swept Asia Minor clear of the Greeks. Nor is there any need to discuss the events leading to the critical situation, increased by the divergence of policy among the Allies, at Chanaq during the same month. It is sufficient for our object to record the signature at Mudania on the 11th October of an agreement which led the way to the Peace Conference that opened at Lausanne in November, 1922, and resulted in the conclusion of a treaty of peace in the same place in July, 1923.

Even this rapid summary will have made it clear how decisively the control of Turkish destinies had passed by now from Constantinople to Angora. The Sultan's Government had, indeed, been invited, together with that of Angora, to be represented at the Lausanne Conference; but Rafet Pasha, whom Angora

had appointed to be Vali of Eastern Thrace, appeared in Constantinople, compelled the Sublime Porte to withdraw its acceptance of the invitation, and thus left the Sultan's Government completely in the air. On the 1st November, 1922, the Grand National Assembly completed the process of the Constantinople Government's dissolution. It proclaimed itself the sovereign of Turkey, it declared the Sultanate of the Ottoman Empire abolished, and it pronounced all official acts of the Sublime Porte since the 16th March, 1920, the date of the Allied occupation of the capital, to be null and void. On the 4th November, 1922, Rafet Pasha carried out a *coup d'état* in Constantinople, and on the following morning the Cabinet of Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, the last of the Ottoman Grand Viziers, resigned office and the authority of which nothing remained, and was not replaced. The inevitable breach, which for so long had been drawing nearer and nearer, had come at last.

The unfortunate Sultan, abandoned to his own non-existent resources by those to whom he thought he might look for support, had shown considerable courage and pertinacity in a singularly exposed and unprotected position. Still confiding in the Allies, he had nerved himself, on the entry of Mustafa Kemal's troops into Smyrna, to issue a Khatt-i-Humayun in which he declared the Nationalists to be rebels and commanded his Government to suppress them. At the same time, the Sheikh ul-Islam delivered a *fetva* in the same sense, proclaiming it to be the duty of good Moslems to treat the Nationalists as rebels. The issue of Khatt and *fetva* would have been a drastic step for the Sultan and his advisers to take even had they pos-

sessed the power to enforce them. Situated as he was, the Sultan thereby pronounced the doom of his dynasty as the Sheikh ul-Islam pronounced the doom of his order. Hitherto, not even the resolutions of the Grand National Assembly, his deposition at the hands of Angora, his threatened prosecution for treason, the hostile activities of Rafet in his own capital, had sufficed to break down the Sultan's resistance. But on Friday, the 10th November, 1922, Vahid ed-Dîn attended his last *selamlık*, to find that none of his remaining subjects ventured to do him honour by their presence. Then, at last, he realized that he could maintain the unequal struggle no longer, and, exactly one week later, slipping out of a side-door of Yildiz Kiosk accompanied only by his little son Ertoghrul and four attendants, he repaired unobtrusively on board H.M.S. *Malaya*, which conveyed him to Malta. His friends had advised him often enough during those last months to leave, especially after the bulk of his bodyguard had gone over to the Nationalists and he had seen his Ministers excluded from participation at the Lausanne Conference and compelled to resign their offices. Until he had no option left to him but flight he preferred to remain in his capital, among the people whose ruler and Khalif he claimed to be despite deposition by Angora and claimed to be until the day of his death in May, 1926. With the Sultan's disappearance there ended the anomaly of two Governments struggling for the mastery of one country; and with Vahid ed-Dîn the Ottomans passed out of history and made way for the reappearance of the Turks.

Seventeen days before the Sultan's departure the

Grand National Assembly, sitting at Angora, had declared the Sultanate to be abolished. On the very day of his departure the Assembly decided that, although the temporal monarchy had been suppressed, the Khalifate, severed from the Sultanate, was to be preserved in the House of Osman, and it ordered the issue of a *fetva* (believed to be the last of these Moslem canonical opinions to emanate from a Turkish Government) declaring the election to the Khalifate of the Sultan's heir, Abdul Mejid Effendi, who throughout the events leading to the split between the Governments of Constantinople and Angora had given evidence of his sympathies with the Nationalist cause.

Abdul Mejid Effendi was born at Beshik-Tash on the Bosphorus in 1868. He was the fourth child and second son of that Sultan Abdul Aziz who, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, was found dead in mysterious circumstances pointing to suicide a few days after his deposition in June, 1876. The right of succession to the throne in the House of Osman being vested in the oldest male agnate of the family, the heir-apparent to Sultan Mehmed V Reshad had originally been Abdul Mejid's elder brother, the ill-fated Field-Marshal Yusuf Izz ed-Dîn, a man of character and a good soldier, who died, likewise mysteriously, in February, 1916. The heirship to the throne then devolved on Vahid ed-Dîn Effendi, the next surviving brother of the reigning Sultan; and, when he in his turn became Sultan in July, 1918, Abdul Mejid Effendi, as the next oldest male of the House, became the heir. There had been nothing outstanding about this Prince's career. He had received the usual military

training of a member of the House of Osman and held the rank of a General of Cavalry, although, what was not so usual, he was a man of considerable culture, possessing marked musical and literary tastes. Politically, he had always shown liberal leanings.

On the 24th November, 1922, Abdul Mejid was inducted into his new functions by Rafet Pasha, now the Nationalist Governor of Constantinople, who made it clear that the Khalifate in its new form was the creature of the Government of Angora. Leaving his residence of Dolma Baghché, the Khalif first drove to the Old Seraglio, where were handed to him the letter of the Grand National Assembly announcing his election and the golden key of the caskets containing the relics of the Prophet. Next he received the homage of the *ulema* and then proceeded, accompanied by Rafet Pasha, to the Mosque of Mehmed the Conqueror in Stambul for his first *selamlık*, breaking the precedent set by Abdul Hamid and his successors, who for this purpose generally attended the little mosque in the grounds of Yildiz Kiosk. As a curious detail of this ceremony may be mentioned the fact that the guns used for firing the salute were borrowed from the British. The dress which the new Khalif should wear for the occasion presented a question of some difficulty. Obviously a General's uniform would have been unsuitable for one who had become the successor of the Prophet and vicegerent of God, nor did Abdul Mejid, hitherto a layman and now an Imperial Majesty, feel inclined to dress in the long gown and white turban of the *ulema* class, of whom he was now the head. The problem was solved by the Khalif appearing in fez and

Stambuli frockcoat,¹ wearing the star and the green and red ribbon of the Order of the Osmanié founded by his father. But Abdul Mejid made one concession to his new quasi-ecclesiastical status: he began to grow a beard.

The Government of Angora were determined that the new Khalif should be entirely *fainéant*. Abdul Mejid was not girt with the sword of Osman, the symbol of rule; he had no patronage; he could give no decisions; he could issue no *fetvas*. Even so, the action of the Kemalists in preserving the Khalifate in a Republican Turkey and, what is more, in a Turkey that was rapidly being laicized, afforded a curious contrast with the general trend of their policy. It was due to the circumstances that a still influential section of the Nationalist party had not yet brought themselves completely to throw off their allegiance to the House of Osman, and that Mustafa Kemal, although even then he had in mind the abolition of the Khalifate at the first opportunity, was not quite ready finally to turn his back on Islam. First among the anomalies of the appointment was the circumstance that, while the Khalifate is the supreme office in Sunni Islam, the Nationalist Government were in process of dethroning Islam from its position as the State religion of Turkey. Secondly, the theory that the Khalif should possess, in addition to his other qualifications, the power of the sword as the strongest Prince in the Mohammedan world (the Khalifate implied, as we have seen, the obligation to protect and defend Islam) was nullified

¹ A garment resembling the English clerical frockcoat, with upturned collar.

by the appointment to the office of a personage from whom all executive power was being explicitly withheld. Thirdly, the War had shown that the Khalifate, as a political institution whereby all Moslems could if necessary be rallied under one banner, had ceased to exist. That Islamic internationalism which Abdul Hamid II had succeeded to some extent in reviving under the aegis of the Khalifate had been proved, when the *jihad* proclaimed by the Sultan-Khalif Mehmed V in 1915 fell completely flat, to have been replaced by the separatist nationalism of Moslem peoples. Not only had it failed to prevent Indian Moslems from fighting on behalf of their Christian Emperor against the Commander of the Faithful; it had failed to prevent Moslem Arabs and Moslem Turks, both owing allegiance to the same Sultan-Khalif, from taking up arms on opposite sides.

For a very short time things went relatively well with the new Khalif despite these anomalies. Abdul Mejid's personality won him a measure of general esteem, and his attempts to revive something of the ancient pomp were acceptable to conservative Turks, who had been treated to little of it under Abdul Hamid, no less than to foreigners in Constantinople. Thus in March, 1923, he decided to hold his *selamlık* in Scutari, for which purpose he crossed the Bosphorus in an ancient and picturesque state barge which had not been seen for many years. This romantic craft, rowed by fourteen oarsmen in baggy white breeches and black zouave jackets, was steered by a helmsman dressed in green and gold; it was adorned at the prow with a large silver bird believed to represent a phoenix, and it

flew, for the first time, His Majesty's personal standard as Khalif, a green flag with a star and crescent on a scarlet centre, from which there emanated a number of white rays. But difficulties soon arose. The proclamation of the Republic in the following October evoked criticism in the Constantinople press; and newspapers published interviews with the Khalif, who, while avoiding political and controversial topics, referred to the veneration with which his office was regarded in the Moslem world. Encouraged by these circumstances, some old-fashioned Turks thought the moment opportune to embark on a movement to uphold the Khalif's authority in Turkey.

None of these developments were agreeable to the Nationalist Government. Early in 1924 Mustafa Kemal stated that the Khalif had placed himself in a false position by reviving the pomp and ceremony of an earlier age, by accentuating the importance of the Friday *selamlık* and by entertaining relations with foreign representatives. The office, he said, was nothing more than a historical memory and was devoid of all religious and political significance. In fact, the new Khalifate had been in existence for barely a year when Angora realized that its preservation was incompatible with their general policy. Despite the correct attitude of the Khalif the Nationalist Government began to feel that, so long as the Khalifate was maintained in the House of Osman, it would tend to be a focus for attempts to suppress the Republic and to restore the Sultanate. Having come to this conclusion, they were quick to put it into effect. On the 3rd March, 1924, Abdul Mejid found himself deposed from the Khalifate

as brusquely as he had been appointed to it; on the following day, by a decree of the National Assembly, he and all the other members of the former Imperial House were exiled from Turkish territory. He made his way, as Sultan Mehmed VI had made his way before him, to the Riviera, and took up his residence in Nice. Thus the throne of Stambul disappeared in the wake of its kindred throne of Peking as the Commander of the Faithful and Shadow of God upon Earth went the way of the Son of Heaven.

Abdul Mejid Khan was not, it is true, the last Sultan of Turkey, but he followed his cousin Mehmed VI Vahid ed-Dîn, the last of the Padishahs, both as head of the House of Osman and in the spiritual half of the Sultan-Khalif's prerogatives, and he was the last of his dynasty to be dignified with the title and status of an Imperial Majesty. If, however, on the one hand, he was a link with the past, he pointed also to the future; his tenure of the Khalifate without the Sultanate marked the transitional stage in Turkey's passage from the Byzantine Imperialism of the Ottoman Empire to the Nationalist Republic of Angora. For, although he held in the Khalifate a traditional office, he received it not in automatic succession to his deposed cousin, but at the hands of the Grand National Assembly at Angora. And what the Grand National Assembly gave, it likewise took away.

A few days after Abdul Mejid's deposition Husein, King of the Hejaz, was proclaimed Khalif in Mecca and Transjordan, but abdicated in the following October, when he became the third ex-Khalif in exile at the same time.

There were good reasons for the ease with which the Nationalists were able to demolish the ancient and once powerful structure of the Ottoman monarchy. The effect of the Treaty of Sèvres, to which the Sultan's Government had perforce given their signature, would have been to have handed Thrace to the Greeks, Eastern Anatolia to the Armenians, Adalia to the Italians and Cilicia to the French, with Constantinople as an international centre, while Turkey would have been deprived of her armed forces and would have ceased to be, save in name, an independent State. The Treaty of Lausanne, on the other hand, had reversed the position in favour of the Turks, while the Nationalists had by their unaided efforts expelled the Greeks from Smyrna and its hinterland and had frustrated the parcelling out of Asia Minor among Western nations. Other important disabilities under which Turkey had lain were likewise removed through the Nationalist Turks' stand at Lausanne. The Capitulations were abolished; the Greco-Turkish agreement of January, 1923, provided for a compulsory exchange of populations between the two countries, an exception being made in favour of the Greeks of Constantinople and the Turks of Western Thrace. The *millets*, or what was left of them, thus practically disappeared, for the Kurds were now the only non-Turkish element of any importance remaining within the Turkish frontiers. Turkey had become, with negligible exceptions, wholly Islamic and, but for the Kurds, racially homogeneous.

As has been said, the Nationalists in the first instance proclaimed the sovereignty of Turkey to be vested in the Grand National Assembly, which Mustafa Kemal

declared up to 1922 to be the form of government most suited to the Turkish people. In the speeches which he delivered in Cilicia on his return from his victorious entry into Smyrna the Ghazi¹ pronounced himself against the republican régime as being an outworn system, but he subsequently changed his opinion. On the 29th October, 1923, Turkey was proclaimed a Republic and Mustafa Kemal was elected its first President. With the party politics and purely constitutional development of the Turkish Republic this book is not, however, concerned. Its remaining chapters will confine themselves to an endeavour to describe the steps taken by the men of Angora to complete, in the fields of law, language, racial feeling, religion, education, family life, dress and general outlook, the divorce of the new from the old Turkey and to create a State on principles the converse of those which had been the basis of the Empire of the Sultans.

¹ This title, meaning "the Conqueror", was conferred on Mustafa Kemal by the Assembly after the battle of the Sakaria.

schools are not mutually antagonistic or competitive: in some regions the majority prefer the one school, in other regions the other. Among the Turks, as in Central Asia and northern India, the prevailing school is the Hanifi; Lower Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Trans-jordan, southern India and Malaya are mainly Shafi; Upper Egypt and the North African territories west of Egypt are Maliki; the Wahhabis, Hanbali.

What gave to the founders of the schools of interpretation their enduring importance was a basic principle laid down by the architects of Moslem law, that of the infallibility of the Doctors as representing the community of the Faithful. In other words, the pronouncements of these four men, none of whom lived after the year 850, were as infallible as were those of the Popes, speaking *ex cathedra*, after 1870. This meant that from the middle of the ninth century A.D. onward the doors of criticism and interpretation were closed on any point covered by the Qoran, the *Sunna* and the four Doctors. It resulted inevitably from this stoppage of natural growth, development and accommodation to changing circumstances that Islamic law became static, rigid and an ever tightening curb on intellectual and liberal expansion, while in many respects it either failed to provide for, or else was in conflict with, the needs of people not living a secluded life in remote Arabia but to a constantly increasing extent in political and commercial contact with other nations and other civilizations. Its inflexibility in the face of social and economic changes was not, perhaps, of vital moment when such changes were slow and almost imperceptible. It became irksome and cramping as the

tempo of reform and modernization increased in the nineteenth century. It became literally intolerable after the meteoric changes which accompanied and followed the fall of the Sultanate.

The Turks who created the Ottoman Empire under the influence and enthusiasm of Islam adopted this system as a matter of course, and large numbers of Turks joined the ranks of what may in a sense be described correctly as the clerical profession. The Turkish people, by temperament docile, disciplined in the face of existing organization and amenable to leadership, took kindly to a system which demanded the virtues they possessed and forbade critical speculation and independent thought, mental processes towards which they had no instinctive leaning. Although Islam has no priesthood, the students and teachers of the sacred law may justly be compared, by reason of their specialized education, their class-consciousness, their privileges and their prestige, also, perhaps, of their sheltered and often easy lives, with the clerks of the Middle Ages in the Christian West. Gifts of the public-spirited among the pious soon endowed a number of Qoranic schools or colleges, called *medresés*, and to these institutions students (*softas*¹) flocked in swarms, impelled by the various motives of a desire for legal and official careers, for a more contemplative life devoted to the study and practice of divinity and law (subjects then indistinguishable and inseparable) or, very often, for the exemption from military service accorded to theological students and for an existence of subsidized and

¹ Von Hammer derives this term from *sokhta* or *sukhté*, lit. the burnt ones, *sc.* burning with the love of learning.

protected laziness at the expense of the pious founder.

In the France of the *ancien régime* the elements of the State took precedence in the following order: clergy, nobility, *tiers état*. In the Ottoman Empire the conception of an hereditary nobility was unknown. Despite its monarchical forms and ceremonial the Empire was always a true democracy in the sense that the way to the highest office, with the single exception of the throne, was open to the man of humblest birth. Was not Kiamil Pasha, the most eminent Turkish Grand Vizier of modern times, followed to his grave at his funeral in Nicosia in 1913 by a nephew wearing the baggy white breeches of the Cypriote Turkish peasant, who laid down the tray of violets he had brought into the bazaar for sale in order to put his shoulder under the coffin of the respected friend of Emperors and Kings? The Turks had, as I say, no aristocracy; on the other hand, they had evolved a regularized, symmetrical and detailed scale of precedence divided into three parallel and corresponding classes, namely what I have called the clergy, the administrative service and the fighting services. In most cases the members of the administrative service ranked as *primi inter pares*, but in certain ranks, as will be seen from the appendix to this chapter, which to the best of my belief has never before been printed in any Western language, the clergy took precedence, so that a *khoja* or *alim*¹ might be senior to officers of the army and navy and to civil Government officials of corresponding

¹ *Ulema* is the plural of *alim*. The word *khoja* (more properly transliterated *khwaja*) in Turkey denotes a teacher of divinity or, generally, a member of the *ulema* class, also known colloquially as *sariqli* from the white turban (*sariq*) worn around the fez by the *ulema*.

rank. In the highest expression of this system we find an interesting parallel with the British Constitution. The head of the *ulema* or *khoja* class and, *ipso facto*, of the Judges of the Sheri Courts, was the Sheikh ul-Islam,¹ as the Lord Chancellor is the head of the Judiciary in England. And as the Lord Chancellor is *ex officio* a member of the British Cabinet and in the general table of precedence ranks as the second peer of the realm after the Royal Dukes, so was the Sheikh ul-Islam to the end of the Empire a member of the Ottoman Cabinet, Head of the Ministry or Department of State charged with the administration of all matters remaining in the hands of the Sheri authorities, and second in seniority to the Grand Vizier, with whom he alone shared the title of Highness after the Chief of the Eunuchs had been reduced from his position of one of the three great dignitaries of state at the fall of Abdul Hamid II.

Now the body of Islamic law properly so-called is denominated the law of the Sharia (in Turkish, Sheri), and its exponents are divided into two classes, the Qadis, who are the judges who preside in the Sheri Courts of Law, and the Muftis, who do not appear in Court but are official jurisconsults, to whom a judgment must be referred before it is promulgated in order that they may record, by means of an opinion which is called a *fetva*, whether the judgment is in point of fact consistent with the divine law or not. Not only did this principle apply to the judgments of the Qadis in the Courts; it applied no less to great acts of State, in respect

¹ The office of Sheikh ul-Islam was created by Mehmed II, the Conqueror, in 1453, after the capture of Constantinople.

of which it was the duty of the Sheikh ul-Islam, who was at the head of Muftis and Qadis alike, to deliver the *fetva*. The supreme illustration of this system is the fact that no Sultan has ever been deposed without a prior *fetva* by the Sheikh ul-Islam that he was unfit to retain the office of Khalif. In the following chapter, which deals with the reforms carried out by the Angora Government in the Turkish language, something will be said of the inordinate prolixity and magniloquence of Turkish official documents under the Empire. To this habit there was only one exception, but it was a conspicuous one. Turkish Muftis, secure in their infallibility, did not deign to argue; they were more laconic than the oracles of ancient Greece. The question submitted to them was generally framed in the form requiring a positive or a negative answer; and the answer rarely consisted of more than the one word *olur* (literally, it happens, it becomes), meaning that it is lawful, or the negative *olmaz*.

But in the days of the great Sultans of the sixteenth century there began to grow up a new practice which, while remaining—ostensibly, at all events—within the theory implied by this system, undoubtedly exceeded it in fact. We have seen in Chapter I how the Sultans began to grant the treaties termed Capitulations; and Sultan Suleiman I, whom Westerners call the Magnificent but Turks know as Qanuni, the Law-giver, not only made dispositions on matters (such as commercial relations with foreign Powers) which did not necessarily conflict with the sacred law, but issued edicts resting not on the sacred law but on the will of the ruler. It resulted from this change, whose importance

became more apparent as time went on, that there grew up a system of man-made law side by side with that of the God-given. The two systems were not, however, intended to be, nor were they necessarily regarded, except by the most rigid of canon lawyers, as being in opposition to one another; rather were they complementary to each other. The Sultans who laid the foundations of the Qanun were active and enthusiastic Moslems and were certainly not inspired by the wish to act in opposition to their faith. What the new development amounted to in practice was that the Sheri (canon) law remained the personal law, embracing such matters as marriage, divorce, inheritance and minors, and was administered by Qadis in the Courts known as *mekbémés*, while the Qanuni (man-made) law came to embrace what we should call criminal and commercial law. Nevertheless, "the canon law had to give way to the will of the sovereign, and ground once lost it has never regained".¹ Ultimately the two systems acquired separate Courts, separate judges and separate bars, but at first any conflict between their principles was tacit and unavowed. So long as Qanuni law avoided an open contradiction with the essential principles of Islam, the Sultans, if they were strong men, such as Suleiman Qanuni and Mahmud II, could make their will prevail and stifle any opposition on the part of the *ulema*; if they were weak men, they were generally deposed. It was not until the era of the reforms imposed on Turkey in the nineteenth century that there came into being, as regards the Qanuni law, actual written codes, based on Western

¹ D. B. Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory* (London, 1903), p. 113.

models and frequently containing, in explicit terms, provisions contrary to the law of the Sheri.

That there was, when this happened, no uprising of the *ulema* against a departure from the principles of the Sheri law greater than any for which Sultan Suleiman was responsible was due to the fact that the personal law, which they regarded as the core and essence of the legal system, was left intact, as were their own precedence and privileges. That there should be a new criminal law to settle what were after all, from their point of view, mere police matters, or a new commercial law to settle the sordid disputes of unimportant merchants, was in their eyes a triviality compared with the preservation of the sanctity of the law of personal status and the maintenance of their own special position. And even after the Young Turk revolutions of 1908 and 1909 those privileges remained intact. Turkey then changed, indeed, from a despotism to a parliamentary State, but it was still the Ottoman Empire with its Sheri law, its Qadis and its Muftis, its *mekhémés* and its Sheikh ul-Islam. It was not until Turkey had become a Republic and both the Sultanate and the Khalifate had been abolished that the real revolution in the legal system of Turkey was accomplished.

In the previous chapter I have referred to the Khatt-i-Humayun which Sultan Vahid ed-Dîn issued after Mustafa Kemal Pasha's entry into Smyrna, followed by the Sheikh ul-Islam's *fetva* declaring the Nationalists to be rebels. These acts, if they were not alone in bringing about the abolition of the Sultanate and of the Sheikh ul-Islam, at all events made the disappearance of those dignities inevitable. On forming his Government

Mustafa Kemal did away with the office of Sheikh ul-Islam and substituted for its holder an ordinary Minister for Religious Affairs, of course without the title of Highness; and on the 3rd March, 1924, the day on which the Grand National Assembly voted the abolition of the Khalifate, even this post was suppressed as an independent Ministry and was replaced by a Presidency of Religious Affairs subordinated to the Prime Minister. On the same day the *medresés* were abolished as separate entities and their endowments appropriated by the lay Ministry of Public Instruction, it being announced that the Minister would create a Faculty of Theology and special schools for the instruction of such numbers of Imams and preachers as were considered necessary by the Republic. In the following April the *mekhémés*, the Courts of the Sheri law, were done away with, and their jurisdiction was transferred to lay Courts of the Western type. On the 7th September, 1925, the number of the Moslem "clergy", the *sariqlis*, was drastically reduced by a decree enacting that henceforth only such of the *ulema* who held official Government appointments would be allowed to wear the turban and gown and that the retention of this distinctive dress by the innumerable Qoranic students and hangers-on of mosques, *medresés*, *mekhémés* and other religious or quasi-religious institutions became a criminal offence punishable by the Criminal Code. Three weeks later, on the 30th September, there followed the suppression of the dervish Orders, the wearing of whose habits was likewise made a criminal offence. After these preliminary steps it is hardly surprising that the Angora Government should have

decided upon a clean sweep of the entire Moslem law. In March, 1926, there was promulgated a Turkish Civil Code which was practically a literal translation of the Swiss Civil Code, followed in the ensuing month by a Code of Obligations following that of the Swiss Canton of Neuchâtel,¹ with the intimation that these Codes were to come into force six months after their promulgation. The new Codes embraced the whole of that family law and the whole of that law of inheritance, property and contracts which had formed the essence of the jealously cherished law of the Sheri. "Consequently", wrote the late Count Leo Ostrorog in his masterly lectures on the Turkish reform of the law which have already been quoted in a previous chapter, "*from the months of September and October, 1926, orthodox Mahomedan Private Law, after a sway of more than thirteen hundred years over the realms of orthodox Islam, ceased to be Law in that Turkish realm which for very nearly as many centuries had been its greatest and most powerful supporter*". So epoch-making was this change that when, in 1928, Islam ceased to be the State religion of Turkey through the abolition of article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic, which had laid down that Turkey possessed a State religion and that the State religion was Islam, this final breach with the religious past evoked relatively little notice.

Nor, moreover, did the sweeping away of the religious Courts, their personnel and their paraphernalia, and the substitution of modern Western codes for the law of Allah evoke noticeable opposition. The

¹ The Minister of Justice, Mahmud Essad, had made his studies at the University of Fribourg.

army was resolutely behind the Government, a fact which ensured that there would be no disorder. But it was not only a case of absence of disorder; the reform gave genuine satisfaction to more than one category of Turks. In the first place it satisfied, *ex hypothesi*, the party in the State determined to modernize Turkey and to bring it into line in every respect with the most up-to-date of Western and Far Eastern Powers (for the rapid modernization of Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century was taken as a model by many of the Angora reformers). It satisfied that section of the population which in the last few years had been acquiring considerable influence over public opinion, namely the women, who were now free to marry non-Moslems if they so desired, a privilege denied to them under the Sheri law, and were not only relieved of the position of theoretical inferiority in which they had been placed by the existence on the statute-book of legal polygamy (for in Turkey polygamy had long been almost universally abandoned in practice), but were also relieved of what had been a real and oppressive disability, the grave disadvantage in which they had stood before men in the matter of divorce. Raised by the reform in all legal respects to the level of their men-folk, restored to that position of human dignity that had been withheld from them under the code of Islam, they rejoiced accordingly. And, lastly, the reform satisfied those Turanian Nationalists who welcomed the disappearance of yet another fetter, as they considered it to be, which the religion and the philosophic and legal concepts of the Arabs had fastened for so many centuries not only on to the souls but on to the daily and domestic life of the Turkish people.

•

APPENDIX

CORRESPONDING RANKS OF THE CIVIL, ECCLESIASTICAL AND MILITARY HIERARCHY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE¹

(The dignities shown on the same line are of the same grade; but at ceremonies those marked with a I preceded those marked with a II, and II preceded III).

Order of Precedence	CIVIL		ECCLESIASTICAL		MILITARY	
	Turkish	English	Turkish	English	Turkish	English
1	Sadr Azam	I Grand Vizier (with the title of Pasha)	Sheikh ul-Islam	II .. (Effendi)
2	Vizier	I Minister (Pasha)	Qadi-Asker	III Qadi of the Army (Effendi) ²	Mushir	II Field Marshal or Admiral (Pasha)
3	Balaa	II Supreme grade (Bey)	Birinji Feriq	I First Lieut. - General (Pasha)
4	Ula Evveli	III 1st class of 1st grade (Bey)	Istanbul Qadisi	I Qadi of Constantinople (Effendi)	Feriq	II Lieut.-General or Vice-Admiral (Pasha)
5	Rumeli Beyler Beyi	I Viceroy of Rumelia (Pasha)	Haremeh-i-Sherifein Mevlevieti	II Qadiship of the Holy Cities (Effendi) ³	Miri Liiva	III Major-General or Rear-Admiral (Pasha)
6	Miri Miran	I Second class Pasha
7	Ula Sanisi	I 2nd class of 1st grade (Bey)	Biladi Hamsé Mevlevieti	II Qadiship of the Five Cities (Effendi) ⁴	Mir Alai	III Colonel (Bey)
8	Sanie Mutemaizi	I Distinguished class of 2nd grade (Bey)	Makhrej Mevlevieti	II Lowest order of Qadiship (Effendi) ⁵
9	Sanie Sinf Sanisi	2nd class of 2nd grade (Bey)
10	Miri Umera	I Pasha of the lowest grade	Qaimaqam	II Lieut.-Colonel (Bey)
11	Istabli Amiré Mudiri	I Grand Equerry (Bey)	Kibari Muderrisin	II Grand Muderrises (Effendi) ⁶	Bin Bashi	III Major (Bey)
12	Salisé	I 3rd grade (Bey)	Alai Emini	III Regimental Paymaster (Effendi)
13	Qapuji Bashi	I Equerry of State (Effendi)	Muderrisin	II Muderrises (Effendi) ⁷	Qol Aghasi	II Adjutant Major
14	Rabia	I 4th grade (Effendi)	Yüz Bashi	III Captain (Effendi)
15	Khamisé	II 5th grade (Effendi)	Khojikian	I Master-clerks (Effendi)

¹ All the civil and ecclesiastical ranks, with the exception of those of Grand Vizier and Sheikh ul-Islam, could also be bestowed as honorary titles.
² This rank was subsequently subdivided into two, viz. the Qadi of the army campaigning in Europe (Rumeli Qadi-Asker) and the Qadi of the army campaigning in Anatolia (Anatolu Qadi-Asker).
³ Viz. Mecca and Medina.
⁴ Viz. Brusa, Damascus, Cairo, Adrianople and Philippopolis.
⁵ Viz. Jerusalem, Eyyub, Salonika, Larissa, Fener, Galata, Smyrna, Sofia, Trebizond and Crete.
⁶ Viz. the masters of four grades of *medresés*.
⁷ This grade was subdivided into eight sub-grades for the masters of subordinate types of *medresé*.

THE LANGUAGE REFORM

UNTIL recently it has been a conviction, held passionately by members of the educated classes but entertained also by the simple, most strongly entrenched in Eastern countries but not altogether unknown in the West, that the dignity of the printed word requires the use of a special terminology not vulgarized and demeaned by use in everyday speech. The Arab seeks to preserve for literary purposes the archaic idiom of the Qoran. The educated Greek of to-day who is not a member of the Society for encouraging the written employment of Romaic has invented for the use of his pen a regular vocabulary of words, even for ordinary household things, which his tongue has never been known to utter. Thus, he would like to persuade the stranger that a tramway is *τροχιόδρομος* when no Greek in his senses calls it anything but *τὸ τράμ*; that umbrella is *ἀλεξίβροχον* when it is really *ὀμπρέλα*; that he speaks of a house as *οἶκος*, of bread as *ἄρτος*, of water as *ὔδωρ*, of brandy as *οἶνόπνευμα*, when he would never dream, if not posing, of saying anything but *σπίτι*, *ψωμί*, *νερό* and *κονιάκ*. And, as I say, the intelligentsia do not stand alone in seeking to maintain this position. They are supported quite often by the man in the street or the bazaar who, the less he understands the written language, the more he frequently

enjoys it, revelling in the sound of phrases incomprehensible to him as the old lady delighted in that blessed word Mesopotamia. So it was with the Turk. When he changed his status from that of a Siberian nomad to that of a member of an Empire partly European, he found it necessary to make large additions to his vocabulary, for which purpose he borrowed widely from Arabic and Persian. It is true that when these Arabic and Persian words passed into the Turkish language they came under the rules of Turkish grammar and were governed by Turkish inflexions, Turkish declensions, Turkish suffixes and Turkish pronunciation. But, even when enclosed within a Turkish frame, they remained unintelligible to Turks who had not a substantial measure of education, with the exception of a limited number of terms which were of daily use and had become as much an integral part of Turkish as many words of Latin origin have become an integral part of ordinary colloquial English.

The Turk of the old régime bore no resentment against this disguise of his language. In the first place, good Moslem that he was, he could not but approve the enrichment of his tongue by as many words as possible from the holy language of his faith and of the Qoran. He was equally benevolent towards Persian as being *par excellence* the language of poetry and of beautiful literature generally. Secondly, he regarded it as no more than seemly that fine writing and high speaking should not be too easily intelligible to the masses. That a letter to an exalted personage should be couched in the plain speech of the man in the street would have seemed to him highly indecorous. Even in

the West does not the legal profession, for example, conceal in the recesses of its mind some such thought as this?

"No Turk", as Sir Charles Eliot aptly put it, writing at the end of the last century, "*is in the least astonished if he does not understand a composition written in Turkish. He merely respects the author as having a command of choice expressions. He hardly regards literature or writing as a normal part of his life. He expects to understand a story when it is told him, or a business transaction when it is explained to him verbally; but he regards a book or a letter much as an Englishman regards a technical legal document, as a thing he could not possibly write himself, and of which he can only be expected to understand the general drift.*"

This complication of the written Turkish resides not only in its choice of words; it resides equally in its style. Compared with the literary efforts of Turkish Court poets, chroniclers and essayists, the prose of Euphues was terse and blunt. These writers sought laboriously for turgid circumlocutions and endless gerundival clauses; it was a point of honour with them to be flowery, magniloquent and obscure. The lawyers were worse. A Qadi of my acquaintance, a dear old gentleman whom I knew and liked well and who was in other respects the simplest of men, once delivered an *ilam*¹ which he regarded as a stylistic *tour de force* and as an object of legitimate pride. It was of colossal length, covering three foolscap pages of the Qadi's minute handwriting, and it consisted of one sentence, containing only a single verb, which was the last word of the judgment. As in Turkish the main point of a sen-

¹ Judgment of a Sheri Court.

tence is kept to the last, it was not until the puzzled reader had struggled through the Qadi's interminable gerundives and involved participial constructives to this solitary verb at the bitter end that he could learn in whose favour the judgment was given. It was beautifully fitted together, a highly ingenious compound of clause within clause as the Arabian Nights are a compound of story within story; and there was hardly a word in the whole document that was of good, honest Turanian origin.

This apparent defeatism on the part of Turkish writers, this lack of confidence on their part in the ability of their tongue to cope with their literary and official needs, this blindness to the real merits of pure Turkish, must be ascribed not only to their veneration for Arabic and their admiration for the beauties of Persian but to the legacy of the Byzantines, who bequeathed, as we have seen, to their successors in Constantinople, with other characteristics, the heritage of the inflated phraseology of the Imperial Chrysobulls. It seemed natural to those in whose hands lay the destinies of Turkish *belles lettres* that side by side with the verbal enrichment of the language there should go the enrichment, as they considered it to be, of its style. "*They forgot*"—I quote from a leading article in *The Times* on the Ghazi's reforms—"that Turkish possessed a great capacity for word-formation, and an unusual and attractive system of vowel-harmony. And so the literary language which they built up was a patchwork, in which the patches soon concealed all but fragments of the original fabric. A Persarabian jargon destructive of the growth of any really national literature became the vehicle by which officials, profes-

sional letter-writers, historians and poets confused the obvious." To employ simple Turkish—*qaba Türkjé*, "common Turkish", as it was contemptuously called—was regarded by them as the act of a vulgar and boorish person. "Poor Turkish language!" wrote Sir Charles Eliot. "*Smothered under a mass of foreign words, its powers of terse and vivid expression and its wonderfully copious methods of word-formation have been deliberately stunted and neglected and nothing developed except its capacities for being long-winded and obscure.*"

Another mistake made by the Turks—seeing that in the days of their rise to power they were among the protagonists of Islam, it was perhaps an inevitable one—was the adoption of the Arabic alphabet for the purpose of writing Turkish. Now the Arabic alphabet, although to the eye a thing of beauty, is of all scripts the most unsuited to transcribe the Turkish language. It was designed for a language in which there are only three long vowels and in which the consonants have all the importance. Owing to the multiplicity of letters to represent consonants differing only slightly from one another in sound, owing, moreover, to the special grammatical system of Arabic, rendering a word easily comprehensible even without the vowels being indicated, the Arabic script is wholly suitable for the language for which it was designed. The essence of the Arabic language is a symmetrical method of forming its verbs from a triliteral root, so that, once the meaning of the root is known, the meaning of its many derivatives becomes automatically clear. It is thus possible to decipher even decorative inscriptions, where bold calligraphers at times take liberties to the extent of

placing letters in the order in which they look prettiest rather than in the order in which they are meant to be read. But with Turkish the converse is the case. It is a tongue of few and simple consonants but of a great richness in vowel sounds, and it is thus the last language in the world that should be written in a script possessing the peculiar feature of ignoring the vowels. If it was not quite as laborious for a Turk to learn to read and write his own language when written in the Arabic script as it is for a Chinaman or a Japanese to learn to read and write their languages, even so the use of that script needlessly prolonged the initial stages of his education. It is often difficult to get the meaning of a Turkish sentence written in Arabic letters unless one already knows what the sentence is about; and this was an additional reason for the constant use of Arabic words. In their case, at all events, there could be no doubt as to how the word should be read.

But, notwithstanding the factors which tended to suppress it, the unhappy Turkish language had not entirely perished. As the spirit of Greek managed to survive in the bold, fresh, natural and vigorous ballads of the Klephts¹ despite the efforts of the more sophisticated writers of modern Greek to stifle it beneath their stilted and unnatural Hellenic, so has the undiluted Turkish—concise, forcible, expressive, laconic and a good vehicle for humour—survived in popular songs and stories. This class of literature has supplied the

¹ The Klephts were Greek brigands who assumed a prominent political rôle as open rebels against the Ottoman Government in the Greek War of Independence. Their ballads are the most attractive products of modern Greek literature.

literary wants of the masses and has been more widely circulated by recitation than by the printing press. Its most characteristic product is the classical exponent of Turkish humour, the Khoja Nasr ed-Dîn Effendi of Aqshehir in Asia Minor, and it includes the dialogues and shadow-plays—more funny than refined—associated with the names of Karagyöz¹ and Haji Aivat. This form of literature met with little respect from the exponents of “fine writing” until the Young Turks, after the revolution of 1908, made an effort to rescue the written language from the solemn fatuity into which the Stambuli jargon had degenerated by the end of the Hamidian régime.² But it was Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his collaborators who forced the pace and, with the persistent thoroughness which characterizes the Government of Angora, imposed the decision that the foreign trappings in which the language had been choked must be thrown off and that true Turkish, by which the Ghazi means Turanian Turkish, must come into its own. And the foreign trappings included not only the Arabic and Persian words but also the Arabic script.

From the point of view of its vocabulary the reform means a change in the Turkish hitherto written, and to some extent spoken, by the educated classes comparable in one sense with the change which would be brought about in English were it to be decided to expel from the language all words of Latin or Romance origin. But in one sense only. English words of Anglo-Saxon origin in our modern speech have departed considerably from their forms in the days of Chaucer, still

¹ Cf. p. 165.

² Cf. pp. 158, 166.

more from their forms in "Beowulf" or the writings of the Venerable Bede. But words of Turkish origin have evolved to a much smaller extent, so that the early Turkish vocabulary wherewith the Ghazi is systematically replacing the Persian and Arabic accretions will not sound unduly archaic in the ears of his people. Fortunately, too, for his purpose, he has an ample stock upon which to draw. Early in the present century there was discovered, and was printed in Constantinople in 1914, a manuscript dictionary containing more than 7000 Turkish words explained in Arabic. This dictionary, known by its Arabic title of *Diwan Lughat at-Turk*, was compiled by one Mahmud Kashgari and completed in 1066, the year of the Norman Conquest. Mahmud Kashgari was, as his name implies, of Turkistani origin, and the vocabulary assembled by him would consist of words used by, or at all events comprehensible to, members of the Turkish race living both to the east and to the west of him. From this valuable corpus and from other sources there had been made, when the second Congress for the purification of the Turkish language was opened by the Ghazi in Dolma Baghché Palace in Constantinople in August, 1934, a selection of more than a thousand words of pure Turkish origin to replace an equivalent number of the intruders. Nobody can doubt that this bold experiment not only deserves to succeed but will do so. If the Zionists have succeeded in reviving the Hebrew language, previously dead but for liturgical purposes, as the language not only of the Jewish section of the Palestinian press but of the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, and not only of the Jews long settled in the

East but of Jews who until recently have spoken no language but one or other of the languages of Europe, there is no reason why the Turk should not take easily and kindly to what is nothing more than the purification and simplification of his own speech. After all, it was only among the intelligentsia that its hybridization had been carried to extreme lengths; the peasantry never ceased to maintain it in reasonable purity. Before the War, for example, I used occasionally to hear old peasant women in Asia Minor and Cyprus still clinging to the ancient Turkish *Tangri* in the place of *Allah*. Nor can there be any doubt as to the wisdom of substituting the Latin for the Arabic script. What is perhaps not altogether free from doubt is whether the system of transliteration adopted by the Angora Government is that best suited to the purpose. It is purely phonetic, and a phonetic writing must certainly have its advantages in the peculiar circumstances of the case. But it has also the disadvantage that it ignores etymology and makes it impossible to establish the relationships of words and their derivations. Thus, the letter "k" does duty for both *kef* and *qaf*; "t" for *ta* as well as *te*; "s" is not only *sin* but *sad* and *se*; and so on. A purely phonetic spelling obscures not only the history of a word, it may also obscure its meaning. A cultured Turk predicted to Sir Telford Waugh that the new method of writing it would destroy the Turkish language in ten years.¹

But in their language reforms the men of Angora have their eyes upon a wider field than that inhabited by their own subjects. In the census of 1927, the first

¹ *Turkey Yesterday, To-day and To-morrow* (London, 1930), p. 275.

general census ever to be taken in Turkey, the population of the Republic, now largely homogeneous, is given as 13,648,000, but the Turks of Turkey constitute only a fraction of the members of the Turkish race. A modern Turkish writer of Russian Tatar origin, Professor of the history of law in Angora, estimated in 1930 that the number of Turks in the world then amounted to 51½ millions, of which 12½ belonged to Turkey, 28 to Russia, 5 to Persia, 3½ to China, 1½ to Afghanistan and 1 million to the Balkan States apart from Turkey in Europe. These figures are no doubt approximate and difficult to check, but it is a matter of fact that Turkish in one form or another is spoken by large bodies of men from the Danube to Diarbekr, from Bulgaria to Bokhara, from the Mediterranean to the borders of Manchukuo. These millions, scattered over this vast area, speak one language, namely Turkish, but it is a Turkish divided into something like fifteen dialects. The differences between these dialects, so far as the unwritten word is concerned, may be likened to the differences between the several Slav languages: between Russian, Polish, Czech, Slovak, Serbian, Croatian, Slovene and so forth. That is to say, they are mutually intelligible to a greater or lesser degree. Even the present writer was able, within the restricted limits of his knowledge of Osmanli Turkish, to transact business without great difficulty with the Ministers of the former Tatar Republic of Azerbaijan, who used the Azerbaijani dialect, during his residence in Transcaucasia. Of these dialects the westernmost, namely the Osmanli, is the most musical and the most refined, but it has also been until now the one most

overlaid with foreign words. It looks as if the language reform of Angora, by stripping the written Osmanli of its foreign accretions and by reviving in their place words that in many cases have never ceased to be used in some, at all events, of the Turkish dialects of Russia and Central Asia and beyond, may provide a powerful bond in the not too distant future between important bodies of men spread over a great part of Asia.

CHAPTER X

THE LAST BREAK WITH BYZANTIUM

I

IN the first chapter of this book I endeavoured to describe the characteristics which mainly contributed to the continuity between the Ottoman Empire and its Byzantine predecessor. It will be recalled that these characteristics, arising from and depending on the governing factor of Constantinople as the common capital of both Empires, were, first, the splitting of the population into more or less autonomous compartments, which developed into the *millet*s of the Ottoman Empire; secondly, the pomp, ceremony and artificiality of the Court with its parallel establishments of the Emperor and the Empress, and of the elements that surrounded and emanated from the Court; thirdly, the spiritual position transmitted from the Basileus, "equal of the Apostles", to the Ottoman Sultan-Khalif, "Commander of the Faithful", and the intimate connexion between Church and State. We have seen how these qualities made of the Ottoman Empire a political organization Imperial and comprehensive in character, international and eclectic, with an impress that was Islamic and in a sense also Christian but was so little Turkish that the name "Turk" found no place in its designation. We have seen how completely taken for

granted was the Turk himself, about whom, because he was docile, inarticulate and uncomplaining, nobody bothered whether outside the Empire or within it. We have seen how the religion which he had adopted was expounded to him in a foreign tongue and how even his own language was almost concealed beneath the cloak of imported words. There was no such thing as Turkish nationalism, no such thing as a distinctive Turkish culture. Most of the Sultan's non-Turkish subjects, Christian and Moslem alike, ultimately broke away from their allegiance after struggles more or less prolonged: Greeks, Serbs, Rumanians, Bulgars, Egyptians, Albanians, Arabs. Even the Armenians, who failed to break away, cultivated a national consciousness and hoped one day to secure their freedom; while none but the Kurds are now left to Turkey, as a minority at all compact, of that mosaic of races that once composed the Ottoman Empire. Only the Turks cultivated no such consciousness, were unaware of an urge to burst the bonds of Byzantium, the bonds of Empire, and to assert themselves as Turks. Neither, it may be urged, did the German-Austrians in the Austrian Empire, whose position as the dominant minority was in a sense comparable with that of the Turks in the Ottoman Empire, cherish similar ambitions. But there was a good reason for this. The German-Austrians of the Habsburg Empire were not alone in bearing the heat and burden of the day. That burden was also borne by their Slav fellow-subjects. In other words, the price they paid for the privileges and glory of Empire was paid equally by all of their Emperor's subjects. With the Turk it was otherwise.

Let us now see how the Nationalist Government has shed the characteristics which the Ottoman Empire shared with its Byzantine predecessor, beginning with the deposition of Constantinople from its metropolitan position. It was not merely the fact that the rebel Government of Mustafa Kemal, soon to be the rival Government and then the supplanting Government, was situated at Angora, that caused Angora to be confirmed as the permanent capital of the Turkish Republic. The fact affected, no doubt, the selection of Angora rather than of some other Anatolian town situated well away from the vulnerable coast. But the return from Europe to Asia was due to deliberate policy. The nucleus and essence of the cosmopolitan Byzantine-Ottoman Empire had been Constantinople; and Constantinople would continue to denationalize, as it had done in the past, any Government and State whose seat it was. And upon this kind of Government, upon this kind of State, the makers of the new Turkey were determined that the Turks should turn their backs once and for all. Constantinople had always been, would always remain Rûm, something non-national, something super-national, something Imperial, which would impose its character on the people whose capital it was rather than receive the impress of its owners. Of a magnificence that overwhelms the occasional squalor, there is a mysterious power in this superbly situated, essentially lovely if at the moment somewhat derelict city which bore so incongruously its name of *Der Saadet*, for in truth it has caused and witnessed more tragedy than felicity. The makers of the new Turkey, seeing that they were bent on shedding

the Imperial trappings which had for so long disguised the true form of the Turk, could not do otherwise than discard the embodiment and spirit of what they were determined to abandon and create a capital in a place with no *damnosa haereditas* likely to divert and defeat their purpose. So for the first time in its career of sixteen centuries the Imperial city has become a provincial headquarters, taking its orders from an Anatolian town that seems in comparison little more than a crude *bourgade*, and disproving the implication of the saying of Napoleon that the master of Constantinople would rule the world. And the Turks have been content to withdraw the seat of their government from that sea of which Kinglake wrote so eloquently in his description of their former capital:

7 *“Venice strains out from the steadfast land, and in old times would send forth the Chief of the State to woo, and wed the reluctant sea; but the stormy bride of the Doge is the bowing slave of the Sultan—she comes to his feet with the treasures of the world—she bears him from palace to palace—by some unfailing witchcraft she entices the breezes to follow her and fan the pale cheek of her lord—she lifts his armed navies to the very gates of his garden—she watches the walls of his Serail—she stifles the intrigues of his Ministers—she quiets the scandals of his Courts—she extinguishes his rivals, and bushes his naughty wives all one by one.”*

2

In Chapter VII we have seen that the result of the Treaty of Lausanne and of the compulsory exchange

of populations between Greece and Turkey had been to leave the latter a country to all intents and purposes racially homogeneous save for the single exception of the Kurds, and thus to lead to the disappearance of the *millets*. We have also seen that with the suppression of the Khalifate there was extinguished the last flicker of the traditional ceremonial of the Byzantine-Ottoman Court. Thus there were snapped two of the most characteristic links between the Empire of the Sultans and the Empire of the Basileis, those States of which internationalism and not nationalism was the keynote. And thus it became possible for the ordinary Turk to come at last into his own.

It will have become clear to those who have read thus far that few sections of the population of the Ottoman Empire, in the period of its decadence, fared worse than the Turk himself. It was he who was sucked dry by the tax-farmer that his rulers might exercise sovereignty over the provinces inhabited principally by races which were Turkish neither in race nor in language. It was the Anatolian Turk—that dumb, patient, uncomplaining creature whose deplorable situation evoked the concern neither of his own Government nor of those foreign Powers who were benevolently articulate over the misfortunes of other sections of the Sultan's subjects—who by the sweat of his brow produced the wealth that kept the machinery of his State from coming to a standstill; it was he who paid in his blood for the wars which he had neither made nor wanted so that his Padishah could continue to call himself the Servant of the cities of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, Sultan of the lands and seas,

Padishah of Stambul, Adrianople and Brusa as of Damascus, Cairo and all Azerbaijan, of Iraq-Arabi¹ and Ajem,² Parthia, Cilicia, Barbary, Abyssinia, Tunis, Tripoli, Cyprus, Rhodes, the Morea, the White³ and the Black Seas and their islands and coasts, of Anatolia, Rumelia, Greece, Turkestan, Circassia, Georgia, the plain of Kipchak and the lands of the Tatars, of Bosnia and its dependencies, the fortress of Belgrade, the vilayet of Serbia and all the vilayet of the Albanians. The curious will find these titles, and many more of a like nature, in the *Almanachs de Gotha* until after the Balkan Wars, but the Sultan had another title, which they will not find in *Gotha*, a title that was in far more frequent use than any of these. This was Khunkiar, the Spiller of Blood, the title whereby their ruler was best known to the peasantry of Anatolia, who regarded the killing of men as the primary, natural and obvious function of the head of a military State such as theirs.

It has been customary for critics of the Turkish State prior to the revolution of 1908 to reserve their sympathy for the Christian sections of its subjects. That those sections merited sympathy—and sympathy less indiscriminate, more discerning, than that which they generally received—is unquestioned; but it is important to remember that they enjoyed, not only in theory but in practice, a considerable measure of civil and religious autonomy, enjoyed valuable exemptions purchased at a relatively small cost. It is idle to pretend that the *rayahs* in general regarded it as a hardship to be debarred from service in the Turkish army; on the contrary, they re-

¹ Southern Mesopotamia.

² Persia.

³ Sea of Marmora.

garded the *bedl askerié* (military exemption tax) as a cheap avenue of escape from an obligation which it would have distressed most of them intensely to have been compelled to fulfil. It is idle to pretend that their feelings were harrowed by the fact that the Turks treated them *de haut en bas*, with a patronage which, if sometimes kindly, was often tinged with contempt. Centuries of service to alien rulers and centuries of oppression had given them enough pliancy and adaptability, enough servility, to blunt the fine point of sensitiveness and to enable them to endure with composure the knowledge that the Turk regarded himself as a superior, the *rayah* as an inferior being. On the whole, they accepted the position as a matter of course: the restrictions placed upon them, the limitations to their activities, the humiliations to be endured, affected them less hardly than they would have affected peoples accustomed to be free. The following episode, related to me by the late General Sir John Maxwell, who was among those present on the occasion, affords a good illustration of what I mean. One day the veteran Ghazi Mukhtar Pasha, then Ottoman High Commissioner in Egypt, was receiving visitors in the *selamlık* of his house in Cairo. Some officers of the British Army of Occupation were sitting by him in the places of honour, drinking coffee and smoking cigarettes. Presently an elderly little man, wearing a frock-coat and fez, entered in a deprecatory manner and, after a respectful *temena* (the Turkish salute—now abolished in favour of doffing the hat—made by waving the right hand from the heart *via* the lips to the forehead), sat humbly down at the far end of the room. Mukhtar Pasha barely acknow-

ledged the greeting and continued uninterruptedly his conversation with his English visitors. Not until these had departed did the little man venture to approach his host and his host see fit to address him, although the little man was none other than the famous Nubar Pasha, then actually Prime Minister of Egypt. For Ghazi Mukhtar, albeit his functions were purely titular, belonged to the ruling race while the *de facto* powerful Nubar was an Armenian *rayah*. The demeanour of both men was natural, not affected; the episode shows how the relative social positions of Turk and *rayah* were recognized and acquiesced in by the two classes.

In August, 1913, I had occasion to travel across the plains of Anatolia to find neglected fields, empty homesteads, Turkish women and children starving, and was able to realize with peculiar force how, next to the Armenians, the greatest victim of the Ottoman Empire was the Turkish people itself. The Treaty of Bucharest had been signed only a few weeks previously, but the Young Turk Government were preparing for yet another Balkan war and had recalled every available Turk, after scarcely a respite, to the lines of Chatalja. From every station which I passed between Bozanti and Smyrna men of military age were being collected and despatched to the headquarters of the main Turkish Army in Thrace; and I witnessed many a pathetic sight as lean old sergeants in tattered uniforms tried to marshal their squads into the train or with rough kindness to cut short harrowing farewells from aged mothers about to lose their sole support. At Karaman had been assembled a particularly large group of young recruits; and I have not yet forgotten the despairing

wail of the old women at the station as the train with their sons and grandsons steamed slowly away in the direction of Konia. Meanwhile, in the seaports and commercial towns, Greeks, Jews and Armenians were pursuing their usual avocations, undisturbed by the conscription of their Moslem fellow-subjects.

It was the Turks, and not the Christians, who bore the heat and burden of the day, who toiled and fought and bled that Turkey might retain provinces largely non-Turkish in population. That the *rayahs* did not share the ambitions of the Turkish Government in this respect can scarcely lessen the value of the exemptions from duties which Turkey had legally, at all events, a right to exact of all her subjects. Primarily, therefore, the victims of the Ottoman Government were the Turkish peasants, who were torn from their families and fields to serve, often for many consecutive years, in the armies of the Yemen or Kurdistan. Prominent among the sufferers were its own officials, who were banished as "dangerous" whenever they tried to work honestly for the improvement of their provinces and were spied upon to such an extent that they usually had to employ counter-spies to spy upon the spies set upon them. Apart from sporadic outbursts of savagery, whose victims were principally Armenians and agents not infrequently Kurds, the lot of the *rayah* was more comfortable than that of the Turk, although it was certainly less distinguished. It was not until the days of the Committee of Union and Progress, whose advent to power was signalized, as we have seen, by the public fraternization of Moslems and non-Moslems, *mollas* and bishops, *ulema* and rabbis, that systematic

spoliation of the Christians in Asia Minor was introduced and that the Oecumenical Patriarch closed churches and schools as a protest against the official persecution of the Government.

3

The third main feature common to the two Empires was the fusion of the State with the State's religious organization, Orthodox under the Christian Emperors, Mohammedan under the Sultans. Unthinkable as would have been the Byzantine Empire on any basis but that of Orthodox Christianity, so would a Turkey without the impress of Islam on the character and functions of the body politic have been unthinkable up to a few years ago. Yet we have seen in the chapter dealing with the reform of the law how in the third decade of the present century measure followed measure for the progressive laicization of the country without upheaval, without even any sustained opposition, until finally, in April, 1928, Islam was declared to be no longer the State religion. Mustafa Kemal justified this step by asking: "Is not a man in the new Turkey to be free to choose his own religion?" And evidently there was no answer to his question, for article 2 of the Constitution of 1924, whereby Islam had been constituted the religion of the State, was repealed in the Grand National Assembly by a unanimous vote.

The disestablishment of Islam in the country which for centuries had been its standard-bearer and its most powerful exponent and defender was not followed by any measure to ban it from the lives of the people.

Indeed, Ostrorog, writing in 1927, the year before it was carried out, defined the effect of the measures that had been taken for the laicization of law and justice as "*causing religion to recede from the halls of human conflict and ascend into the stronghold of conscience, to dwell there in much greater dignity and security than when its ministers pretended to rule earthly interests as well as moral aspirations*"; but here he is perhaps a little difficult to follow. Lofty motives of this kind no doubt inspired such measures as the English Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act of 1860, whereby the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical Courts in matrimonial causes was transferred to the newly established Divorce Court; but their relevance to the disestablishment of Islam in Turkey is open to question. It is true that on the "Night of Power" of the Ramadan of 1932 the mosque of S. Sophia was so packed with worshippers that thousands failed to gain admittance, but the reason for this phenomenon was that for the first time the service was intoned in Turkish instead of Arabic and was broadcast to all parts of Turkey. Apart from the curiosity aroused by such far-reaching innovations, it is inevitable that the appeal of Islam has been lessened to a disciplined man like the Turk when the acts of his Government have deprived it of its previous prestige, supremacy and privileged position. He cannot fail to be affected by the fact that his rulers no longer aspire to lead the Moslem world and have of set policy discarded the sword of Islam.

The "hat law" of 1925, which abolished the fez and substituted hats or caps of Western types, was another *diminutio capitis*, in the literal as well as the metaphorical sense of the words, of Islam in Turkey. Although, as

we have seen, Mahmud II was denounced as a bad Moslem for inflicting the fez on his Moslem subjects, this Greek head-dress had become in the course of time, so paradoxical are the processes of history, a symbol of Moslem orthodoxy. The old-fashioned Turk regarded it as unseemly, as have other Orientals from time immemorial, to uncover the head indoors, especially in a place of worship; and this brimless, and at the same time dignified, covering was highly convenient for the purpose of his ritual prostrations. The Doctors of the Law had included the wearing by Moslems of the hat of foreign unbelievers—termed *shapqa*¹ in Turkish—among the offences included under the heading of apostasy; and apostasy was so serious an offence that it not only demanded a renewed profession of faith and of the bond of marriage, it required repentance within three days, failing which the penalty was death. So when the *shapqa* was proclaimed by law the national head-dress of the Turkish nation, and a decree of the same year enjoined that it should be removed indoors while salutes were to be performed out of doors by the raising of the hat and an inclination of the head, there was accomplished a revolution in the personal habits of the people greater than anything that had gone before.

On the other hand, not every activity of the Angora Government at that time was necessarily derogatory to Islam: in the previous year, for example, an order had been made, and was rigidly enforced so long as it remained in effect, that all shops, offices and other places of work were to close on Fridays, the Moslem day of rest, instead of following, as they had hitherto done, the

¹ From the French *chapeau*.

day of rest of their owners and closing on Fridays, Saturdays or Sundays according to whether these were Moslems, Jews or Christians. It was obviously good economics to substitute six working days for four, and this principle has been maintained, greatly to the advantage of a country so dependent as is Turkey on its export trade. But the Islamic holiday has not been preserved. In 1935 the Christian Sunday was substituted for the Moslem Friday, and scarcely a complaint was heard at the change, accompanied as it was by the introduction of the "English week-end", whereby work ceases at 1 P.M. on Saturdays, to be resumed on Monday mornings.

Another sumptuary law with an ecclesiastical connotation was included among the legislative enactments of 1935, namely, the prohibition of the wearing of clerical dress in public by members of all cults. The principle of this law is that neither Christian clergy, *mollas* nor rabbis, nor even nuns belonging to the cloistered Orders, shall be distinguishable by their attire from other citizens. The wearing of vestments or the customary robes by the officiants at religious ceremonies in churches, mosques and synagogues is permitted, but exemption from conforming with the law out of doors is only granted, by an order of the Minister of the Interior, to one member of each recognized community, namely, to the Orthodox Patriarch, to the head of the "Turkish Orthodox Church", Papa Eftim, of whom more will be said hereafter, to the Gregorian Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople, the Armenian Uniate Patriarch, the Protestant *vekil* and the Grand Rabbi. No preferential treatment is meted out to Islam,

which, like the other communities, receives only a single exemption.

For this measure, as well as for three measures adopted in the previous year, 1934, namely, the secularization of the mosque of S. Sophia by its conversion into a museum of Byzantine art, the abolition of decorations and of the time-honoured titles of Agha, Effendi, Bey, Pasha and other designations of honour, and, thirdly, the ban on the broadcasting by Turkish stations of oriental music so that the Turkish people may learn to accustom themselves to the music of the West, public opinion was already prepared.

Two other changes whereby the Nationalists have profoundly modified the life and outlook of the Turkish people mark an important departure from Islamic principles and habits of thought, namely, the changes they have effected in the status of women and in the basis of the Turkish teaching of history. In Chapter I, I indicated briefly that the position of women among the pre-Islamic Turks had been independent and free. The origin of the seclusion of women is geographical rather than Islamic. Chronologically, indeed, it is pre-Mohammedan; and the Prophet, who found the system in existence in Arabia, retained it with certain modifications, while the Byzantine Gynecaeum was not without its influence in consolidating it among the Turks after they had moved into Europe. In Chapter II, I referred to the abortive effort of Sultan Selim III to emancipate Turkish women, an attempt which was taken up once more in the middle of the nineteenth century by the reformers associated with the Tanzimat. These efforts were sharply repressed by

Sultan Abdul Hamid II, in whose time it was an unthinkable breach of manners to ask after the health of a Turk's female relatives, while inquiries as to the number of his children received an answer confined to his children of the male sex. It was then out of the question for a town-dwelling husband and his wife to be seen out of doors together; and if, among the peasantry in the villages, husband and wife were ever compelled to move together from one place to another, they would do so in single file, the man leading. If it was a long journey and there was only one beast of burden, it would normally be ridden by the man. The enforcement of the social segregation of men and women was definitely one of the duties of the police. In the towns it was specifically forbidden for women to walk in the street with men, even if they were their relatives, or to stop and talk with men even if they did not raise their veils. And the veils had to conceal the features; there was no such thing as a nominal compliance by means of a flimsy and transparent piece of gauze. The *charshaf* was not allowed to be cut to the figure; its duty was to conceal it and make its wearer look like an hour-glass rather than like a woman. Any lady bold enough to disregard these precepts was certain either to get into trouble with the police or to be insulted by members of the lower classes, who showed great fanaticism on the subject; she would probably have incurred both misadventures.

When Abdul Hamid disappeared these efforts were revived by the Young Turks, but the complete emancipation of Turkish women was the work of the Turkish Nationalists, who in this respect also have deliberately

reverted to the social habits of their pre-Islamic ancestors. Not only are Turkish ladies of the upper class, now unveiled, seen freely in society, not only do they dine out, go to the theatre, dance openly in public with their male friends, indulge in mixed bathing, in other words, behave as do their sisters in the West. These symptoms are not really the most surprising, since Turkish women of this class had always been more or less dissatisfied with their cramped conditions, had long desired emancipation, have in their veins much blood of the Caucasus, where the women lead lives that are, in general, active and untrammelled. It is among the middle class that the full measure of the change can best be measured, for in this class, as with the peasantry, the women not only acquiesced in their status, they were often passionately averse from any change. Turkish women of the humbler sections of the community are frequently persons of character and determination, but they were wont to prefer to exercise their influence in their own homes. Now they are ardent supporters of the régime and are beginning to earn their living, like their sisters of the West, as stenographers, telephone operators and in many other walks of life, while since March, 1935, the women of Turkey are represented as Deputies in the Grand National Assembly. To those who have known the Turkey of Abdul Hamid few achievements of the creators of the new Turkey will appear more striking, I had almost said more miraculous, than the change they have wrought in the position, the activities and the aspirations of Turkish women.

It would not be fair, however, to depict the black

side of the situation of Turkish women before the recent changes without alluding to the other side of the picture. It must not be forgotten that Turkish women enjoyed, under Moslem law, full control over the property that had come to them from their fathers, while their husbands had no claim to land which they might inherit later. They could sue and be sued independently of their husbands; while the same law protected them by severe sanctions against libel and slander. Their movements outside their own houses were subject, certainly, to the most severe restrictions, which, if relatively tolerable to the uneducated, must have been desperately galling to the many Turkish ladies of intelligence, culture and refinement. But at the same time it protected them no less completely against the risk of insult and violence. "Under their veil and black mantle, Turkish women were as inviolable as vestals in ancient Rome."¹

It was in keeping with the order of ideas that governed the polity of the Ottoman Empire that Turkish history as taught under the Imperial régime began with the founder of the Osmanli dynasty. Where earlier history was concerned, Turkish historians deliberately side-stepped from the Turks themselves and passed to the Arab Khalifs of Baghdad and Damascus and to the growth and spread of Islam. It did not occur to the historians or to Ministers of Education that the Turkish child, or for that matter the Turkish adult, could possibly want to know about their pre-Islamic forefathers, while the early history of non-Islamic peoples was quite outside the pale of any Turkish

¹ Ostrorog, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

student's concern. Not only were these brought up to be indifferent to the history of non-Moslem Western peoples; they were brought up in total indifference to the history of non-Moslem Turks. To such an extent had Islam usurped in the Empire the conceptions of race and blood.

All this has now been changed. Not only does the Ghazi see in the conversion of the Turks to Islam but an incident in their political career; he wishes the history of the Ottoman Turks to be studied in conjunction with, and as a part of the history of the Turkish race as a whole. And that history, instead of beginning with Sultan Orkhan, with his father Osman or, at the very earliest, with his grandfather Ertoghrul, goes back until it merges in pre-history and the Turks become one of the races descended, together with the Hittites, with the Pelasgian ancestors of the Greeks, with the progenitors of the Slavs, with Scythians and other ancestors of the peoples of to-day, from the same remote parent stock. In other words, he is determined to break down the former conception that between the Turks and their non-Moslem European neighbours there was fixed a great gulf, which was rightly fixed and should remain unbridged. In the place of this theory he intends to substitute that of the Turks' racial unity with other peoples, which he is determined to inculcate no less effectively than the unity which he has already imposed as regards their script.

A strange episode in Nationalist ecclesiastical politics deserves separate mention. Many of the Orthodox who inhabited Anatolia, more particularly the inland districts, prior to the exchange of populations, were

Turcophone, that is to say, spoke Turkish as their mother tongue and generally knew no other language. Sometimes they had a knowledge of the Greek alphabet without knowing the Greek language; and there exists a number of books, mainly of a religious kind, printed for their benefit in the Turkish language transliterated into Greek characters. Several of these works were published in Venice in the eighteenth century and are now literary curiosities eagerly sought by collectors of books on the Near East, but a newspaper entitled "*Ἡ Ἀνατολή*", in the same combination, was published in Constantinople for their benefit as recently as the beginning of the present century. The racial origin of the Turcophone Orthodox is a matter of controversy, for, while their Greek fellow-Orthodox look upon them as Greeks by race who after the Turkish conquest were compelled to abandon their mother-tongue and adopt Turkish in its place, the Nationalists declare them to be the descendants of Turks who embraced Christianity during the period, before the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, when Turkish soldiers of fortune entered the service of the Byzantine Emperors as mercenaries. The Turks call them Karamanlis, from the afore-mentioned town of Karaman in the vilayet of Konia, which gave its name to the whole of the southern or Karamanian coast of Asia Minor.

We have seen in Chapter IV how the Oecumenical Patriarchate became a citadel of political Hellenism in Turkish territory. Still more was it regarded as such by the Government of Angora, particularly after the failure of the Greek campaign in Asia Minor and more especially during its tenure, which lasted from 1921 to

1923, by that strong protagonist of Hellenism, Meletios IV, who subsequently became Patriarch of Alexandria as Meletios II and died in 1935. As an ardent Greek patriot the Patriarch Meletios was *persona ingratissima* to the Government of Angora. As an ardent ecclesiastical reformer he was also viewed with suspicion by some of his own communion, including a group of the Karamanli Orthodox, whose self-constituted leader was a rude, violent and active village priest (*Papas*) of the name of Evthymios, known in Turkish as Papa Eftim. This Papa Eftim proceeded, with the help of the Metropolitan of Konia and two other Anatolian bishops, to organize a "Turkish Orthodox Church" on the basis of the exclusive use of the Turkish language, political loyalty to the Government of Angora and opposition to Hellenic Orthodoxy. But Papa Eftim's ambitions were not limited by the creation of this Church; he aimed at capturing the Phanar itself.

In July, 1923, the Patriarch Meletios, whom the Turks had tried to kidnap in the previous month, withdrew from Constantinople to Mount Athos, leaving behind him a letter of resignation to be used by his Synod if they thought that his abdication would cease relations between the Turkish Government and the Phanar. On the 2nd October of the same year the Allies began to evacuate Constantinople after the coming into force of the Treaty of Lausanne. One hour before the evacuation was completed Papa Eftim forcibly invaded the Phanar accompanied by a body of Turkish police, posted guards around it and announced that he intended to remain there until he had secured the acceptance of the following demands:

- (1) the deposition of the Patriarch;
- (2) the expulsion of six of the eight members of the Holy Synod and the admission in their place of seven new members to be nominated by him;
- (3) his own appointment as the representative of the Phanar in Angora.

To some extent his *coup* was successful and Meletios's dormant resignation was published in the course of November. For some time thereafter the Oecumenical Patriarchate continued to be in great jeopardy, and during 1924 and the early part of 1925 its existence as an institution hung in the balance, despite the fact that its maintenance in Constantinople was provided for in the Treaty of Lausanne. The successor of Meletios, Gregory VII, died eleven months after his accession, and the next Patriarch, Constantine VI, was expelled by the Turkish Government in January, 1925, ten days after his election, as an "exchangeable Greek". The Patriarch appealed to the League of Nations and there were discussions which led to active diplomatic negotiations with the Turkish Government. Then came a change in the Turkish attitude, partly due to the arrogance and intransigence of Papa Eftim. Ultimately the Turks allowed it to be known that if Constantine VI were to resign and to be succeeded by a Patriarch who was *persona grata* to Angora, Angora would adopt a more benevolent attitude towards the Patriarchate and would allow it to survive in its traditional form. Constantine VI accordingly abdicated and was succeeded by a Turkish subject in the person of Basil III, who reigned until his death in 1929. Basil III

was followed peacefully by Photios II, who died at the end of 1935, and Benjamin I succeeded equally uneventfully in January, 1936.

In the meantime the "Turkish Orthodox Church" continues to exist obscurely in central Anatolia on the pattern of the Bolshevik "Living Church"; and Papa Eftim is, as we have seen above, the representative of this organization selected for exemption from the ban on the wearing of clerical dress.

4

The difference between the Ottoman Empire and the new Turkey may be measured by the fact that Constantinople, while remaining within the latter's boundaries, has been deliberately rejected as the seat of government. To the Ottoman Empire, had it survived, the retention of Imperial Rûm as the capital would have been a *sine qua non* of continued existence. With the Turkish Republic the converse is the case. On the other hand, it must not be supposed that Angora had been a place of no repute until it became the capital of the new Turkey. It was the chief seat of the Roman province of Galatia and must certainly have heard the word, even if it did not hear the very voice, of S. Paul. The first Roman Emperor, who gave it the title of Sebaste, is there commemorated by a handsome temple; and the celebrated Busbecq, the Flemish scholar-diplomatist whom the Archduke Ferdinand, brother of the Emperor Charles V, sent as his Ambassador to Suleiman the Magnificent, brought back to the West, together with lilac and the tulip, the "turban-flower",

the first copy of the inscription which Caesar Augustus caused to be carved in Latin and Greek upon the walls of the *monumentum Ancyranum* to record his deeds in considerable detail. It was in this town, now embarking upon a new career, that Mustafa Kemal set out his deeds and those of his fellow-architects of the new Turkey at yet greater length. The Ghazi is by temperament and inclination a silent man, who has made it clear, both in the text of his political creed and by his practice, that he prefers action to words. But when he departed from his practice, he departed from it to some purpose. Addressing the Grand National Assembly at Angora in order to present the balance-sheet of the Nationalist Party and of the new rulers of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal began to speak on the morning of Sunday the 16th October, 1927, and, speaking daily for seven hours on each of the ensuing days, concluded his address on the evening of the following Friday. It was a feat of endurance no less physical than mental. In what must surely be the longest consecutive speech of a head of a State or, indeed, of any other orator, the Ghazi gave the official version of the history of the Turkish nationalist movement, that is to say, the history—by no means in outline—of Turkey since he landed at Samsun in May, 1919.¹

The speech deals in the main with military and political history, with the struggle with the Allies, the war with the Greeks, the Peace Conference at Lausanne, the suppression of the Sultanate and the Government

¹ The speech was published in Turkish in a book of 543 pages. It is briefly summarized on pp. 201-264 of Sir T. Waugh's *Turkey Yesterday, To-day and To-morrow*.

of Constantinople, the abolition of the Khalifate, the internal differences among Turkish politicians, the change of capital, the form of the new Government. It was a great achievement which he was able to announce, even though the version of what had taken place was his own, unsubjected to either criticism or contradiction. It was the tale of a mighty transformation, carried out in the face of formidable difficulties. He had defied and then divided the Allies, he had made use of such ill assorted helpers as Soviet Russia and Indian Moslems; he had overcome the conservatism of his people and had swept away without serious opposition things which all students of Turkey had believed to be inextricably ingrained in Turkish character and habits. The masses followed him even when he was abolishing what they held most dear, and why? Because he gave them their national feeling which had been concealed from them, as they had come to realize at last, by the internationalism of Islam. Yet the proverbial conservatism of the Turkish peasant dies slowly, and the following incident shows that it could co-exist with admiration for the new order and the new man.

— In 1922 a Turkish friend of mine asked one such peasant what he thought of Mustafa Kemal. The peasant answered with genuine approval: "*Padishahin sadig bir khidmetji dir*" ("He is a faithful servant of the Sultan").


→ Thus, at long last, began the change and, once it had begun, it was carried to its logical conclusion swiftly, ruthlessly, completely. A small group of men who knew what they wanted—and what they wanted was the end of the Osmanli and the resurgence of the

Turk—came into power, determined upon the drastic operation of shedding the Byzantine habiliments and revealing the Turk as he was before he was swallowed up by that which he believed he had conquered. It may appear to some that the Ottoman Empire has shrivelled up into Turkey, but this view is, I think, a mistaken one. The old Ottoman Empire has been thrown into a crucible in which its Turkish core has been separated from the non-Turkish elements that from the point of view of the Turk had distorted the nature of his State, to emerge small indeed, but compact, refined. The new Turkey has relaxed its hold on the Arab countries, it has exchanged its alien populations, it has sought, and achieved, racial homogeneity. It has thus no longer a place for those *millets* which had made of Turkey not one nation but a collection of nations. It has rejected the religion of Arabia as the religion of the State, it has decreed that the Qoran, if read at all, shall be read in the native tongue. It has, it is true, deliberately discarded Islam, which was the inspiration and creative element of past Turkish greatness. No less deliberately has it abandoned the political and spiritual leadership of the Mohammedan world, whose rewards, while considerable, had benefited the Sultan-Khalif rather than his subjects. The results of the divorce of the laicized Turkish Republic from the faith and hierarchy of Islam have yet to be awaited; but the rulers of the new Turkey have sought to put something that may become of an equal importance in the place hitherto occupied by Islam, namely a Turkish nationalism which had been submerged for nearly five hundred years. In other words, the Turk has thrown off

the Byzantine vestments—perhaps shackles would be a truer term—by which he had been encumbered for centuries, by which he had been turned into something non-Turkish, Levantine, unnatural, stilted, artificial, formal. He has burst the bonds forged on him by Constantinople to find himself again, as he hopes, the simpler, more natural Turanian who emerged from the plains and plateaux of Central Asia. Paradoxical though it may sound, it is none the less the truth that the Turks were the last of the subject races of the Ottoman Empire to achieve their national emancipation. Now that they have done so, for the first time in its history—that strange history of two centuries of glory followed by three centuries of decay—Turkey has become a unity.


GENEALOGICAL TABLES

I. THE LATER OTTOMAN SULTANS



II. THE CONNEXION BETWEEN THE IMPERIAL HOUSES OF BYZANTIUM AND RUSSIA

(To illustrate Russian ambitions as regards Constantinople; cf. pp. 24-26, 37.)



GLOSSARY

A. = Arabic ; P. = Persian ; T. = Turkish.

- alim* (pl. *ulema*) (A.), one learned in the Qoranic law.
- berat* (A.), an Imperial patent or warrant, conferring some dignity or privilege.
- charshaf* (T.), lit. a sheet: the garment, covering head and breast, worn out of doors by Turkish women who have not adopted European or semi-European fashions.
- chiftlik* (T.), farm, agricultural estate.
- damad* (P.), title prefixed to the name of an Imperial son-in-law or brother-in-law.
- evqaf* (T. form of A. *awqaf*, plural of *waqf*), property dedicated under the Moslem religious law to the service of God.
- fedai* (P.), lit. one who voluntarily risks his life in a hazardous but praiseworthy enterprise; a devotee.
- fetva* (A.), Islamic legal opinion issued by a *mufti*.
- firman* (P.), official commission, patent or rescript.
- ghazi* (A.), as a title: the Conqueror, the Victorious.
- iradé* (A.), Imperial command or permit.
- jihad* (A.), war against the enemies of Islam.
- kboja* (P.), in Turkish use a schoolmaster; a teacher, especially of the *ulema* (q.v.) class; a teacher of divinity.
- khunkiar* (P.), lit. one who sheds blood; an appellation of the Sultans of Turkey.
- medresé* (A.), school or college of Islamic law.
- mekbémé* (A.), a Court of Islamic law.
- millet* (A.), non-Moslem subject-nation of Moslem States.
- molla* (T.), a teacher of Islamic law.
- mufti* (A.), a Moslem jurisconsult who issues his rulings in the form of a *fetva* (q.v.).
- qadi* (A.), a judge of a Sheri Court (Court of Islamic law).

qibleb (A.), point or direction of adoration in Islam.

qonaq (T.), large house; palace; official residence.

rayab (A.), a member of a recognized non-Moslem tributary *millet* (q.v.).

sariq (T.), the white turban worn round the fez by the *ulema* class; *sariqli*, a wearer of the *sariq*.

selamlık (T.), reception room or rooms of a Moslem house, as opposed to the *baremlik*, the private or women's quarters; in the special sense, the ceremony of the Sultan's State visit to the mosque on Fridays.

softa (P.), a student of Islamic law and religion.

Sunna (A.), the "Tradition" accepted by the Sunni branch of Islam as complementary to the Qoran.

ulema (A.), cf. *alim*.

vali (A.), Governor-General of Turkish province (*vilayet*), whose principal division is a *liwa*, administered by a *mutesarraf*. A *liwa* is subdivided into *qazas* under *qaimaqams*.

vekil (T. form of A. *wakil*), representative, trustee.

INDEX

- Abbas Hilmi, ex-Khedive, 173
 Abbasids, 14, 110-115, 119
 Abdallah Pasha of Acre, 36
 Abdul Aziz, Sultan, 49, 56, 58, 131-132, 142, 178
 Abdul Hamid I, Sultan, 26, 31-32, 133
 Abdul Hamid II, Sultan, 40, 57, 103, 123, 127, 132-144, 147-148, 151-154, 157, 168, 179, 181, 190, 223-224
 Abdul Mejid, Khalif, 168 *n.*, 178-183
 Abdul Mejid, Sultan, 46, 49-54, 56, 58, 131
 "Abode of Felicity", the, 139, 211
 Abyssinia, Abyssinians, 69, 78, 103, 214
 Adalia, 184
 Adrianople, 12, 34, 47, 156, 197 *n.*, 214; Treaty of, 36
 Aehrenthal, Count, 57
 Aivali, 151-152
 Albanians, 8, 22, 47, 77, 85 *n.*, 135, 138 *n.*, 141, 143, 145, 149, 154, 162, 165, 210, 214
 Aleppo, 47, 63
 Alexandria, Patriarchate of, 47, 69-72, 76, 91, 99, 228
 Ali Haidar, Sherif, 173
 Ali Riza Pasha, Field-Marshal, 172
 Ali, the fourth Khalif, 107-109, 111, 117-118
 Amadeus VIII, Duke of Savoy, *cf.* Felix V, Anti-Pope
 Amalfi, 2
 Anatolian peasantry, the, 9, 59, 167, 206, 213-217, 232
 Ancona, 2
 Andronicus II, Byzantine Emperor, 75
 Angora, 171, 174, 178, 211-212, 229-231; Government of, 43, 45, 125, 161, 171, 174, 191, 194-196, 204, 206, 218-228
 Antioch, Patriarchate of, 47, 69-72, 76-77, 82, 91, 99
 Aqshehir, 12, 204
 Arabic, its influence on Turkish, 9, 158, 166, 199-203
 Arabic script, 202-203, 206
 Arabs, 8, 47, 80-82, 85 *n.*, 91 *n.*, 107-115, 119-121, 135, 138 *n.*, 149, 154, 157, 159, 162, 165, 167, 173, 196, 198, 210, 215-217, 233
 Armenians, 8, 19, 29-30, 47, 58, 69, 78, 91, 98-100, 137, 142, 144, 150, 162, 184, 210
 Army, Ottoman, 20, 22-24, 26-35, 38-39, 141, 146-148, 150
 Arnold, Sir T. W., quoted, 94 *n.*, 115-117
 Asia Minor, Greek advance into and operations in, 163, 169-170, 175, 184-185, 227, 231
 Asiatic characteristics and rulers of Byzantine Empire, 12, 18-19
 Asiatic orientation given to Ottoman Empire by Abdul Hamid II, 134-136, 140, 153
 Assyrians, *cf.* Nestorians
 Astrology in Turkey, 41 *n.*
 Athens, 47, 89, 93
 Athos, Mount, 228
 Augustus, Caesar, 230-231
 Austria, 22-23, 57, 136, 146-147, 210
 Azerbaijan, 207, 214
 Azov, Sea of, 3
 Baghdad, 14, 33, 47, 110, 112-113, 225; Railway, 137
 Bairaqdar, Mustafa, 34-35
 Baku, 161
 Balkan League, 155
 Balkan nationalities, rise of the, 43-44, 77, 100, 132, 134, 167
 Balkan Peninsula, 23, 81, 84, 92, 145, 207

INDEX

- Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the, 44,
155-156, 164, 212
Baltic Republics, 77, 83 n.
Basil III, Patriarch of Constantinople,
129-130
Bayazit I (the Thunderbolt), Sultan,
23
Belgium, 47, 64
Belinski-Moravskii, 27-28, 102, 109
Berlin, Ottoman, granted to heads of
millet, 16, 79, 90-91, 97, 102-103
Berlin, Treaty of, 57, 155
Bismarck, Sir Anton, quoted, 81-82
Bismarck-Luke Committee, the, 81-
82, 103
Bosnian-Serb, schools of Constantinople,
38, 123, 173
Bulgar, Memluk Sultan, 100-104
Black Sea, 2, 23, 25, 36, 156, 212
Borisheviks, 160-161, 220, 232
Boris Godunov, Tsar of Russia, 76-
77 n., 167
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russian, 2, 36,
47, 126, 135-137, 191, 224
Bosporus, Sea, 3, 36, 131, 138, 173,
181
Bosna, 47, 101, 173, 197 n., 212
Bretagne, Treaty of, 216
Bulgaria, Bulgaria, 24, 34, 46, 93, 21,
84, 92-93, 95, 99-100, 122, 124,
144-147, 151, 153, 167, 210
Buchara, Angles-Chikinde, 230-231
Byzantine Empire, the, 1-4, 72-73; its
characteristics, 1-2, 10-11, 79-81,
209-211; its legacy to the Ottoman
Empire, 9-13, 18-19, 43, 83, 183,
201, 203-213, 218, 234

Cassius, Metropolitan of, 77
Caton, Dion, 163-164
Cairo, 114-115, 197 n., 214-216
Captivities, the, 5-7, 184, 191
Cassio Ebnud, Emmanuel, 152-153
Carlowitz, Peace of, 27-28
Caucasia, Transcaucasia, 26, 83 n.,
117, 136, 166, 206, 224
Chalcedon, Council of, 69-70, 73
China, 173
Chonovskii, I, 78
Chozja, 216
Churches, 156
Chelabi of Korta, the, 128, 173
China, 42, 203, 207
Chol, Sir V., quoted, 125-126
Christian influences in Ottoman
Empire, 9, 101-102, 216, 209
Cilia, 173, 184-185, 212
Chorvats, 3, 156, 138 n.
Coke, Ottoman Royal, 42, 53
Croatish Civil, 43
Cooperation of Union and Progress,
137, 143, 156, 168-169, 217
Council of Europe, 24, 57, 194, 137
Constantine I, Emperor, 70-71, 80
Constantine XII, last Byzantine
Emperor, 80
Constantin, King of the Hellenes,
175
Constantine VII, Patriarch of Con-
stantinople, 229
Constantinople, 1-4, 10-11, 15-19, 24,
57, 91, 70-76, 78, 128, 133, 139,
160, 170-182, 184, 203, 221-222,
232, 233; American Patriarch of,
22, 222; Orthodox Patriarchate and
Patriarch of, 15-18, 69-76, 79, 83-
84, 86-91, 93, 218, 221, 227-230;
Russian designs on, 24-25, 37
Constantinople and Angora, struggle
between the Governments of, 170-
172, 174-177, 199
Coptic Republics, of, Mediterranean
States
Coptic, 47, 69, 73, 91, 103
Cossack, Russian, and changes in,
41, 219-220
Cous, similarity of Byzantine and
Ottoman, 10-12, 42, 209, 213
Cuba, 48, 57, 149, 151, 153, 197 n.
Cuba, the, 25-26
Cuban War, 90, 94
Cyprus, 60-61, 102, 123, 189, 206,
212; Church of, 69, 72, 76
Cyril Lazar, Patriarch of Constanti-
nople, 83

Dariusius, 47, 103-104, 137, 197 n.,
223
Dariusius Principatus, of, Russian
Patriarchate, the, 36, 131
Dariusius, frequency of among
Orthodox hierarchy, 30, 83, 91

- Dert-Beyis*, the, 36, 44
 Dervishes (*cf.* also Bektashi, Mevlevi Dervishes), 126-129, 194
 De Vogüé, Vicomte E. M., quoted, 77 *n.*
 Dionysios of Philippopolis, Patriarch of Constantinople, 86-87
 Diplomacy, European, influence of in Ottoman Empire, 24, 55
 Divorce in Islamic law, 196
 Doctors and Schools of Islam, the four, 109, 186-187, 220
 Dolma Baghché, Palace of, 179, 205
 Dönmés, 145
 Dress, ecclesiastical, restrictions on wearing, 194, 221-222
 Druses, 47

 Eastern Rumelia, 92, 140, 146-147
 Echmiadzin, Katholikos of, 98-99
 Education, 130, 225-226
 Eftim, Papa, 221, 228-230
 Egypt, Egyptians, 14, 36, 38, 43-44, 47-48, 50, 57, 81, 108, 112-115, 156, 159 *n.* 187, 210, 215-216
 Eliot, Sir Charles, author of *Turkey in Europe*, quoted, 4, 19, 58, 92, 128-129, 140, 200, 202
Enclaves, foreign, in Byzantine territory, 2-4
 England (and *cf.* Parliamentary Papers), 5, 21, 43, 141-142, 159-160, 169
 Enver Pasha, 143, 155-159
 Ephesus, Council of, 69, 73, 78
 Epirus, 100
 Erzerum, 170
 Espionage in Turkey under Abdul Hamid II, 138-139, 144
 Eugene IV, Pope, 75
 Eunuchs, Chiefs and corps of, 34, 42, 190
 Evidence, Christian, in Ottoman Courts, 51, 61-63, 67
 Exarch, Exarchists, Bulgarian, 89, 99
 Exchange of populations, 184, 212-213
 Eyyub, Mosque of, 173
 Eyyubid dynasty, 113

 Fatimites, 111-112, 117

 Felix V, Anti-Pope, 75, 114 *n.*
 Ferdinand of Bulgaria, 146-147
 Ferid Pasha, Grand Vizier Damad, 169-172
 Ferrara-Florence, Council of, 15, 75-76, 78
Fetvas, 38, 87, 152, 176, 178, 180, 190-191, 193
 Fez, the, imposition and abolition of, 43, 219-220
Filioque clause, the, 73
 Finlay, George, quoted, 86, 93
 Fortescue, Rev. A., quoted, 74
 Fourth Crusade, 74-75
 France, 5, 21, 30-31, 43, 57, 117, 152-153, 159, 172, 174, 184, 189
 Freemasonry, Ottoman, 145, 148, 152-153
 French Revolution, 26, 32, 154

 Galata, 3-4, 32, 130, 197 *n.*
 Gallipoli Peninsula, 172
 Gennadios II (George Scholarios), Patriarch of Constantinople, 15-18, 79, 86
 Genoese settlement in Constantinople, 2-4
 Georgia, Georgians, 47, 214; Church of, 77, 103
 Germany, Ottoman relations with, 136-137, 157-159, 168
Giaur Sultan, term of opprobrium applied to Mahmud II, 37, 41, 43
 Gibbon, Edward, 27, 78 *n.*
 Girding of the Sultans of Turkey, 173, 180
 Golden Horn, 3, 38
 Goldziher, I., quoted, 121-122
 Granada, Khalifs in, 111
 Grand National Assembly of Angora, 174, 176-179, 183-185, 194, 218, 224, 231
 Grand Vizier, Ottoman, office of, 22, 30, 39-40, 87-88, 135, 176, 197
 Great Britain, *cf.* England
 Greco-Turkish War, *cf.* Asia Minor
 Greece, 43, 85, 93, 147, 155, 214; Church of, 85 *n.*, 97
 Greek Independence, War of, 36, 82, 84, 96, 151 *n.*, 203 *n.*
 Greeks, 1, 3, 46, 58, 72-76, 80-97,

INDEX

130-132, 163, 167, 169-170, 173, 184
 Gregory V, Patriarch of Constantinople, 96
 Habashi, Hün, quoted, 27-28, 38
 Halilî Hilâlî Khann, quoted, 33, 163
 Hanser-Bergstall, Joseph, Baron von, quoted, 5, 27, 40-41, 183 n.
 Hasan and Hacı, sons of Ali (gsk), 108, 117-118
 Hakkimik dynasty, 121, 173
 Haksch, H. W., quoted, 27, 272 n.
 "Hot Law", the, 213-214
 Hıfız, the, 102, 221; *Yedıyay*, 103, 126
 Hittite, modern meaning of term, 31-32
 Hellenization of Slav and Arab Orthodox, 95-96
 Hender, Metropolitian of, 17, 70
 Hierachy, Ottoman official, 127-129, 197
 History, change in Turkish meaning of, 222, 223-226
 Hırmı, 43, 226
 Hogarth, D. G., quoted, 43, 133
 Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, 95-96
 Hüsrev Hilâlî Paşa, 143
 Husin, King of the Belgars, 173, 183
 Iermodant controversy, 73
 India, 136, 181, 187, 232
 İpek, Patriarchate of, 92
 Iran, cf. Persia
 Iraq, 3, 101, 117, 139 n., 214
 İrene, Church of S., 41
 İsaevan dynasty, 13, 73
 Isidors of Kiev, (Carlovi), 13
 İskan (and cf. Paç-İskan), 14, 21-22, 37, 102, 107-129, 134, 143-146, 160-161, 126-196, 226, 237; disestablishment of, in Turkey, 180, 193, 212-213, 233; *millat* of, 8-9
 İskano-Christians sects, 102
 İsmid, Metropolitian of, 94
 İsto-Turkish War, the, 44, 155-156
 Italy in Asia Minor, 171, 174, 184
 Ivan III, Great Prince of Muscovy, 24

Jacobites, 47, 62, 70, 91, 99-101
 Janissaries, 26-31, 33, 34, 37-38, 101
 Japan, 193, 203
 Jergis's Khan, 162
 Jovanides II, Patriarch of Constantinople, 77 n., 87
 Jovianus, 47, 112, 137, 137 n., 193; Patriarchate of, 47, 62-72, 76, 80-82, 91, 99, 103-106
 Jura, 47, 102, 143, 143, 153, 162, 183-186, 201
 Jüed, the, 139-140, 182
 Joseph Kallias, Patriarch of Constantinople, 16
 John VII Constantine, Byzantine Emperor, 101
 John VII Theodorus, Byzantine Emperor, 13, 75-76
 Joseph, Metropolitan of, 39
 Joseph, Patriarch of Constantinople, visits and dies in Italy, 73
 Kangyö; 163, 204
 Karman, Karaman, Karamanlık, 12, 216, 221-222
 Karamanoglu, dynasty of the, 16
 Kashgari, Mahmud, 203
 Khat al-Din, General, Turkish Minister and Ottoman Grand Vizier, 133
 Khatkhat, the, 14, 62, 107-108, 120-121, 122, 191; its assumption by the Ottoman Sultans, 14, 19, 114-119, 126, 133-137, 142, 152, 154, 177-183, 193, 202, 213, 233
 Khair-Husayin, the, of 1836, 44, 49-54, 59, 94, 98, 131; of 1912, 174, 193
 Khair-i-Sherif, the, of 1894, 41-42 of 1899 (cf. Gök-Khat), cf. Persia; the
 Khrothia, a designation of Ottoman Sultans, 214
 Khunlik İskikol, Treaty of, 27
 Kharal Paşa, 189
 Kinglake, A. W., 34-35, 212
 Kişpadi, Viceroy of, 22, 93
 Kiphas, Kiphasic beliefs, 203
 Korda (and cf. Koro, Sarmate off., 12, 47, 82, 128-129, 173, 217, 227-228

- Kossovo, Plain of, 154
 Küchük Qainarji, Treaty of, 24-26, 31, 40, 116
 Kurds, 8, 47, 136, 149, 154, 184, 210, 213, 217

 Larnaca, 60
 Latin Empire of Constantinople, 2-3, 74-75
 Lausanne, Conference and Treaty of, 175, 177, 184, 212, 228-229, 231
 Law, Islamic, 186-196
 Lazes, Lazistan, 8, 47, 102
 Libya, 155
 Liman von Sanders, General, 158
 Linobambakoi ("Linsey-woolseys"), 102
 London Conference, 174-175
 Luke, Sir H. (and *cf.* Bertram-Luke Commission), quoted, 81-82, 128
 Lyons, Lord, 65-67
 Lyons, Second Council of, 74-75

Mabein, the, 138 *n.*
 Macedonia, 90, 92, 100, 143, 145-146, 148, 154-155
 Mahdi, the, 118
 Mahmud II, Sultan, 31, 34-46, 49, 121, 131, 133, 137, 141, 173, 192, 220
 Malta, 56 *n.*, 177
 Mamluks, 14, 38, 112-114
 Manchus, Manchukuo, 42, 207
 Mar Shimun XXI, Nestorian Patriarch, 8
 Mecca and Medina, 47, 107-108, 119-121, 124, 136, 173, 183, 197 *n.*, 213
 Mehmed II (the Conqueror), Sultan, 1-2, 15-19, 23, 28, 39, 76-79, 91, 115, 190 *n.*
 Mehmed IV (the Hunter), Sultan, 23, 29
 Mehmed V Reshad, Sultan, 148, 154, 168, 178, 181
 Mehmed VI Vahid ed-Din, Sultan, 168-174, 176-178, 183, 193
 Meletios IV and II, Patriarch of Constantinople and Alexandria, 228-229
 Metternich, Prince, 40

 Mevlevi (Dancing) Dervishes, 128-129, 173
 Michael Cerularius, Patriarch of Constantinople, 74
 Michael VIII Palaeologus, Byzantine Emperor, 3, 74-75
 Midhat Pasha, 132, 138, 141-142, 144
 Military service, and exemption from, 49, 51-52, 64-65, 67, 150, 167, 214-215
 Miller, W., quoted, 56, 144
Millet system, the, 7-10, 16, 21, 48, 50-53, 56, 97-101, 130-131, 150, 184, 209, 233
 Mohammed Ali of Egypt, 36, 38, 44, 50
 Mohammed, the Prophet, 48, 107, 118, 122, 186, 222
 Moldavia, *cf.* Rumania
 Monastir, 64, 143
 Mongols, 14, 19, 110, 112, 163
 Monophysites, 69, 71, 99
 Montenegro, Montenegrins, 84 *n.*, 145, 155
 Morocco, 119
 Moslems outside Turkey, Ottoman protection of, 2-22, 116-117, 136-138, 154
 Mosul, 8
 Mudania, agreement signed at, 175
 Mudros, 151, 160, 168
 Mufti, office of (and *cf.* *Fetvas*), 190-191, 193
 Murad I, Sultan, 101
 Murad II, Sultan, 78
 Murad III, Sultan, 116
 Murad IV, Sultan, 32-33
 Murad V, Sultan, 132, 168 *n.*
 Mustafa IV, Sultan, 33-35
 Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Kemal Atatürk), 43, 170-172, 174-176, 184-185, 193-194, 204-205, 211, 231-232
 Mutawakkil, Abbasid Khalif, 114-115, 119

 Narbonne, 2
 Nasr ed-Din, the Khoja, 204
 Nationalist Turks (and *cf.* Angora, Government of), 2, 6, 10, 19, 149, 158, 162, 170-185, 193, 211-212

- 45; of Young Turks, 132-133, 148-155, 188, 204
 Relics of the Prophet, the, 118-119, 179
 Religion, classification according to, in Ottoman Empire, 7, 100-101; freedom to profess, 51, 218
 Republic, proclamation of Turkish, 182, 185, 193
 Reshad, Sultan, *cf.* Mehmed V.
 Revolution, the Young Turk, of 1908-9, 138 *n.*, 141, 143-148, 153, 193, 204
 Roe, Sir Thomas, 23
 Romaic (colloquial Modern Greek), 2, 83, 90, 198, 203
 Roman Catholics (Latins), foreign protection of in Ottoman Empire, 6, 21, 57, 117, 151-152
 Románov, House of, 24-25
 Rome and Constantinople, breach between, 71-75
 Rûm ("Roman"), meaning and use of term in Ottoman Empire, 7-8, 16, 80-85, 103-104; *millet* of, 48, 80-83, 85, 99; Sultanate of, 12, 83, 128
 Rumania, Rumanians, 25, 43, 46, 58, 81, 84-85, 93-96, 132, 134, 167, 210
 Ruschuk, 34, 132
 Russia, 21, 24-26, 31, 36-37, 57-58, 97, 116, 132-133, 138, 159-161, 207, 232; Church of, 76-77, 87
 Russo-Turkish Wars, 29-30, 36, 43, 50, 57, 133

 Sabaeans, 47
 Sakaria, Battle of the, 175, 185 *n.*
 Salonika, 143, 145, 153-154, 197 *n.*
 Samaritans, 47
 Samsun, 144, 231
 San Remo Conference, 174
 San Stefano, Treaty of, 133
 Scutari (in Asia), 47, 181
 Scutari (in Europe), 47
Selamlık, ceremony of the, 177, 179, 181-182
 Selim I (the Grim), Sultan, 23, 30, 114-115
 Selim III, Sultan, 26, 31-34, 38, 46, 222

 Seljuq Turks (*cf.* also under Rûm), 12, 83, 128
 Senussi, the, 156, 173
 Seraglio, the Old, 32, 34, 38, 40-42, 137, 179, 212
 Serbia, Serbs, 43, 46, 58, 81, 84, 93, 95, 99-100, 132, 134, 145, 155, 167, 210
 Sèvres, Treaty of, 174, 184
 Sheikh ul-Islam, the, 38-39, 87, 152, 176-177, 190-191, 193-194, 197
 Sheri Courts and Law, 62-63, 152, 190-196, 200 *n.*
 Shiah division of Islam, 108-112, 117-118, 122
 "Sick Man of Europe, the", 23, 57 *n.*, 132, 135, 146
 Sivas, 12
 Slav and Hellene, antagonism between, 48, 65, 84, 91-96
 Smyrna, 36, 47, 160, 169, 175-176, 185, 193, 197 *n.*, 216
 Sophia, S., Church of, 15, 26, 219, 222
 Spain, Islam in, 111, 119
 Stavriotai, 102
 Stratford de Redcliffe, Lord (Stratford Canning), 39-40, 53-55
 Sufis, 120, 127
 Suleiman I, the Magnificent (Qanuni), Sultan, 22-23, 115, 191-193, 230
Sumna, the, Sunnis, 14, 37, 108-112, 117-122, 135, 180
 Supreme Council, Allied, 169
 Swiss Civil Code, basis of Turkish Code, 195
 Syria, 107-110, 125, 141, 159 *n.*, 187

 Tahsin Pasha, 138 *n.*
 Tanzimat, the, 44, 49-50, 52, 54, 59, 130, 138, 145, 222
 Tatars, 8, 25-26, 116, 157, 207, 214
 Taxation, Tax-farming, 49-51, 61
 Thrace, 61, 176, 184, 216
 Timur the Lame (Timur-lenk), 163
 Titles of the Ottoman Sultans, 116, 213-214
 Transjordan, 159 *n.*, 183, 187
 Trebizond, 47, 86, 102, 197 *n.*; Empire of, 86
 Tripoli (in Barbary), 155-156, 214

INDEX

Hapoli (to Syria), 144
 Herak, Turkish, 182, 183, 204
 Homenation, 149, 154, 156-158, 160-167, 194, 203-205
 Turkmen, 166, 203, 204
 Turkish language, 9, 198, 166, 191, 198-203, 209
 Turkey, the (and cf. Ottomans), 1-2, 46, 58-67, 73, 112, 142, 144, 162-167, 169, 184, 187, 207-208; characteristics of, 3, 7, 9-12, 20-23, 36, 39, 101-102, 105-116, 122-126, 188, 196, 200-211, 232
 Uzun, the, 37-38, 41, 109, 123, 126-127, 172, 179, 188-194
 White Churches, 76, 78, 92, 221
 Union and Progress, Committee of, cf. under Committee
 Union of the Eastern and Western Churches, 15, 74-76, 78
 Valid ed-Din, Sultan, cf. Mehmed VI
 Venian, work of, translated into Turkish, 32
 Verine, Versions, 2-3, 5, 202, 207
 Vezirlik, Embassies, 133
 Vidin, 36
 Vienna, sieges of, 22
 Vlach, 92, 145

Vahidiz, 96-97, 119-121
 Vahidiz, cf. Rumelia
 War of 1914-1918, 21, 44, 124, 137-163, 168, 181
 Waugh, Sir A. T., quoted, 206, 231
 Wiggin, Grace W. A., quoted, 90
 William III, German Emperor, 137, 137
 Women, Turkish, characteristics and status of, 21, 33, 154, 222-223
 Xenophon, 128
 Yemina, 62-63; All Basha of, 36
 Yez Hissen, Lord of, 101
 Yezidgil III, King of Raska, 107
 Yemina, the, 117, 207
 Yerd Hutan, cf. Homenation
 Yezlik, 47
 Yildiz Kiosk, 138, 141, 143, 152, 171-179
 Young, George, quoted, 98 n.
 Young Turks, 6, 9-10, 130-132, 143-167, 203, 206, 223
 Yuzma, meaning of term, 83
 Yusuf Izz ed-Din, Khalid Mansur, 173
 Zahir, Khalif, 112
 Zinabiz, 203
 Zia (Sopli), Byzantine Process, 24

11114 PND



ALLAN TOWN LIBRARY



18673

Printed in Great Britain by R. & R. CLARK, Limited, Edinburgh

BY SIR HARRY LUKE

AN EASTERN CHEQUERBOARD

With 50 Illustrations. 8vo. 12s. 6d. net

The Times.—"It is interesting to read again descriptions of the past in which the contemporary flavour is still fresh. . . . Sometimes Sir Harry Luke writes as an inquiring, observant and well-informed traveller, sometimes as an administrator drawing upon the varied stores of his official experience."

The Morning Post.—"An amazing selection of diverse places and diverse types which the author brings out of his treasure of rich remembrances, whether as scholar, traveller or administrator."

The Church Times.—"A book finely written, packed with strange experiences and full of human interest."

Near East and India.—"There is much of history in these essays, much of lovely description of natural scenery and old buildings, much pathos and a good deal of fun and many interesting peeps into religious beliefs and antagonisms. . . . Unusually interesting photographs are included in the book."

MORE MOVES ON AN EASTERN CHEQUERBOARD

With 50 Illustrations. 8vo. 12s. 6d. net

SIR RONALD STORRS IN *The Sunday Times*.—"These 'More Moves', like their original 'Eastern Chequerboard', the memories of a man who has made his mark and left his mark everywhere he has served, will be found not unworthy to stand beside such classics as 'Turkey in Europe' and 'Eothen'."

The Times Literary Supplement.—"Sir Harry Luke is to be congratulated on having, in the second series of excerpts from his treasure of rich memories, fully maintained the interest, the diversity and the fantasy of his first 'Moves on an Eastern Chequerboard'."

The Manchester Guardian.—"Sir Harry Luke regales us with a literary feast, comparable only with some of the culinary ones to which in various parts of the Near and Middle East he was invited and at which he appears not to have let England down."

LONDON: LOVAT DICKSON, LTD.

